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Abstract
This dissertation examines the emergence of political pluralism in the unlikely case of 
Kyrgyzstan. The main question is: How can we explain ‘pockets of competition in semi­
authoritarian states? The literature has focused on identity politics and more specifically 
on the ‘clan politics’ hypothesis, which states that competition is organized along the lines 
of kinship groups (‘clans’) and that competition is therefore fractionalized, especially in 
rural areas.
Kyrgyzstan is shown to be a critical case for the ‘clan politics’ literature. The unit of 
analysis is two-fold: Single-Member Districts (SMD) and individual candidates in 
parliamentary elections 1995-2005. Evidence is provided through a candidate survey 
(«=160), expert interviews, and local level statistics. The whole idea that there actually 
exists such an informal institution as ‘clan politics’ in Kyrgyzstan is questioned. At least 
‘clans’ do not exist as corporate groups that actual possess agency characteristics. A ‘clan’ 
in the Kyrgyz sense of the word, uruu/uruk, is shown to be something that necessarily 
involves kinship, therefore refuting a widely used metaphorical conceptualization of the 
phenomenon. The reason for the politization of these genealogical categories in some rural 
districts can be found in the incentive structure of the electoral system (SMD), the causal 
story being: contests were localized and no viable national-level parties existed, therefore 
some political entrepreneurs turned to imagined ‘clans’ instead to rally support. This 
created the impression that there were corporate ‘clan’ groups that coordinated electoral 
behavior in rural Kyrgyzstan.
Competitiveness has been reduced over time, with the 1995 elections being the most 
fragmented in terms of Effective Number o f Candidates. Until the December 2007 PR 
elections no new party system emerged. In 2005, the elections were especially competitive 
in the south, where the already mobilized campaigners later formed the backbone of the 
ensuing ‘Tulip revolution’ protests. It is shown that the introduction of election 
mechanisms empowered local elites to challenge the authorities. Campaign experience and 
financial resources were also important factors in many competitive races.
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Note on Transliteration and Names
In this dissertation I have used The United States Board on Geographic Names and by the 
Permanent Committee on Geographical Names for British Official Use (BGN/PCGN) 
system. The BGN/PCGN system is relatively intuitive for anglophones to read and 
pronounce. I use a simplified form of the system to render English versions of Russian 
names, typically converting e to yo, simplifying -iy and -yy endings to -y, and omitting 
apostrophes for t  and t. However, for some frequently occurring words I decided to keep 
the apostrophe, like in oblast'.
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Chapter 1: ELECTORAL POLITICS IN NEWLY 
INDEPENDENT STATES -  A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
This research project seeks to explain the emergence o f competitive rural election districts 
in the unlikely case of Kyrgyzstan. The ambition is to make a contribution to the theoretical 
understanding o f informal institutions and especially kinship based ‘clans’. The 
fundamental question that I want to answer is whether ‘clans’ dominate electoral politics, 
and if so, by what mechanisms. The focus is on the interaction of informal and formal 
institutions in a newly independent and democratizing country. If ‘clans’ were a strong 
informal institution then electoral politics could be affected in two ways: 1) ‘clans’ 
coordinate among themselves and agree to nominate a consensus ‘clan’ candidate, thereby 
reducing competitiveness in the election district (Single-Member District, hereafter SMD); 
or 2) each ‘clan’ have their own candidates and voters loyally vote for someone from their 
own ‘clan’ resulting in high levels o f vote dispersion (here understood as competitiveness).
Map 1: Central Eurasia
UKRAINE
y
K A Z A K H S T A N
Cmfiian a . 
i S m  %
C H I N A
* Source: University o f Texas, Perry-Castaneda Library Map Collection, Caucasus and Central Asia 
(Political) 2000.
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Some scholars would argue that politics in Central Asia is dominated by ‘clan’-based 
groups that compete for power and advantage (R Abazov, Elebayeva, & Omuraliev, 2000; 
Collins, 2002, 2006; Schatz, 2004). The ‘clan’ logic allegedly explains the weakness of the 
party system, with grave consequences for democratic representation, contestation, and 
accountability. The purpose of this research project is to examine the electoral dynamics 
and candidate typologies in a selected set of Single-Member Districts in the 1995, 2000, 
and 2005 parliamentary elections in Kyrgyzstan. I am here interested in how many 
candidates were nominated, and what personal profile they had, and, if possible, what 
‘clan’ affiliation. Furthermore I am interested in the political platform and the campaigning 
activities of the candidates and political parties. An interesting question is how the 
introduction of formal institutions like elections has affected the ‘clan logic’, if there ever 
was such a thing. Has the introduction of more competitive elections restructured power 
relations within and between kinship groups in any way? Even though few ‘clans’ have 
allegedly formed parties, most candidates use their informal networks to mobilize support 
in times of elections. How about the relationship between the voter and their 
representatives? Have electoral mechanisms empowered the citizens to hold politicians 
accountable, or are they simply voting out of primordial loyalties?
Understanding politics and the driving forces behind it requires that we take informal 
institutions seriously. Third wave democratization scholars have long pointed out the need 
to move beyond an exclusive focus on ‘parchment’ institutions. This study finds that 
‘clans’ are only a symbolic glued-on reality, a discourse that both political entrepreneurs 
and observers pay tribute to in times of elections, but that they do not exist as groups 
possessing agency characteristics.
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State-Building, Democratization, and Elections
A great majority of the third wave democratizing states can be characterized as weak states. 
This is especially so for those coming from a post-colonial setting, where in most cases 
there was no previous experience of independent statehood. This creates special problems 
in terms of institutionalizing certain features of democracy, like party systems and 
parliaments. As a lead in to the subject of this dissertation I give a short overview of State- 
building, Democratization, and Elections. All relevant dimensions for the understanding of 
political developments in Kyrgyzstan, Central Asia, and beyond.
Building a State
Having received independent statehood without a national liberation struggle puts 
Kyrgyzstan and the other Central Asian states in a peculiar position in terms of global 
comparative politics. There are also many other features that characterize the post-Soviet 
experience of transition to sovereignty. As already Huntington noted in his seminal 1968 
work, modernizing states are under intense pressure from different groups within a 
particular country and stability is often achieved only after protracted fighting among 
different social forces (Huntington, 1968). A state can be defined according to Weber as an 
organization that has the ‘monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force within a given 
territory’ (Weber, 1965). The challenge for many newly independent states is how to build 
a modem state, as contrasted with Weber’s ‘traditional’ institutions of mle (patrimonial 
authority), while at the same time maintain stability. A common pattern in many third wave 
states is the phase of state building that they are in, often characterized by weak and 
inefficient institutions, more often than not inherited from the former colonial powers.
For our purposes here it is important to note the centrifugal and centripetal tendencies that 
all new states have to deal with. As we shall see this is of particular importance in 
analyzing post-Soviet trajectories. The focus in this dissertation is on local dynamics, but 
all along I relate this to larger national level struggles for power and influence. The 
centripetal tendencies has been noted by many scholars:
While the new nations must wrestle with problems of political coordination 
which arise out of a plurality of citizen identifications, modernization may not 
minimize the number of such identifications. It may generate other 
identifications, equally localistic. Thus the heterogeneity of interests spawed by 
urbanization, industrialization and socioeconomic differentiation are the product 
of ongoing structural tensions (Kesselman & Rosenthal, 1974, p. 6).
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The centralizing state attempts to integrate smaller units into the control of the state, but are 
often facing resilience and resistance by ‘chiefs, landlords, bosses, rich peasants, ‘clan’ 
leaders, za ’im, effendis, aghas, caciques, kulaks (for convenience, ‘strongmen’), through 
their various social organizations’ (Joel S. Migdal, 1988, p. 33).
Religious commitment, tribal loyalty, identification with a linguistic group or 
with a distinct piece of territory all attempts to maintain or expand small units or 
social integration -  are seen as impeding citizens’ ability to participate fully in 
the construction of the modem nation. They are, the literature would have it, 
barriers to societal penetration by the modem state (Kesselman & Rosenthal,
1974, p. 6).
There are also other problems in terms of state building that are especially relevant for 
developing countries. Since so much of the emergence of the modem state is related to the 
industrial revolution it can be difficult to apply the concept to non-industrialized settings. 
The long drawn-out process of state consolidation in Western Europe has not been afforded 
to the developing countries of today (Tilly, 1990). The demand for a State in the Western 
world was internal, while in the developing world a certain model was externally imposed 
on them. The legacy of colonial mle has often been to support local power brokers, since 
the colonial administration lacked institutionalized capacities to govern. This led to a 
reliance more patron-client relations (Leftwich, 2005, p. 148).1 But the critique does not 
stop here; some say that we need to rethink the traditional dichotomy between state and 
non-state society (Sneath 2007). Previously a state has been defined by centralized 
sovereign political structure within a specific territory. The non-state was somewhat 
idealistically described as egalitarian and nomadic, while the modem state was stratified 
and territorialized (Sneath 2007).
Procedural Democracy
To what extent citizens can control their representatives is the crucial question and needless 
to say it is imperfect in all democracies. Citizens being empowered to exercise control over 
their representatives is especially problematic in information scarce less educated segments 
and/or regions of a particular country. In this dissertation I focus on the procedural 
dimension of democracy, not the substance, inspired by Schumpeter (Schumpeter, 1976).
1 Note, that I am here not claiming that the Soviet Union was a colonial empire. This topic is associated with a 
long-standing debate. Without entering in these debates, I do consider that post-colonial studies help to 
illuminate how post-Soviet states manage the legacy of their Russian colonial and Soviet communist past.
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Political regimes are in essence about ‘the rules of the game’ and not the content. The 
outcome, in terms of policies, is not the interesting part here, but rather the involvement in 
the process of the citizenry. I focus on rule by the people, not for  the people, as the saying 
goes. However, also in terms of a procedural definition I could opt for a comprehensive 
definition following Dahl 'polyarchy as responsive regimes in the imperfect real world' 
(Robert Alan Dahl, 1971). Or I could go for a more restricted minimal definition focusing 
only on the competitive element, i.e. elections. Here I have chosen the latter. For our 
purposes the key feature of democracy is not popular sovereignity, legitimacy or some 
abstract concept of human equality. The key is the elite rotation mechanism that it provides 
and the responsiveness to the wishes of the citizenry that comes with it.
The focus here is on ‘selection of leaders’. Politicians are less than noble, just like all the 
rest of us, and therefore they do not necessarily have any regard for the ‘will of the people’. 
The only way to keep them in line is by allowing for them to be challenged in free and fair 
elections. Electoral competition works as a straitjacket for rational self-interest maximizing 
politicians. This is arguably an elitist system, but nevertheless a competitive system. One 
of the challenges in studying third wave democracies (or democratizing states) is that the 
conceptual apparatus has been develop for the study of well-established Western states. In 
non-industrial societies where cleavage structures are very different and where other basic 
features of Western countries are lacking it should hardly be surprising that the outcomes in 
terms of democracy is quite different. This is not to say that other countries will eventually 
converge into the Western pattern of democratization, but in the meantime I need to further 
elaborate the theories, methodologies, and terminologies that I utilize in studying 
democracy and electoral politics.
Elites in Democracies
How do elites take part in the politics of different regimes? How do elites relate to the 
masses, how do they control political mobilization and representation? Since the days of 
Mosca, Pareto, and Michels there has been a focus on elites. Elites can be defined as the 
most powerful segment of any institutionalized sector of society (politics, business,
2 For more on competitive oligarchy see Schumpeter 1976 or Dahl, 1971.
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military, religion etc.). The formation of elites and their consolidation is of crucial 
importance to political regimes. There are basically two models here: enforced 
consolidation (imposed by centralized organizations, like Ak Jol and the presidential 
apparatus in Kyrgyzstan, as we shall see) and voluntary consolidation (Higley, 1995, p. 
427). For a democracy to take root there is a need for voluntary elite consolidation, i.e. that 
the central actors agree to the ‘rules of the game’. The key issue for us is related to elite 
recruitment and representation, undeniably crucial if we are interested in democracy. The 
whole idea behind democracy is that the social profiles of elites becomes more 
representative of the larger society (Higley, 1995, p. 429). Elites need the support of the 
masses and they get it through legitimizing myths and ideologies.
Democracy in the developing world
National unity must precede all the other phases of democratization (Rustow,
1970, p. 351)
The problem in many developing countries is the inadequacies of the citizenry in terms of 
not being fully equipped to deliberatively participate in the democratic process. This has of 
course to do with general socioeconomic standards, but there is also a cultural variable at 
play here. The dilemma seems to be that the voters do not have the proper capacities, or 
incentives to elaborate on what the ‘public interest’ could be. The politicians (and parties) 
on the other hand do not have any incentives to engage in more programmatic 
campaigning. Furthermore, democracy is by nature conflict generating and in weakly 
institutionalized polities there are ongoing struggles about ‘the rules of the game’. This is 
explained by the legacy of predatory state behavior and the fact that democracy in these 
contexts are zero-sum games, which in turn is both a colonial legacy issue, but also related 
to the absolute levels of socio-economic development. Also, in economies of shortage 
people cannot wait for four years (mandate period) to get a seat at the pot again. Opening 
up a closed authoritarian system to contestation naturally brings out all sorts of demands. 
These pressures can originate from previously unprivileged sub-national groups (or strata) 
that at last see an avenue for claiming a bigger role through either economic distribution or 
even self-determination. It might also threaten otherwise comfortable minorities with the 
‘tyranny of the majority’ and lead them to take precautionary measures.
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In the case of the Central Asian former Soviet republics it seems far-fetched to expect 
electoral accountability based on policy platforms and track records. The most we can hope 
for is the competitive pressures to be aimed at the ruling elite would make them more 
responsive to the needs of the citizens. Since electoral clientelism has been and continues to 
be a key feature of any political campaign in these countries, the only option for 
oppositional groupings is to use the same techniques in challenging the incumbents. In the 
wake of the Soviet collapse the central governments of these newly independent states were 
unable to effectively control the regions. With time this capacity has increased and might 
therefore explain the general decline of democratic politics in the non-Baltic former Soviet 
republics (Way, 2003, p. 480). In between there was a period of competitive democratic 
politics, like in Moldova, Belarus or Kyrgyzstan.
Elections and political parties
There are some special challenges in terms of electoral politics in states that moved from a 
closed hegemonic regime to open competition over night. This is especially so in the 
former Soviet republics that did not have any alternative organizational basis to replace the 
discredited and in most cases dismantled Communist Party. No alternative movements, 
ideologies, or programs were developed at the time of the break-up. In most cases electoral 
competition was unstructured and organized along lines of local strongmen and their 
different resource bases. The historical trajectory of establishing interest groups based on 
modem class structures to replace more ‘parochial’ social units was clearly not a possible 
route in these countries. In addition there are some particular challenges in the post- 
Communist world with the Soviet era majoritarian electoral system.
The study of political parties has long been at the center of political science inquires. Lately 
there has been an upsurge in studies on the workings of contemporary parties both in the 
old democracies and in new emerging competitive regimes around the globe (Gunther & 
Linz, 2002). When applied to ‘Third Wave’ regimes some of the old concepts and theories 
have been shown incomplete and especially so in studying electoral politics and party 
formation in former Communist countries. There is an inherent problem of ethnocentrism 
in party studies, since parties first emerged in the West. Parties are however seen as 
absolutely critical to any democratic regime (Seymour Martin Lipset, 2000). The traditional 
role of political parties include: recmiting candidates; mobilize electoral support;
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structuring of policy agendas; formation of government. A key element has been the idea of 
parties functioning as vehicles for interest articulation and aggregation, but also political 
socialization, recruitment and communication. Nowadays and especially in the former 
Soviet states these functions are not always played by the existing parties.
There are mainly two theoretical and methodological traditions in the study of parties; 1) 
structural-functionalism; and 2) rational-choice. These are both deductive enterprises. 
There is also a need for a certain amount of induction in party studies, especially outside 
the established old liberal democracies. The classical point of reference in describing the 
development of party systems in the West is the Lipset-Rokkan cleavage model of party 
system development (S. M. Lipset, 2001; S. M. Lipset & Rokkan, 1967). It states that there 
are four sources of cleavage that explain the different trajectories in old democracies 
(Europe, North America and Australasia): capitalists-workers, which is the most salient 
one, center-periphery, church-state, land-industry. This model derives the party system 
from structural conditions that have been produced by National and Industrial revolutions 
(to use the Lipset-Rokkan’s terminology). For parties to be stable and strong they are 
required to be ‘linked to deep-rooted sources of cleavage’ (S. M. Lipset, 2001, p. 5). The 
Lipset-Rokkan model is fundamentally based on the premises of modernization theory and 
trajectories of economic development, therefore making it difficult to apply to a non- 
teleological framework of today’s developing countries. By emphasizing social cleavages 
Lipset makes it difficult to transfer the model to the late ‘Third Wave’ cases where neither a 
National nor an Industrial revolution has taken place yet. Hardly surprising then that 
competitive politics in these new cases, in the developing world if you like (including the 
Southern tier of the former Soviet Union), organize party loyalties around ethno-linguistic 
lines (primordial identities), not class lines. After all these are the most salient cleavages in 
most post-colonial settings in Africa, Middle East, and Central Asia.
Clearly a model in which class and religion are the most important features does not fit this 
new global context of multi-national, pre-industrial post-colonial weak states with no prior 
experience of statehood. In many cases parties are not even allowed to organize around 
religious principles (or identities). Does this mean that such countries are doomed to weak 
parties? The sequence in terms of party development in the 19th century was first through a 
strengthening of the legislature (pre-enfranchisement) and the establishment of
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parliamentary fractions. This meant that when the suffrage was expanded the organizational 
structures of ‘parties’ were already in place (Duverger, 1959; Sartori, 1978). Contrary to 
cases like Denmark, where large expansions of the franchise preceded the emergence of 
legislative parties (Katz & Crotty, 2006, p. 17). When parties were forming in Europe in 
late 19th century there was no mass suffrage, there was a period of ‘early competition’ (S. 
M. Lipset & Rokkan, 1967). This meant that the mobilization of electoral support was more 
orderly and manageable. Barriers (thresholds) to participation were still high and this 
solidified and unified organizations. The mobilization market was therefore structured to 
support the emergence of strong and durable organizations.3
Also the well-established stateness character and professional bureaucracy of the Lipset- 
Rokkan countries does not allow for clientelism to be accounted for as a crucial variable in 
party system institutionalization (Randall, 2001, p. 248). Parties in the third world were 
more reliant on the state and were also more successful in cementing their supremacy in 
politics, often leading to near one-party states. Since competition was sporadic (not 
persistent competitive politics) the cleavage that followed was more about pro- and anti 
government, not about any social cleavages. The question remains whether introducing 
democratic procedures, or at least allowing for contestation, lead to an empowerment of the 
voter, i.e. citizen. At least during the actual election it seems that the voter is empowered, 
receiving money if vote buying is prevalent etc.4 On the other hand it seems that voting 
behavior is pretty straightforward in many settings, in that in-group loyalties prevail, even 
if there is no way for the patron to control the clients (citizens) (Walle, 2007).
3 This is the ‘early mover’ argument also called the ‘freezing mechanism’ (Randall, 2001).
4 C.f Baregas study of Africa in the excellent anthology on clientelism (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007).
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Informal Institutions
Urbanization, Westernization, and increased state intervention and control has 
changed the kinship system into a patron-client model (Lindholm 1986:348 
referring to Gellner).
Nominally modem institutions such as bureaucracies and political parties in 
Southeast Asia are often thoroughly penetrated by informal patron-client 
networks that undermined the formal structure of authority (Scott 1972:92).
In the literature on the ‘third wave’ democratizing states the importance of informal
institutions has been stressed (O’Donnell 1996; Lauth 2000, 2004). Unfortunately there
seems to be a need for some conceptual clarifications in this discourse (Helmke & Levitsky
2004: 726). There is an understanding for the need to take the informal level of
particularistic ties seriously in the study of newly independent states (O’Donnell 1996). To
simplify one can say that there are two different kinds of networks: those that are based on
strong and self-conscious group identities and those who are based on short-term
instrumental exchange (Way 2003:477). The challenge is to operationalize different forms
of informal institution and organizations, like ‘clans’ and clientelism, along this axis.
Earlier research on the Soviet and post-Soviet countries has convincingly made the case
that patron-client networks played a role in leadership selection, but it has been difficult to
demonstrate the importance of such connections outside of personnel policy (Way
2003:478; Willerton 1992:116-117). The ambition in this project is to take this a step
further, even though the focus would still be on leadership selection (parliamentary
candidate selection).
So how does one conduct research on these phenomena? Some scholars argue that informal 
networks are virtually immune from detailed investigation (Hughes 1997:1021). The focus 
in this dissertation is on institutions and individuals within these institutions, therefore we 
need to look both at the micro- (individual) and the macro (institution) level. First I will 
outline what institutions are, both formal and informal. After this is completed I take a 
closer look at particular kinds of informal institutions.
Institutions
In everyday language we sometimes use the concept of ‘institution’ to denote organizations 
and other corporate actors, like business firms, schools, and public administrations. By 
corporate I here refer to organizations that coordinate action and have an existence beyond 
the lives of particular members. In the social sciences the concept has a more specific
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meaning in that it refers to rules and other constraints of human behavior. There are many 
different kinds of rules, both personal (habits and routines) and social. The latter are 
basically used to overcome social dilemmas. It is generally acknowledged that we can 
divide institutions into formal and informal. There are some definitional problems and also 
specific issues as to the effects of particular institutions. Part of the problem is the 
difference between academic disciplines in terms of methodological traditions and objects 
of study. The economic tradition generally views institutions as designed by humans and 
where individuals behave instrumentally in order to achieve ends. The sociological tradition 
on the other hand sees institutions as emerging from human activity, but not consciously 
designed.
This is of particular interest for the democratization literature. O’Donnell’s defines an 
institution as ‘a regularized pattern of interaction that is known, practiced, and accepted (if 
not regularly approved) by actors who expect to continue interacting under the rules 
sanctioned and backed by that pattern’ (O'Donnell, 1996, p. 35). Formal institutions are 
formally codified (like constitutions and laws), while informal institutions are not. The state 
acts as a guarantor for formal institutions (legitimizing and sanctioning), while informal 
institutions are based exclusively on the fact of their existence and of their effectiveness. 
Different kinds of institutions have different ways of sanctioning behavior. An institution is 
not necessarily an organization. According to North it is useful to separate the political 
actors (organizations) from the rules that they form (North, 1990). As we shall see, this is 
especially important for the discussion about ‘clan politics’. The literature has often 
portrayed ‘clans’ as organizations, corporate entities that actually possess agency.
Formal institutions rely on an external authority’s monitoring and policing of individual 
behavior, informal institutions do not. The law can be considered the most elaborate 
expression of a formal institution. Formal institutions are laid down in writing. Many 
formal institutions are, however, embedded in informal norms. Other examples of formal 
institutions are: economic institutions (e.g. regulating property rights), political, cultural, 
religious etc. The defining feature of an informal institution is the un-codified nature of 
them. Legitimacy is derived from social acceptance. Examples of informal institutions are 
social norms for self-help among residents in rural communities or conventions (Ellickson, 
1991). Informal institutions are based on auto-licensing (a kind of self-enactment and self­
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assertion) and they develop indigenously over long periods of time. It is important to note 
that informal institutions are more than only ‘regularities’ of behavior, like habits or 
conventions. According to Lauth we need to find the existence of informal institutions in 
the beliefs and attitudes of individuals, otherwise they do not exist (Lauth, 2004, p. 8). With 
this definition we come very close to another interrelated concept, that of culture. Culture 
does indeed shape informal institutions, but it is a much broader concept. A distinction can 
be made between shared values, i.e. culture, and shared expectations, that is informal 
institutions (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004, p. 728).
There are many kinds of non-institutional, informal phenomena, but I am here trying to find 
a definition of informal institution that is precise and analytically meaningful. Such a 
definition could be ‘socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, 
communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels’ (Helmke & 
Levitsky, 2004, p. 727). Furthermore, I need to state what informal institutions are not. 
Sometimes informal institutions are understood to be the same as weak institutions, i.e. the 
lack of effective formal institutions. This is not the case since the dysfunction could be 
explained by the lack of stable or binding rules -  formal or informal. For instance abuses of 
executive power is a practice that departs from formal rules, but it does not need to be an 
informal institution because of that (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004, p. 727). Informal 
institutions should also be distinguished from other informal behavioral regularities. The 
key thing here is whether there exists a rule or a guideline that in the case of violation 
triggers some kind of external sanction. Or to use an example of Helmke & Levitsky, 
removing one’s hat in church is an informal institution, whereas removing one’s coat in a 
restaurant is simply a behavioral regularity. The difference is that there exists a rule, even 
though it is informal, that one should remove the hat upon entering church. There is no rule 
or no sanctions generated if one leaves the coat on in a restaurant (Helmke & Levitsky, 
2004, p. 727).
Furthermore, there is an important distinction to be made between informal institutions and 
informal politics, like coalition agreements, corporatist meetings, or private sauna talks 
(Lauth 2004:8). So what then is the relationship between democracy and informal 
institutions, or more broadly between institutions and efficiency? Are all institutions 
efficient? According to O’Donnell informal institutions do collide with democratic
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principles (O'Donnell, 1996). In order to specify the consequences for democracy we need 
to differentiate between various kinds of informal institutions. Lauth divides them into five 
categories: clientelism, corruption, the threat of putsch (the use of force), civil 
disobedience, and custom law. Some people see informal institutions as functional and 
problem solving, other see them as dysfunctional and problem creating.
Particularism: Patron-client relationships and Clientelism
One of the most prominent informal institutions in the literature is Patron-client 
relationships, or sometimes even called Clientelism, or simply Patronage. These practices 
belong to the general category of particularism that can be defined as non-universalistic 
relationships that involves preferential treatment of some sort. The institution of 
particularism is considered to be at odds with democracy in that it undermines the workings 
of formal institutions. The focus here is on the practice not on the actors (like ‘clan’). There 
are many intertwined concepts here: clientelism, patronage, nepotism, favoritism etc. Here I 
try to clarify some of these conceptual issues. It is important to note that all countries 
exhibit different combinations of universalism and particularism. There is a grey scale at 
play here. It is, however, as O’Donnell has noted justified to differentiate between cases 
that approximates either pole, universalism or particularism (O'Donnell, 1996, p. 43).
The definition of Patron-client relations is that it involves an open-ended transaction based 
on differential control by individuals or groups over the access and flow of resources. Both 
parts benefit from the arrangement, but it is an asymmetric relationship. In modem societies 
the clients are supposed to have access to power and the ability to convert resources 
autonomously, but if the patron controls scarce resources, like land, water, employment, or 
schooling, then the access is circumscribed. Clientelism is an informal institution (i.e. a 
practice) not an identity or an organization. The literature on clientelism is not always 
conceptually clear on this. It is basically an economic phenomenon (transaction), not an 
identity bearer in itself (like ethnicity, caste, tribe, or ‘clan’). Clientelism can be defined as 
the informal exchange of goods and services through asymmetric, dyadic ties. There is no 
element of ascription or affection here, rather it is solely based on need. It is with Scott’s 
words based on a non-primordial cleavage. According to another prominent scholar on 
patron-client relationships, Chubb, we can define clientelism as a ‘strategic response by 
individuals to state or market inadequacies’ (Chubb, 1982). Clientelism and the Russian
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phenomena Blat are based on ‘weak ties’, while kinship and ‘clan’ are based on ‘strong 
ties’. Blat is, however, unlike clientelism an immediate or short-term practice (Collins 
2006:39; Ledenevna 1998, Way 2002). Another related concept is rapacious individualism, 
which denotes politics dominated by non-ideological, unstructured, and highly 
individualized competition for power and rents. In this kind of situation there is a lack of 
‘institutionalized ties of trust -  in the form of a party or strong informal network -  that can 
structure politics and create the basis for stable coalitions’ (Way, 2003, p. 475). ‘Clans’ and 
other identity organizations are more enduring because they are not based exclusively on 
political or economic interactions, but they contain an identity element as well.
The conclude, it was long assumed that modernizing state policies would shift ‘loyalties 
from family, village, and tribe to nation’ and ‘clan networks’ would disappear with the 
emergence of modem states and the rise of institutionalized politics (Weber 1968; 
Huntington 1968). This was not, however, the case in the Soviet Union, quite the contrary 
actually (Roy 2000; Collins 2006). Nevertheless, there seems to be an agreement that a 
vibrant civil society based on well-developed social networks is a prerequisite for a 
functioning democracy (Putnam 1993). But this holds only if the networks are composed of 
‘weak ties’, and not of ‘clan’ or kinship (Gibson 2001:52). For ‘clan politics’ to be defined 
as an informal institution we need to follow up on the questions raised by Helmke & 
Levitsky: 1) What are the actors’ shared expectations about the constraints they face; 2) 
What is the community to which the informal rules apply; and 3) How are the informal 
mles enforced (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004, p. 727). For instance, if there are no enforcement 
mechanisms at hand for ‘clan elders’, as a way to sanction certain behavior, it can be taken 
as a sign of the weakening of ‘clan politics’.
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Identity politics -  ‘Clan Politics’
Although kinship is the most arcane aspect of anthropological study, it 
nonetheless must be understood if we are to analyze societies, like those of
traditional tribal Inner Asia and the Middle East... (Lindholm, 1986, pp. 336-
337).
‘Identity politics’ refers to a set of political activities based on group identification. In a 
Western context it is associated with previously marginalized groups gaining influence 
through raising awareness about unjust treatment or members of a particular constituency 
(Native American, African American, Women etc.). In this dissertation I adopt a somewhat 
broader definition, referring to any kind of political activity that makes appeals to group 
identification. Identity politics is of special importance in many newly independent states 
that are in the early process of state- and nation-building. Identities are based on shared 
experiences of group members, but political entrepreneurs often manipulate the actual 
articulation of the identity. On the highest, aggregated level, we have the ‘imagination’ of 
the nation, as a form of identity politics. The Kyrgyz nation-building effort is a prime 
example of ‘modular nationalism’, a process that originated in Europe in the end of the
eighteenth century and was later transplanted elsewhere (Anderson, 1999, p. 4). The
process was one where the state actively promoted a ‘nation-people’ in order to fit it with 
the boundaries of the state, thereby creating a nation-state. The same has also been 
attempted in many post-colonial settings, Central Asia included.
In this study I focus on sub-national identity categories, like ‘clans’ and ‘tribes’. First of all 
it should be noted that the discourse on ‘kinship’ and ‘clan’ is a heavily contested one in the 
social sciences. On the one hand you have political scientists bringing in these concepts 
into the study of political phenomena, as in the literature on ‘clan politics’ in the former 
Soviet republics of Central Asia (Collins, 2004,2006; Roy, 2000; Schatz, 2004):
Clan, tribal, and regional factionalism is very much a key to the political life of 
the republics of Central Asia (Roy, 2000, p. 13).
Clan structure does not determine outcomes [of transition], but it strongly shapes 
and constrains the preferences and decisions of individual actors (Collins, 2006,
p. 20).
On the other hand we have anthropology of different strands which has developed a critical 
discourse on these concepts in the later half of the 20th century (Kuper, 2004[1982]; 
Schneider, 2004[1972]). Even though many scholars have dismissed the concept of kinship 
as an analytical category it continues to be used by others. In this chapter I use the concept
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of ‘clan’ instead of ‘tribe’ for the simple reason that I am referring to the literature on ‘clan 
politics’. Arguably the concept of ‘clan’ is a loaded term in English, Russian (klan or rod), 
and its Kyrgyz forms (uruk). I use quotations marks throughout the chapter to indicate the 
contested notions surrounding this term. It is not my aim here to provide a thorough 
critique of the concept’s use of the in social science literature. Suffice to note that the term 
is widely used and by using it here I indicate the literature that I am directly engaged with 
(Collins; Dzhunushaliev & Ploskikh; Schatz).
Here I define ‘clan’ narrowly in order to avoid confusion with other informal phenomena 
like clientelism, regionalism, corruption or organized criminal organizations (mafias). A 
metaphoric and loosely defined use of the concept is a predicament in the literature on ‘clan 
politics’. I argue that the defining element of a ‘clan’ is that it is a network of individuals 
linked by kin-based bonds. The definition used here is that a ‘clan’ is an informal 
organization comprising a group of individuals linked by kin-based bonds, either real or 
imagined. It is an imagined community of ‘genealogical relatedness’ (Gullette, 2006a, p. 
214). It is the affective tie of kinship that is the crucial difference between ‘clans’ and other 
informal institutions. Note that this definition states that ‘clans’ are indeed organizations, 
i.e. groups ‘conceived as entities and cast as actors’ (Brubaker, 2003, p. 4). A ‘clan’ is by 
nature an exclusive phenomenon; it is not a voluntary association or an interest group. A 
key dimension in the study of sub-national groups like ‘clans’ is to what extent they are 
groups that coordinate action and have an existence beyond the lives of particular members, 
i.e. to what extent they are corporate groups. Some scholars seem to consider ‘clans’ in 
Central Asia as corporate groups, as actors, while some anthropologists have refuted this 
(Gullette, 2006b).5
In the contemporary literature there are those who claim that we need to rethink the 
traditional dichotomy between state and non-state society. Previously a state has been 
defined by centralized sovereign political structure within a specific territory, but with the
5 For scholars that seem to advocate the view that ‘clans’ are corporate groups see (Collins, 2003; Dukenbaev
6  Hansen, 2003; Temirkulov, 2004). These authors do not use the corporate concept, but the sub-text in their 
analysis is that there exists such a thing as ‘clans’ and that they somehow coordinate actions, i.e. that they are 
actors. This is not to say that they consider ‘clans’ to be constant over time, Collins actually makes a good 
point about the changing nature of ‘clans’ during the Soviet and post-Soviet period. However, her definition 
of a ‘clan’ also includes close friendship ties and personalistic business ties.
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onset of post-modems theories of power this has changed (Sneath, 2007). It is necessary to 
understand these underpinnings if we are to use the same terminology today. Tribal 
societies were understood as non-state societies without a central government, as a contrast 
to the modem nation state of the West. Colonial administrators had a practical interest in 
studying and sometimes even constructing tribes in the interest of administration and 
dominance. This is what I earlier referred to as the Orientalistic nature of the discourse on 
‘clans’ and tribalism in Central Asia, or as Southall puts it:
Tribe is a self-fulfilling Orientalist prophesy in which vague notions of outsiders
are essentialized (Southall 1996:1331).
Kinship
Kinship...does not correspond to any cultural category known to man
(Schneider, 2004, p. 269).
All human populations do recognize links between generations. There is however a great 
variation in how this is done. To be related to someone does not necessarily mean that you 
act or live together. Kinship was for long one of the most important topics in anthropology, 
especially in the early days of the discipline starting in the mid 19th century. The early 
pioneers focused on descent and lineage theory (Lowie, 2004[1950]; Maine, 1861; Morgan, 
1877). The intellectual context of these early anthropologists was, among other things, the 
Darwinian idea of evolution. This stimulated an interest in the ‘origins’ of humanity and 
human social life. Primitive peoples of the non-western countries were made objects of 
intensive study and one of the key topics was kinship. In anthropological research a 
distinction is made between emic and etic categories, the former being classifications 
specifically defined within a cultural context and the latter classifications used by 
researchers to describe and understand the object of study. Many of the analytical 
categories of the early contributors in to the field were etic in nature.
Kinship was interesting because it was thought to be the basis of social organization in 
many societies. It explained the maintenance of order within ‘simple societies’. Social 
organization does of course contain several different aspects and dimensions. The early 
discourse on kinship as a social organization can be understood as the opposite, or the 
‘other’, to the state. The kinship logic can also be seen in opposition to other social 
formations that do not rely on kinship, like community, division of labor, friendship, 
economic relations etc. Much of the later critique of the concept of kinship derives from
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this dichotomizing tendency in earlier anthropological work. So what then is kinship and 
how can it be defined? Many anthropologists would claim that it is impossible to arrive at a 
universal definition of kinship because kinship as an institution has too many local 
variations. It is however clear that for two persons to be kin they either both have to 
descend from a common ancestor, or one of them have to descend from the other. 
Important to note is that ‘descent’ here refers to the social relationship of parents and 
children, not to the physical (biological) relationship. In many cases there is a biological 
element involved, but there are many forms of descent that are non-biological, like 
marriage, adoption, fostering, and step-relations. Blood has frequently been used 
metaphorically to describe the kinship relation, but it is clearly arbitrary since other 
societies may choose other features to symbolize kinship, like flesh or bone instead. The 
problem with a narrow biological definition of kinship is that, as a phenomenon, it is 
universally constant, i.e. all of us have a biological father and a mother and they in turn 
have parents as well. There is, however, a great variation in how kinship is organized in 
different societies and therefore the difference must be explained by something else than 
biology.
Furthermore, one can ask what place and function descent plays in the formation of groups. 
This is a separate issue from the descent modes (patrilineal, matrilineal, and cognatic). 
Lineage is a form of an extended descent group in which the members are supposed to 
know, or at least claim to know, the genealogical connections interlinking all members of 
the group. These links are viewed in terms of generation and relative birth order and 
thereby provide a basis for calculating relations of seniority or degrees of relatedness 
between individuals and segments within a lineage. A lineage can stretch back for several 
generations and can be subdivided into segments through growth over time. Clanship 
relations on the other hand are categorical in character and typically non-hierarchical within 
the ‘clan’.6 To conclude, it seems clear that there is both a biological and a social aspect to 
kinship. The relative emphasis on any of the two aspects is the main dividing line in the 
study of kinship. Early accounts on kinship terminology tended to rely on genealogical and 
biological notions (Morgan, 1877). Gellner for one, stressed that biology must be involved
6 In reference to Evans-Pritchard in (Parkin & Stone, 2004, p. 31).
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in kinship (Gellner, 1957, 1960). Levi-Strauss on the other hand considered kinship to be 
distinctively social, or cultural (Levi-Strauss, 1969).
‘Clan’ and ‘Tribe’
If kinship is the organizing logic of ‘simple societies’ on a micro level, then ‘clans’ and 
‘tribes’ are macro level structures. These terms were first used to describe the divisions 
among the ancient Greeks, Romans, and Israelis. The discourse on ‘clans’ and ‘tribes’ is 
like the kinship discourse a highly contested one in the social sciences. The practice of 
naming and defining groups of people cannot be separated from the colonial context in 
which it was done. Colonial and imperial powers, be it Western European, Arab, or 
Chinese, defined and named groups of people as part of a process of dividing them into 
administrable units. Nothing surprising and new here. The categories and the names do not 
therefore, necessarily, provide an accurate picture of the social organization of the people at 
hand.
‘Clan’ as a concept is still used even though the usage varies with the geographical area of 
study. ‘Tribe’ on the other hand, as a term, is today largely defunct as a general 
comparative category in anthropological study (Gingrich, 2004). The concept of ‘tribe’ is 
still used as equivalent to certain local conceptions of collective sociopolitical identity. 
Many anthropologists abandoned the concept of ‘tribe’ and started using ‘ethnic groups’ or 
‘sub-nationalism’ instead (Rasuly-Paleczek, 2005, p. 5). According to the conventional 
definition a ‘tribe’ is ‘a culturally homogenous, non-stratified society possessing a common 
territory, without centralized political or legal institutions, whose members were linked by 
extended kinship ties, ritual obligations, and mutual responsibilities for the resolution of 
disputes’ (Winthrop, 1991, p. 307). A ‘clan’ on the other hand can be defined as a group of 
persons who believe themselves to be related by unilineal descent but who are unable to 
trace genealogical connections linking all members of the group (Burnham, 2001, p. 1921). 
Etymologically the term comes from Gaelic clan and Old Irish clann, denoting a group 
claiming descent form a common ancestor (Keen, 2006, p. 516). Groups recruited by 
filiation and descent have historically been given several different labels: gens (plural 
gentes) by Morgan and sib by Lowie. The key feature of a ‘clan’ is the recognition of the 
kinship element and it always involves a genealogical narrative. Other defining attributes 
are exogamy and totemic taboos (Burnham, 2001, p. 1922). Birth, marriage, fostering, or
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adoption generally determines membership in a ‘clan’, even though a great variation can be 
observed. In some cases you distinguish between mother ‘clan’ and father ‘clan’.
We cannot discuss the categories of ‘clan’ and ‘tribe’ without providing some of the 
context in which the terms emerged in the development of social sciences from 19th 
century and onwards. Intellectually the period was influenced by Darwinian evolutionary 
thinking and politically it was a time of colonial expansion and imperialist ambitions. It is 
necessary to understand these underpinnings if we are to use the same terminology today. 
In the early anthropological studies ‘tribe’ and state was regarded as successive stages of 
sociopolitical organization. Some scholars made an ordinal distinction between bands, 
tribes, chiefdoms, and stratified societies. Tribal societies were understood as non-state 
societies without a central government, as a contrast to the modem nation state of the West. 
Colonial administrators had a practical interest in studying and sometimes even 
constructing tribes in the interest of administration and dominance. During the 
decolonization the term attained a largely negative and pejorative meaning. It should be 
noted, however, that in parts of Inner Asia and North Africa this was not the case, quite the 
contrary actually. This is especially so in areas influenced by Islam, in which ‘tribe’ and its 
local equivalents were associated with pride and autonomy (J Hughes, 2007).
A key dimension in the study of sub-national groups like ‘clans’ is to what extent they are 
groups that coordinate action and have an existence beyond the lives of particular members. 
To what extent are they corporate groups, in that they come together occasionally to carry 
out some collective action; have a chief or a council that represents the groups as a whole; 
controls collective property; exacts vengeance for the killing of a member, or demands and 
receives an indemnity (Radcliffe-Brown & Forde, 1950, p. 43). ‘Clans’ have been 
perceived of as groups that are tied together by ‘mechanical solidarity’ as contrasted with 
‘organic solidarity’ that were organized around a division of labor (Durkheim, 1984). A 
‘clan’ being an informal identity organization, a type of a traditional social organization 
(Joel Samuel Migdal, 2001). There are also other types of informal organizations, like 
mafias. In some contexts heavily reliant on kinship and ‘clan’ ties, like the Italian mafia. 
This is not, however, a requirement. Mafias differ from kinship based informal 
organizations in that they are explicitly criminal organizations and that they frequently use
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violence. Examples of formal social organizations on the other hand are trade unions and 
parties (Collins, 2006, p. 10; Helmke & Levitsky, 2004, p. 727).
Dissertation outline
The dissertation consists of a total of seven chapters. The first two of which are lead in 
chapters to the theoretical framework and the specific methodology applied. However, 
already in chapter two, I present a first take on electoral dynamics on a district level in 
Kyrgyzstan. This hopefully gets the reader interested in possible explanations for patterns 
of competitiveness. In chapter two it is shown that competitiveness has been reduced over 
time, with the 1995 elections being the most fragmented. Until the December 2007 PR 
elections no new party system emerged and the contests up until the 2005 elections were all 
localized battles over resources and influence. In 2005 elections were especially 
competitive in the south where the already mobilized campaigners later formed the 
backbone of the ‘Tulip revolution’ protests. Chapter two also contains a detailed discussion 
about the conceptual framework for this thesis, with a special focus on the discourse on 
‘clans’.
Chapters three to six are all based on the twin data sources of published elections results 
and the conducted candidate survey (n=160). I start by examining national level patterns 
(chapters 3-5) and end up with a detailed study of an alleged ‘clan’ district (chapter 6). 
Chapter three shows the reader the consequences of the emergence of new alternative elites 
as a consequence of market reforms and the role that they played in elections. Here I also 
present how candidates have perceived competitiveness and I outline explanations for the 
fact that elections on a district level remain competitive, even if the overall democratic 
environment deteriorates. It is shown that the introduction of electoral mechanisms 
empowered local elites to challenge the authorities. Chapter four examines candidate 
profiles in more detail and answers the questions: 1) Who are the candidates; 2) How are 
they selected and whom do they represent; and finally 3) How are different types of 
candidates performing. It is, perhaps surprisingly, shown that experienced politicians and 
bureaucrats fare better than businessmen. The theoretical implications of this chapter are 
that the role of financial resources and economic autonomy that followed in the wake of 
market reforms is exaggerated in the literature and that traditional elites (Soviet era 
nomenklatura) are performing well.
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Chapter five focuses on the identity discourse and here I examine how political elites in 
Kyrgyzstan define themselves in terms of identity categories. It is shown that a ‘clan’ in the 
Kyrgyz sense of the word, uruu/uruk, is something that necessarily involves kinship, 
therefore refuting Collins metaphorical understanding of the phenomenon. The reason for 
the politization of these genealogical categories can be found in the incentive structure of 
the electoral system (SMD). Chapter six takes this discussion further by examining polling 
station level dynamics in a rural and infamous ‘clan’ prone district. Here it becomes 
apparent that even in this critical case ‘clans’ are not dominating the electoral process. 
Actually it is shown that the genealogical narrative is only a symbolical dimension of the 
contest and that everyday issues are more important. Therefore the ‘clan politics’ 
hypothesis is finally refuted. Alternative explanations for competitiveness are shown to be: 
1) empowerment of local elites through market reforms in the sense of shifting state-society 
equilibriums creates autonomous actors that challenge the regime from below; 2) weak 
organizational capacity of the state to coerce and/or co-opt potential challengers. In the 
concluding chapter I suggest that we stop using the ‘clan’ concept in a metaphorical and 
lose way. Secondly, I conclude by noting that the organizational capacity of the state is 
crucial in understanding the emergence of pockets of competitiveness in Kyrgyzstan. I also 
note the role of financial resources as a consequence of privatization (marketization) 
reforms. However, I also highlight a fascinating pattern of electoral accountability. These 
local level dynamics were typical in the transitional phase when a majoritarian electoral 
system was employed. In most cases in the former Soviet Union this changed with the 
introduction of party list PR systems and as a consequence competitiveness has lately 
decreased significantly.
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CHAPTER 2: STUDYING INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS AND 
ELECTORAL POLITICS
Kinship and ‘clans’ are interesting phenomena in the contemporary world, a world in which 
many institutionally weak states struggle with state building. States that recently gained 
their independence are trying to equip the state with functioning institutions and also to 
instill a sense of collective identity, often along nationalistic lines. This is obviously 
difficult since in many cases there is no prior experience of social organization on the 
allotted territory. This chapter will present some of the methodological considerations that 
went into this research project. I will also present a first overview of patterns of electoral 
competition in Kyrgyzstan 1990-2007. A key question in this dissertation is whether 
electoral politics in Kyrgyzstan is dominated by ‘clan politics’. In order to answer this 
question I will use a two-fold methodology: a cross-constituency comparative study of 
competitiveness and candidate typologies in three post-independence elections (1995, 2000 
and 2005); and a critical case study of a selected ‘clan district’.
If ‘clans’ were a strong informal institution then electoral politics could be affected in two 
ways: 1) ‘clans’ coordinate among themselves and agree to nominate a consensus ‘clan’ 
candidate, thereby reducing competitiveness in the election district (SMD); or 2) each 
‘clan’ have their own candidates and voters loyally vote for someone from their own ‘clan’ 
resulting in high levels of vote dispersion (here understood as competitiveness). Some 
conceptual clarification is required for a sound operationalization of a ‘clan’ in the 
Kyrgyzstan context. Here I provide a short summary of the argument and outline the 
consequences for my research. The key to understanding the pertinent difference between 
different kinds of networks is the strength of the identity factor. Another question is how to 
measure that strength, i.e. the strength of the ties and the identity element. I could measure 
it as a ‘combination of the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual 
confiding), and the reciprocal services which characterize the tie’ (Granovetter, 1973, p. 
1361).
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We need to remember that relying on ‘clan networks’ could be considered rational in many 
situations. The key element here is trust, which in turn allows for cooperation and thereby 
overcoming social dilemmas. All institutions make interaction between individuals and 
groups easier and more predictable because they create known and accepted behavioral 
structures. Trust is also what makes ‘clan networks’ more durable. Individuals cannot 
change theses structures, at least not without paying a certain price, i.e. cost. So a rational 
actor accepts the institutions and acts accordingly, even if they do not agree with the 
institution themselves (Lauth, 2004, p. 6).
The ambition in this work is to test the explanatory power of the ‘clan politics’ theory. 
What I am interested in here is the relationship between ‘clans’ and formal institutions of 
the regime, parliamentary elections in this case. What about the normative dimension? First 
of all we have the question about competitiveness? What levels of competition is ideal for 
democracy? Clearly a fragmented electoral field is associated with problems of effective 
governance (government formation, stable coalitions etc.). Secondly, there is the question 
whether ‘clans’ necessarily are bad for democracy. Why would respect and obligations to 
ones family be incompatible with democracy? ‘Clans’ might be considered to create trust, 
something that is seen as a condition to solve social dilemmas. The problem with ‘clan 
networks’, however, is that they are inherently exclusive and therefore they only create 
trust among its members, not among citizens in general.
In daily use people often confuse ‘clan’ with mafia, clientelism, patronage, and corruption. 
A short clarification is necessary. Clientelism and corruption are informal institutions 
(practices), not identities or organizations. ‘Clan’ on the other hand contains an element of 
identification, as does ethnicity and caste for instance. Mafias on the other hand are 
organizations that sometimes rely on kinship ties, but not necessarily. Furthermore, mafias 
are per definition explicitly criminal organizations that use violence, or the threat of 
violence, as a mean to meet their ends. Another concept that is frequently used in 
describing corrupt, and allegedly, kinship tied practices and networks, is tribalism (or 
traibalizm in the Russian spelling). This can be defined as ‘particular kinds of corrupt 
relations among elites’ (Gullette, 2006b, p. 2). Conceptually it is very close to nepotism and 
favoritism. Tribalism does not, however, suggest that there is a primordial social formation 
at the basis of the relations, it is merely a ‘collection of idioms which depict how different
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factions and networks have emerged in government since independence’ (Gullette, 2006b, 
p. 44).
Is it meaningful to create a dichotomy of ‘clan networks’ on the one hand and clientelist 
networks on the other? Perhaps I should adopt a compromise stance instead, combining the 
two informal institutions into a ‘clan-type’ clientelist networks (J. Hughes, 1997, p. 1021). 
Or perhaps ‘patron-client networks linked to extended families’ (Atkin, 1997, p. 292). I 
could also use ‘clan network’ instead of only ‘clan’, which would be a bit less rigorous 
(like Collins does). The problem is that ‘clan’ is an actor and clientelism is a practice, a 
way of doing things. An additional and substantial problem in the study of these things in 
contemporary Central Asia is that ‘clans’ do not necessarily act as corporate groups, which 
basically discredits them from being identified as actors.
The danger in keeping with the concept of ‘clan’ is that it leaves us with an evolutionist 
agenda, once again emphasizing colonial categories on the local population. It should, 
nevertheless, be noted that the discourse on ‘clans’ in Kyrgyzstan is officially and culturally 
sanctioned and it might therefore prove an easier case than in many other settings. Or 
perhaps, in the light of the anthropological critique of the concept, we should stop using it 
altogether? If we instead start talking about categories of genealogical relatedness, does that 
help us in explaining and understanding kinship based networks any better?
Here follow an assumption and some hypothesis that the research project is addressing. 
Assumptions
• If ‘clans’ dominate politics in Central Asia, as many argue, it should be noticeable 
in times of parliamentary elections, even though the parliament plays a marginal 
role in Kyrgyz politics.
Hypothesis
• ‘Clans’, if they exist in any politically meaningful way, should be able to do an 
informal pre-selection of candidates and therefore reduce electoral competitiveness. 
This obviously depends on how many different ‘clans’ reside in each constituency. 
In constituencies with several ‘clans’ we can expect some kind of pre-electoral 
inter-‘clan’ coordination.
• Alternatively, each ‘clan’ could have their own candidates and voters loyally vote 
for someone from their own ‘clan’ resulting in high levels of vote dispersion (here 
understood as competitiveness).
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• If ‘clans’ dominated electoral politics it would imply certain reciprocity between the 
members of the network. People vote for a particular candidate because of kinship 
ties, either real or imagined. If this were the case then ‘clans’ would not need to buy 
votes.
• Voters in rural constituencies, that are said to be dominated by ‘clan politics’, are 
more loyal with their candidates and electoral (democratic) accountability is 
therefore non-existent.
• Voters in urban constituencies are more critical towards candidates and political 
platforms play a bigger role in winning the election. Electoral accountability is also 
substantially higher in urban constituencies.
• Ethnic voting works in the same way as ‘clan’ voting, in that the loyalty supersedes 
accountability.
• The ‘localism’ hypothesis states that voters will vote for the candidate they
personally know best, i.e. someone from their own immediate surrounding, 
irrespective of their ‘clan identity’.
In the next few chapters I will deal specifically with all of these ‘hypotheses’. More 
specifically I am addressing the following questions:
Specific Research Questions
• What explains the pattern of electoral competitiveness in a semi-authoritarian, 
hybrid regimes?
• What is the explanatory power of the ‘clan hypothesis’ when it comes to 
competitiveness (chapters 6 & 7)?
• Is there really such a thing as a ‘clan’ today in the sense of kinship-based groups
that are relevant for politics (chapters 6 & 7)?
• Do elections lead to political pluralism (chapters 4 & 5)?
Methodology Summary
The methodology will be two-folded. The first part is a comparative quantitative and 
extensive study on competitiveness, candidate typology, political parties, turnover, and 
campaigning in parliamentary elections Kyrgyzstan 1995-2007.
The variables will be constructed out of the following kind of data:
• Competitiveness measured by the Effective Number of Candidates
W -(-7 ^ -  + - ) x X
V
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• Candidate typology -  a typology of all candidates (in a random selection of 
Single-Member Districts): experienced politicians (pro-government or 
oppositional), businessmen, bureaucrats (state administrators), and cultural- 
professional (intelligentsia)
• Accountability -  re-election rate and turnover (total turnover of incumbents 
irrespective if they take part in the election or not).
• Party Strength by examining (following V.O.Key): Party in Electorate (polling
data of most ‘well known parties’ and detailed election results), Party as
Organization (no. of members, no. of candidates, no. of election commission 
members, and no. of election observers).
• Voter survey data (IRI, IFES, and own interviews): what determines the vote, 
policy issues/personality features, vote buying etc.
Data gathered through candidate survey («=160), officially published election statistics
(CEC), and expert interviews. The final part of the study examines one particular SMD in
detail and examines what role ‘clan’ plays, if any. This is a unique intensive study in a
‘clan’ prone district (contrasted with the extensive overview of the other SMDs selected for
the candidate survey). This district is considered a critical case for the ‘clan politics’
hypothesis. I will be looking at:
• Reconstruction of candidate selection procedures: who pre-selected, who 
nominated, problems with registering etc.
• Examination of the relevance of ‘clans’ in voting behavior, including vote 
buying, by in-depth interviews, focus groups, and surveys.
Data sources are the same as in the extensive study, i.e. the very same candidate survey
(«=160), officially published election statistics (CEC), and expert interviews. In addition
the author visited the selected district several times and also witnessed a by-election in the
district first hand.
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Informal institutions in former Soviet republics
In the former centrally planned economies of the Soviet Union informal institutions have 
played a key role in the economic and political transition. Corruption, patronage, and 
bribery were widespread in the final years of the Union as different kinds of networks were 
struggling for resources and influence (Ledenevna, 1998; Varese, 2005). Some of these 
networks were based on traditional kinship ties, real or imagined, and others were of more 
clientelistic nature. In terms of structuring the political landscape the networks can be 
divided into three categories: Soviet-era political ties, workplace relationships, and national 
groups (McMann, 2006, p. 38). Here follows a short overview that introduces some of the 
concepts relevant in the literature on elites and networks in the former Soviet republics.
A central concepts in the study of informal institutions in the Soviet and post-Soviet 
literature is Blat. It can be defined as ‘the use of personal networks and informal contacts to 
obtain goods and services in short supply and to find a way around formal procedures’ 
(Ledenevna, 1998, p. 1). The practice became especially prominent in the 1970s as a 
consequence of the economic stagnation in the Soviet Union. Blat differs from bribery in 
that it relies on trust or continuity of relations. Bribery on the other hand is purely a 
transaction that does not require any previous personal connection or friendship. Formally 
bribery was considered illegal according to the Soviet Criminal Code, while blat was not 
even mentioned. There is also a difference between corruption and blat, in that the former is 
a practice that necessarily involves public officials and does not need to be based on 
personal relations. Blat and clientelism more generally is based on ‘weak ties’ while 
kinship and marriage are ‘strong ties’ (Collins, 2006, p. 26). During the Soviet times there 
were widespread informal practices that were described with the term ‘second economy’, a 
complementary and parallel to the Soviet central planning system (Ledenevna, 1998, p. 47).
‘Clan’ on the other hand differs from blat in that it is based on strong and self-conscious 
group identity. It is a key informal organization in the literature on parts of the post-Soviet 
space, especially Central Asia. ‘Clans’ traditionally included both a few wealthy persons, 
called bai in Kyrgyz, and some more dependent members (Edgar, 2004; Massell, 1974). In 
order to maintain their social status the elites need the support of their network. The non­
elites, on the other hand, need ‘clan’ elders and patrons to help them with ‘finding jobs, 
dealing at the bazaar, gaining access to education, getting loans, obtaining goods in an
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economy of shortages, and obtaining social or political advancement’ (Collins, 2006, p. 
29). It is important to note, however, that kinship entails a shared identity that organizes the 
ties across time and space. This is what brings stability into ‘clan’s and kinship based 
networks, as opposed to ordinary patron-client relations. Individuals make rational choices 
in ‘clan’-based societies, their preferences, choices, and actions are shaped by the 
normative social structure in which they are embedded (Collins, 2006, p. 33). In the 
Moldovan case it seems that weak personal connections were very important and played a 
critical role the institutionalization of competitive electoral politics (Collins, 2003). The 
networks were not of a strong tie character, like in the Central Asian republics.
Kinship, ‘clan’ and tribalism in Central Asia
Rod and Plemya are not corporate groups which can support its members, they
are categories of relatedness (Gullette, 2006a, p. 95).
In the study of the Central Asian countries the notions of kinship, ‘clans’ and ‘tribes’ have a 
prominent position. The region is dominated by the steppe landscape, mountains and the 
more arable areas along the rivers. There are many prejudices about the general models of 
Eurasian pastoral nomadic societies. Often these societies are perceived of as segmented 
societies where groups act as corporate units. But already 1986 Lindholm stated that ‘the 
Central Asian ‘clan’ structure was long since functionally disintegrated by the hierarchical 
tendencies it held within itself (Lindholm, 1986, p. 350). Historically the dichotomy with 
the Middle Eastern kinship system has been emphasized. It is worth remembering that Inner 
Asian kingships ruled large parts of the Middle East for centuries, the Ottomans, Qajar, 
Selcukid, and others (Lindholm, 1986, p. 351). The social organization of the Central 
Asians enabled them to build empires in the Middle East, largely because of their social 
organization, that was based on a hierarchical kinship system.
Soviet ethnography was highly influenced by the Morganian thinking and thereby 
evolutionist in character. Early Soviet-era scholars tended to describe tsarist and pre-tsarist 
Kazakh and Kyrgyz society in terms of feudalism, something that was later refuted by 
Tolybekov and Markov (Markov, 1976; Tolybekov, 1971). Since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union there has been an upsurge in the study of Inner Asia (Collins, 2002, 2006; Schatz, 
2004). Of the previous attempts to study kinship and ‘clan’ politics I can mention Charles 
Lindholm and Elizabeth Bacon, of which the latter spent a few weeks in Central Asia in the
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1930s and 1960s, but fieldwork was during the Soviet time done in the context of officially 
controlled visits. Khazanov is a prominent example of a Soviet anthropologist whose work 
was also translated into English (Khazanov, 1984).
It is hard to determine to what extent plemya and rod has any elements of corporate group 
characteristics in contemporary Central Asia. It is clear, however, that these identities have 
to some extent disappeared and/or been transformed during 70 years of Soviet rule. 
Previous attempts to conduct political science research on ‘clan politics’ in Central Asia has 
not taken into consideration the anthropological critique of the concept. Some of the 
research has relied solely on biographical data on the elites and/or historical (and Russian 
imperial) documentation. So what are ‘clans’ in the Central Asian context? Tribal names 
and traditions are said to remain stronger in the more recently nomadic tribes, the Kyrgyz, 
Kazakhs, and Turkmen, than in the sedentary cultures of the Tajiks and the Uzbeks 
(Collins, 2006, pp. 72-73). As in many other nomadic cultures the Kyrgyz were once 
organized according to tribal rules and traditions. According to the 19th century 
German/Russian historian V.V.Radlov we basically have three levels of analysis here: 
Confederations of tribes, tribes, and ‘clans’ (Collins, 2006, p. 72).
‘Clan’ terminology in Kyrgyzstan
In the case of Kyrgyzstan a ‘clan’ is something specific, especially for the titular nationality 
in rural areas. A ‘clan’ in Kyrgyz denotes a nameable patrilineage, which comes with an 
elaborated set of stories and founding myths.7 This cannot be equated with the purely 
residential category like mahalla in the case of Uzbekistan, like Collins does. The Kyrgyz 
word for ‘clan’ is uruk or uruu, depending on what level we are referring to.8 The most 
cited level is that of uruu, like for instance the Sarybagysh, the uruu of the previous 
President Askar Akaev and the Teiit, the uruu of the current President Kurmanbek Bakiev. 
In this chapter I will use the English word ‘clan’ to denote any relevant level, be it uruu or
7 A lineage is a descent group that is able to demonstrate a common descent from a known ancestor.
8 In the anthropological and ethnographic literature on Kyrgyzstan, uruu is often equated with the English 
tribe and Russian plemya, while uruk has the equivalent or clan in English and rod in Russian. In the context 
of the Russian language, the word klan is also used, but often in a pejorative sense. An uruu is simply a larger 
kinship unit consisting of several uruks. An uruk is a ‘lineage’ in the strict sense of the word (Beyer, 2006, p. 
160).
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uruk.9 Strictly speaking, the focus in this chapter is on 'uruu (or uruk) politics’, but this is 
an utterly incomprehensible term for both the Kyrgyz themselves and for the larger 
scholarly community. The most commonly used equivalent concept in English language 
literature on the region is that of ‘clan’. As already noted, in the political science literature 
the concept of a ‘clan’ in Kyrgyzstan has been used in an overly metaphorical way (R. 
Abazov, 2003b; Collins, 2006). This way of using the concept can be both confusing and 
frankly orientalistic.10 In some writings on regionalism and localism in Kyrgyzstan the 
concept of ‘clans’ has been equated with larger territorial concepts like north and south:
...by regional rivalry and ‘clan’ loyalties. This divide will probably dominate 
political life in the Republic in the future. (Abasov 2000:552)
Kyrgyzstan’s clans... are bound by informal arrangements and rules, and their 
power is based on representing regional interests. The so-called northern clan 
represents the Chui, Issyk-Kol, Naryn, and Talas oblasts [region], while the so- 
called southern clan represents the Batken, Jalal-Abad, and Osh oblast (R.
Abazov, 2003a).
Here the concept of a ‘clan’ is used to denote a vast geographical territory that would never 
be associated with an uruu or an uruk in the Kyrgyz sense. Also, there was never a 
genealogical narrative of relatedness that covered the ‘south’ of Kyrgyzstan.11 Collins at 
one point refers to the ‘Issyk-Kul clan’ and the ‘Chui clan’, which is clearly misleading 
since these are purely administrative units (Collins, 2006, p. 126). These two examples 
illustrate how the concept of a ‘clan’ has been used in a loose and metaphorical way that 
completely misses the point of uruus and uruks and their emic meaning in contemporary 
rural Kyrgyzstan. I argue that applying foreign categories, like ‘clan’, a concept that has a 
unique emic meaning to the Kyrgyz, in such a loosely defined way qualifies as orientalism. 
An uruu identity necessarily involves kinship; it cannot be a geographically determined 
administrative category, like an oblast’ (region). But even if there exists a genealogical 
narrative about these kinship-based groups it does not mean that these groups dictate
9 This is problematic from the viewpoint of established anthropological distinctions (see previous footnote). 
However in ordinary use in the villages the distinction between uruu and uruk is fluid. The most widely used 
term for a ‘clan’ is uruu. For more on the ‘tribal structure’ of the Kyrgyz see Abramzon (Abramzon, 1963, p. 
175).
10 Only by using the ‘clan’ and ‘tribe’ terminology one projects a view of an unruly and uncivilized people 
that were not even been able to set up a centralized state structure in the period prior to the Russian conquest.
11 It is popular to point out the north/south cleavage in analysis of Kyrgyz history and contemporary political 
divisions. Here they usually refer to the areas on separate sides of the Tian Shan mountain range. However, as 
anyone who ever studied the map can see, the more proper geographical division would have to be north­
east/south-west.
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politics locally, that they are groups that actually do things in an organized way. Yes, 
people do talk about their uruu belonging and possibly even give an impression of them 
existing as corporate groups. And yes, in mid 1990s at the height of the transition (political 
and economic reform process) in Kyrgyzstan there was a lot of confusion about the identity 
of the Kyrgyz, their social organization, and what consequences this would have for 
politics. However, now we have reached a point in time when we can sort out some of the 
confusion and at the same time strip the ‘clan’ concept of some of the most distorted 
connotations in the literature. Again, I want to reiterate that when I use the ‘clan’ concept I 
do not intend to imply that there actually are ‘clans’ in contemporary Kyrgyzstan that are 
organized as corporate groups. I narrowly define ‘clan* as kinship-based social units and 
then I go on to show that there is no such thing as a ‘clan’, as an organization, that actually 
deals with political matters in contemporary Kyrgyzstan.
Terminologically there are some difficulties in that both Russian and the local languages 
have been used. The Russian term rod is usually translated into the English term ‘clan’, but 
it can easily be misinterpreted. The same Russian term is as a matter of fact also used for 
family, sort and gender. The Russian term for tribe, plemya, corresponds with the Kyrgyz 
term uruu, while the Kyrgyz term for ‘clan’ is uruk. An uruu consists of a few uruk (seed in 
Kyrgyz) and have related (familial) ties going as many as seven generations back (Gullette 
2006:61). There are diverging opinions as to whether these can be seen as corporate groups 
or not (Collins 2006; Gullette 2006). These categories are nevertheless determined through 
narratives of genealogy. Some would argue that the Soviet documentation of Kyrgyz 
‘tribal’ society in itself created an authoritative description of social life (Gullette 2006:58).
On the highest sub-national level the Kara-Kyrgyz (today known as the Kyrgyz) were 
divided into two big confederations (wings) of tribes: Sol kanat (the ‘left’, Kyrgyz meaning 
branch, wing) and Ong kanat (the ‘right’) (Dukenbaev & Hansen, 2003, p. 25). The basic 
dividing line here is geographical, the first based in the South/West and the latter in the 
North/East. This division into left and right reflects ‘the quasi-military formation of post- 
Chingisid ethnoi, but there was no practical significance to the system since the Kyrgyz had 
never in memory engaged in universal military action’ (Prior, 2002, p. 49). In addition to 
this we have the Ichkilik, which consists of many ‘clans’ of different national origins, but 
they still claim Kyrgyz identity. On the next level we have the tribes or tribal unions.
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Historically the Kyrgyz social structure was constructed out of around 40 tribal unions (or 
groups, Uruu in Kyrgyz). There is disagreement as to whether these groups were 
necessarily based on real kinship ties or only imaginary kinship (Temirkulov, 2004, p. 2). 
Tribes in this context are essentially groups of ‘clans’. Lastly we have ‘clans’ (Uruk in 
Kyrgyz), which are patrilinear units whose members descend from a common known 
ancestor, ‘clans’ can, however, also include individuals connected via marriage, family 
alliances, neighborhood or a village. The ‘clan’ is based geographically in a village or the 
like, but members of the ‘clan’ do not necessarily have to live in the location to be a part of 
the ‘clan’.
In the context of the Russian language it should be noted that ‘clan’ has very negative 
connotations. During the Yeltsin years and thereafter, it was synonymous with ‘faction’. So 
why do we not use the concept of ‘tribe’ instead? The term is seen as derogatory, in that it 
labels the developing countries as primitive. However, it should be noted that the concepts 
of ‘clan’ and ‘tribe’ have long been used by Central Asians themselves. In Africa these 
terms have been viewed in a more negative manner, but not so in Central Asia.
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Operationalization and measuring ‘clan’ and clientelism
So how do we go about measuring to what extent ‘clans’ dominate electoral politics in 
Kyrgyzstan? I have decided to define ‘clan’ in a narrow sense in this research project. This 
means that there is a requirement of having direct kinship bonds with the respective people 
in the election district and that both the candidate and the people identify the candidate as 
belonging to a particular ‘clan’. So there is both an objective ‘biological element’, if you 
will, and an ascriptive social element in the definition used here. The rationale for a narrow 
definition is to allow for distinguishing between candidates relying on a ‘clan’ identity and 
a ‘clan network’ and candidates relying on pure patron-client networks.
Here I approach the question about ‘clan’ identity in a straightforward way. I simply ask the 
candidates to identify their ‘clan’ (uruu/uruk) and ask them to estimate the importance of 
‘clan’ loyalty for voting behavior to find out whether there are any elite/mass differences in 
terms of ‘clan’ identity I also ask voters similar questions in our SMD case study. 
Furthermore, I ask several other questions related to the genealogical narrative, i.e. the local 
discourse on ‘clans’. This allows us to gamer the ‘clan’ discourse fluency of particular 
candidates. Possessing a lot of genealogical information is here considered a pre-condition 
to the existence of ‘clan politics’ in the Collin’s sense of the word.
Positional analysis will complement the ‘clan’ identification analysis mentioned above. 
This combined with an occupational variable and social background variables allows for a 
categorization of each candidate. The question here is what can be formalized and 
measured and what needs a more intensive ethnographical case study approach? According 
to Lauth we need to find the existence of informal institutions in the beliefs and attitudes of 
individuals, otherwise they do not exist (Lauth 2004:8). This means that we need to 
measure self-identification. The requirement here is that the candidates identify themselves 
as being a member of a particular nameable ‘clan’ and that they are able to place that ‘clan’ 
in the broader narrative about the ‘clan’ structure of their country.
The narrow definition used in this context is challenging the more unspecified and 
metaphorical use that is so common among journalists and political scientists. The 
assumption in this dissertation is that a candidate that is not from the region in which he or 
she is running and does not have relatives there, apart from the most immediate family, but 
that still uses a ‘clan’ discourse to describe themselves is not a ‘clan’ candidate. The reason
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for them using the ‘clan’ discourse to describe their candidacy might be to legitimize their 
role as a representative of the community. However, if there are no direct kinship bonds 
with the voters in the constituency I would regard this as a non-‘clan’ candidate. Of course 
the candidate could have an attachment to the constituency without having kinship bonds in 
there, but this per definition disqualifies him or her for being considered a ‘clan’ candidate. 
Territoriality therefore becomes one of the key features in the definition used here.
In table 1 1 have ranked ‘levels of attachment’ with strong ties at the top:
Table 1: Levels of Attachment
Direct kinship (blood ties, in l 8t and 2nd order)12 s  . faffective>
Indirect kinship (marriage, other order, including imaginary)
Direct territoriality (born and lived)__________________________
Indirect territoriality (m oved in)_____________________________  Weak ties
Economic relation (mafia, clientelism)_______________________
* There is a hierarchy at work here. Following my definition of ’clan’, if a candidate is categorized as 
belonging to one of the lower three levels of this table he/she is not a ’clan’ candidate.
In order to qualify as a ‘clan’ candidate in the narrow sense of the word, you need to run in 
a constituency in which your own ‘kinsmen’ live. For instance, the infamous case of 
Bayaman Erkinbayev in the southern constituency of Kadamjai, cannot be considered a 
‘clan’ candidate since neither he nor his wife was from that constituency.
The challenge is to go beyond the metaphorical use of the ‘clan’ concept and to see whether 
the candidate actually is a candidate representing a corporate group with a distinct identity. 
Following the levels of attachments table I ask candidates questions about the place of 
birth, the place where they grew up, studied, and lived, and whether there were any 
kinsmen in these territories. The question I ask the interviewees is ‘What clan are you’, but 
specifically using the Kyrgyz word uruu for ‘clan’. If the candidate is not able to identify 
their own ‘clan’ by name, then I immediately disqualify them as a ‘clan’ candidate.
From previous anthropological research into kinship, ‘clan’, and tribalism in Central Asia 
and Kyrgyzstan it seems that these concepts are very fluid and plastic (Gullette, 2006a).
12 Following Radcliffe-Brown, the first order of relation is constituted by three types of social relationship 
‘that between parent and child, that between siblings, and that between husband and wife.’ Beyond this first 
order is a second order of social relationships, which connect different elementary units through a common 
member (uncles, aunts, cousins, etc.).
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Based on the recent anthropological critique of the ‘clan’ discourse one could redirect the 
research into how candidates and the local population perceives of relatedness in times of 
elections and how it is being used in the campaign. This will be done in the constituency 
level case studies.
In an ideal case scenario in order for a candidate to be considered a 100 percent ‘clan’ 
candidate, all of the following condition would need to be filled:
A. There needs to be at least one nameable ‘clan’ {uruu) occupying the territory of the 
constituency.
B. The candidate understands himself to be a representative of that ‘clan’. 
Operationalized and measured as self-ascription: use of ‘clan’ discourse, both 
publicly and privately (subjectively expressed in interviews); demonstrable kinship 
ties to the constituency (objectively).
C. The electorate sees the candidate as a representative of the ‘clan’, understood as a 
corporate group, being able to name the ‘clan’ {uruu) of the candidate.
Tougher conditions include:
D. The candidate is neither a businessman nor an experienced politician, i.e. could not 
have used extensive vote buying or administrative resources.
E. The candidate secures a seat in the parliament with a number of votes that roughly 
corresponds with estimates about the number of fellow ‘clan’ members in the 
constituency.
This is not to say that there was such a candidate in the last elections in Kyrgyzstan. But in 
order to identify critical cases for the ‘clan politics’ theory these set of ‘ideal’ conditions 
are helpful as a benchmark.
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Operationalization of competitiveness, accountability, and party 
strength
What I am interested in this dissertation is the developments in terms of electoral politics 
post-independent Kyrgyzstan. The focus is on the parliamentary elections. The 1990 
election was the first multi-candidate election and since then the elections have all been 
fairly competitive if we look on an aggregated national level. If we examine some of the 
constituencies separately a different picture emerges. Was there a ‘clan’ involvement in 
anyway in the selection of candidates? Do voters in Kyrgyzstan keep their politicians 
accountable in times of elections or do incumbents always win when they decide to run 
again? Are urban districts more competitive and do parties fare better there than in rural 
less developed constituencies? These are some of the questions.
Competitiveness
One way to measure the competitiveness of an election is to look at the Effective number o f 
candidates (ENC), which basically measures the number of ‘real’ or ‘viable’ candidates. 
This is an adaptation of Laakso & Taageperas widely used Effective number of Parties, 
ENP.
• Quantitative analysis of competitiveness (or format of competition) on Single- 
Member District (SMD) level. Competitiveness operationalization: Effective 
Number o f Candidates, which is an index that measures the number of candidates 
that stood a chance.13
N - ( r-^—  + - ) x y i 
I c f  ”
13 Where Cj is the fractional share of the i-th component. In this formula the squares of all the fractional shares 
are added together and this sum makes up the denominator. For instance the fractional share of 40% is .40 and 
the weighted value that we got from the equation is .40 X .40 = .16. If the fractional share is only 1%, i.e. .01, 
then the weighted value would be .0001. In reality this means that extremely marginal candidates are 
automatically discounted (Taagepera & Shugart, 1989). The second party of the formula corresponds to 
Dunleavy and Boucek’s critique of Taagepera and Shugart (Dunleavy & Boucek, 2003). Here v stands for the 
winner’s share of the vote and by adding this last part to the formula we account for the largest party 
predominance.
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As already noted this is basically a modified version of Effective Number of Parties (ENP). 
However, in the Kyrgyzstan case there is no use in measuring the number of parties since a 
majority of the candidates are running as independents. Therefore I have just replaced the 
Parties variable (p) with a candidate variable (c). The rationale for using this measure here 
is to show competitiveness in the different constituencies in Kyrgyzstan for the 1995, 2000 
and the 2005 elections. What the ENC does is that it discounts the really marginal 
candidates, the ones that did not stand a chance.
One problem with labeling ENC as competitiveness is that it basically measures the degree 
of dispersion of the vote, i.e. to how many candidates the votes are pooled. This is 
obviously not the same as competitiveness in a strict sense, since only two candidates that 
get about 50 percent each is clearly a competitive election. What I am interested in here, 
however, is more the dispersion element, i.e. as a proxy for how fractional the 
constituencies are (following the ‘clan’ hypothesis).14 The problem with ENC can be 
exemplified by district no. 36 and 44 in the 2005 election in Kyrgyzstan. In 44 there were 
three incumbent MPs running and they got 26, 34, 36 percent of the votes respectively. 
Clearly a very competitive election. In selecting the extreme cases of ‘competitive’ 
constituencies, however, these got an ENC value of well under 4, which was the threshold 
selected for singling out the most ‘competitive’ constituencies. This example illustrates the 
terminological problems with using the concept ‘competitiveness’ when I am in reality 
measuring vote dispersion in the first round of elections. In terms of competitiveness it is 
clear that an ENC score under 1.75 is not a very competitive.
14 Cf. Fractionalization: A variable to be used whilst plotting the electoral system effects is ffactionalization 
index F by Douglas Rae (1967). This index is based on another well-known index called the Herfindahl- 
Hischmann concentration index (HH) that is calculated by adding up the weighted values of all the parties and 
can be calculated from both votes and seats.
H H  =  2  Pi2
Rae suggested that if HH is taken from 1, an index is derived that is zero when concentration is extreme and 
one when the system is maximally fractionalized (Rae 1967, 54).
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Table 2: Effective Number o f  Parties/Candidates examples
Case Division of Vote Among Candidates (in %) TOTAL
Taagepera
ENP
Dunleavy 
ENC (N)
1 100 100 1.00 1.00
2 80 18 2 100 1.49 1.37
3 70 5 5 5 5 5 5 100 1.98 1.70
4 70 10 10 10 100 1.92 1.68
5 60 35 2 2 1 100 2.07 1.87
6 60 15 5 5 5 5 5 100 2.53 2.10
7 51 26 10 10 1 1 1 100 2.87 2.42
8 50 50 100 2.00 2.00
9 27 29 34 8.5 1.5 100 3.57 3.26
10 20 20 20 20 20 100 5.00 5.00
On the other hand all ENC scores above 2.00 are clearly describing high levels of
competition. Above this arbitrary level it is basically only fractionalization that increases. 
An ENC of 5.00 is therefore both competitive, but also highly fragmented.
Accountability
Apart from competitiveness, one of the key issues in this research project is that of electoral 
accountability. In a semi-authoritarian context like Kyrgyzstan we are interested in voting 
behavior and local loyalties. Possible incumbency effects are of particular interest here. The 
ultimate test of accountability is whether incumbents really do lose elections. In cases 
where this is theoretically possible, but has never happened there is reason to doubt the 
democratic nature of the contest.15
• Incumbency re-election rate -  The percentage of incumbents seeking re-election 
who win another term (well over 90 % in the US)
• Pre-Election Turnover (retirements) -  Number of incumbents not seeking 
another term or not being able to register for a second run
• Election-Day Turnover (defeats) -  Number of incumbents that decide to run, but 
who loose on Election Day16
• The peculiar ‘Against all’ vote in many post-Soviet States can also be considered 
as an accountability measure
15 This corresponds to Przeworksi et.al’s definition of democracy (Przeworski, 2000).
16 The latter two figures can be combined into a biennial turnover rate.
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Turnover is measured by the number of persons that were a member of the previous 
legislature but that either chose to not run again or that lost the re-run. This is generally 
defined as the aggregate level of exit, from one general election to the next, of elected 
candidates in the popularly elected lower house of the legislature in a bicameral system or 
the sole chamber in a unicameral one. This is usually measured as a percentage of all seats. 
The typical average in western European countries is around 20 %. It is important to note 
that in some legislatures there are term limits that naturally affect the turnover rate. A 
distinction is made between pre-election turnover and election-day turnover. Also, within 
pre-election turnover I make a distinction between incumbents that have no intention of 
running or incumbents that were unable to secure a nomination are counted as pre-election 
turnover.
I will examine how candidates themselves explain the phenomena of incumbency in 
Kyrgyzstan. In cases where there was a winning incumbent, we asked the reasons for them 
winning, and in cases of losing incumbents we asked about the reasons for them losing. In 
the Kyrgyzstan case I also need to account for changes in the total number of MPs elected 
in each election if I want to compare the developments over time. The number of seats has 
been steadily decreased from 350 in 1990 to 105 in 1995 and 2000, and to 90 in the 2005 
elections. The incumbency re-election is therefore expected to be substantially lower since 
the number of seats has been steadily decreased, i.e. for each seat there has in theory been 
more than one incumbent. Therefore there is a natural turnover in the Kyrgyzstan system 
that in itself is quite high, at least between the 1990 election and the 1995 election (going 
from 350 to 105 seats). To summarize, electoral accountability cannot be compared over 
time in Kyrgyzstan. This does not, however, rule out comparing turnover rates between 
regions and on the urban/rural axis.
Low turnover, or non-existing turnover, is operationalized as incumbency in the 2000 and 
2005 elections, i.e. a MP that secured elections in all three majoritarian elections in 
Kyrgyzstan. What this measures is basically patterns of entrenched support for a particular 
candidate in one and the same area, if not exactly the same district (due to re-drawings). 
High turnover (I) will be operationalized as: rule 1) SMDs in which an incumbent lost and 
no other incumbent won. In addition to that I will also define as High Turnover (I): rule 2) 
SMDs in which an incumbent runs and gets an 'against all' vote of more than 50 percent
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(only once district); rule 3) SMDs in which several incumbent runs, but one of them gets 
less than 10 percent. High turnover (II), is a more restricted version and it is utilizing only 
the latter two decision rules. A SMD in which an incumbent runs and does not get elected, 
and no other incumbent gets elected either, is clearly a sign of the voters ‘punishing’ the 
candidates, or alternatively the authorities ‘punishing’ the incumbent (rule 1). Furthermore 
a vote ‘against all’ of above 50 percent in a district where an incumbent runs is also clearly 
a sign of the voters ‘punishing’ an incumbent in the lack of other ‘good’ candidates to vote 
for (rule 2). Lastly, a SMD where several (maximum two) incumbents run, but one of them 
gets less than 10 percent is also clearly a sign of the voters ‘punishing’ that particular 
candidate. If they had been happy with their representative they would probably have given 
him/her at least more than 10 percent of the vote. 10 percent is obviously a arbitrary 
threshold, but it is a good way of restricting the sample for the High turnover cases.
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Case Selection: Why FSU and Kyrgyzstan?
There are several reasons why we should be interested in electoral politics in the former 
Soviet Union republics. First of all it seems like these countries somehow contradict some 
of the major political science findings from other regions, like Duverger’s law 
(Likhtenchtein & Yargomskaya, 2005). The former Soviet republics are also good cases of 
the effect of different kinds of informal institutions on elections. This is interesting both 
academically, in terms of explaining diverging outcomes that electoral institutions have, but 
also policy wise, since it is a stated intention of many International Organizations, 
Governments, and NGO’s to promote democracy through electoral assistance. Central Asia 
is especially interesting since informal institutions are said to be even more prevalent than 
elsewhere in the post-Communist space (Collins, 2006). Furthermore Central Asia is 
interesting because traditional theories of democratization would consider them lacking the 
prerequisites of democratization, like a strong middle class, developed economy, market 
mechanisms etc (S. Lipset, 1959; Moore, 1966).
Kyrgyzstan is especially interesting since it has arranged elections with a fairly high level 
of adherence to international commitments and with surprisingly competitive outcomes. 
Parties and candidates have been allowed to register and the elections themselves have been 
monitored by both local and international observers. This is not to say that the elections 
have been free and fair, but they have nevertheless been freer and fairer than elections in 
other Central Asian countries (R. Abazov, 2003a).
Why a single-country case study on Kyrgyzstan?
In general it is thought that single country case studies is a good complement to large-A 
studies and a central avenue for research if we are interested in theory-construction. When 
it comes to informal institutions, and especially kinship based ones, it seems obvious that 
we are in need of some better theories. Case studies are also good if we want to go beyond 
correlations of different phenomena to an actual explanation of causal mechanisms. Not to 
mention a possible understanding of the phenomena. Furthermore, identity politics and 
genealogical relatedness are issues that necessarily involve perceptual variables, symbols, 
and discourses. Quantifying these is not an easy task, and it can only tell us so much about 
the underlying logics at play. Therefore we need to combine an extensive large-TV approach 
with an intensive case study approach. The large-TV in this case is the overview of both
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competitiveness (election statistics) and candidates (survey) in the last four elections in 
Kyrgyzstan. From a theoretical point of view, the cases can be considered as critical in that 
they challenge some of the assumptions in the literature (Collins, 2006).
The reason for choosing Kyrgyzstan as our country case is that, first of all, they have had 
three relatively competitive elections since independence (1995, 2000, and 2005). This is 
not to say that they were free and fair, but they were nevertheless generally more 
competitive than other Central Asian parliamentary elections. Secondly, if we are to say 
anything about the concept of ‘clan politics’, and potentially to determine whether it exists 
or not, Kyrgyzstan should be a good case because it is considered one of the most ‘clan’ 
prone societies in the former Soviet Union. If we want to falsify the pre-conception of 
’clans’ in much of the literature, then Kyrgyzstan is a critical case.
District (SMD) level case selection
...there is probably no substitute for intensive fieldwork in informal institutional 
analysis. Indeed most studies of informal institutions take the form of either 
abstract theory (N=0) or inductive case studies (N>0) (Helmke & Levitsky &
Levitsky 2004:733).
Focusing on the national is clearly not enough for the purposes of this dissertation. What is 
warranted is a micro analytical approach, or to paraphrase Snyder, to ‘scale down’ (Snyder, 
2001). The phenomena of ‘clans’ are per definition sub-national in nature and therefore we 
need to bring down our study to the level where possible ‘clan’ interaction can actually be 
observed. Since the interest here is on elections I have decided to study in depth several 
Single-Member Districts (SMD). In choosing the constituency cases, i.e. the critical cases 
for the ‘clan’ theory, we need to keep in mind that the size and the number of constituencies 
in Kyrgyzstan has changed several times over the last 17 years. The electoral system has 
been changed from a pure majoritarian system in the 1990 with 350 constituencies to a 
mixed system in the 1995 and 2000 elections with 105 MPs, back to a majoritarian system 
in 2005 with 75 MPs. On an aggregated regional {oblast) level it does not make any 
difference, since the constituencies were always organized into sub-oblast’ level units. 
Therefore we can use oblast ’ level aggregated data to analyze the developments in terms of 
electoral politics. However, the changing size of the constituencies means that we cannot 
use exactly the same units of analysis (SMDs) in comparing developments over time. We 
therefore need to examine the re-drawings of the constituencies and try to determine
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whether there was a ‘clan’ components involved in the deliberations or not. Since the 
number of ‘clans’ (or ‘tribal unions’) is somewhere between 40 and 80 and since there are 
currently 75 seats in the parliament there is in theory a possibility that each ‘clan’ has then- 
own representative in the parliament. The selection of a particular ‘clan’ case constituency 
needs to be one that has not been severely altered by these re-drawings.
There are also two other relevant divisions in Kyrgyzstan that we use to group 
constituencies together: north and south, and urban and rural. The north/south divide is said 
to be very important in Kyrgyz politics. Roots of the division can be traced back to the fight 
for the territory that is today Kyrgyzstan. The southern tribes in Kyrgyzstan were closely 
linked to and under direct supervision of the 18th and 19th century Kokand Khanate in the 
Ferghana Valley. The Northerners on the other hand inhabited the frontiers where Russian 
Imperial power was more present.
When the Russian Empire expanded to Turkistan (what is today’s Central Asia) 
at the end of the 19th century the Northern tribes accepted its rule voluntarily 
while the Southerners were more reluctant to join and offered heavy resistance 
(Chargynov, 2005).
The southern tribes were incorporated into the Russian Empire among the last territories of 
Turkistan The divisions persisted and grew stronger during the Soviet period when the 
north was favored both in economics and politics. During the independence period it also 
continued until the end of the Akaev era in the spring of 2005, when a southerner, 
Kurmanbek Bakiev came to power. Since then the balance between north and south has 
shifted to the advantage of the latter. South is generally regarded as more rural, poorer and 
traditional (conservative) and is therefore of importance if we are trying to identify a ‘clan 
constituency’. There is partly a geographical explanation to the differences between north 
and south since a large part of the country is divided by the Tian Shan mountain range. Of 
the seven oblast of Kyrgyzstan three of them are in the south: Batken, Jalalabad, and Osh, 
and Chui, Issyk-Kul, Talas are in the north. Naryn can be partly considered as a northern 
region, even though some would regard it as a southern in terms of customs and traditions. 
The north would be perceived as more industrialized and russified (Chargynov, 2005).
The urban/rural division is also used in this dissertation in order to distinguish between 
allegedly traditional Kyrgyz agro-nomadic regions and more urban settings where the level 
of education and patterns of mobility is different. One can assume that if we want to find a 
‘clan logic’ in Kyrgyz politics we would need to examine the politics in one of the rural
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constituencies. Since Kyrgyzstan is a predominantly rural country this will not be difficult. 
Urban population as a percentage of total population is 36 percent in Kyrgyzstan, compared 
to 64 percent for other post-Communist countries, and 31 percent for other low-income 
countries (World Bank Institute, Kyrgyz Republic At a Glance). There are two city oblasts ’ 
in Kyrgyzstan and they most obviously qualify as urban regions, even though they might 
contain constituencies on the fringes of the city. In the other seven oblasts ’ I single out the 
urban constituencies from the rural ones. This is not a problem in Naryn, Talas, Chui, 
Batken, since there are no urban centers to speak of. In Jalalabad, however, there are clearly 
some urban constituencies in the city center. In the urban rural quantitative comparisons the 
urban constituencies of Jalalabad will be separated from the rural ones.
The ‘clan politics’ case was identified using a snowball method, i.e. gathering as much data 
as possible about an alleged ‘clan dynamic’.17 In the first phases of the fieldwork (March- 
April 2006, June-July 2006, and July-September 2007) I identified ‘clan’ constituencies by 
asking local experts and by conducting interviews with candidates and the electorate in 
these constituencies. During fieldwork there were several by-elections organized which 
provided additional information that fed into the case selection decision. Following my 
hypothesis about ‘clan’ coordination, I have examined some of the least and most 
competitive rural constituencies. I was able to identify 4-5 constituencies that many 
observers find dominated by ‘clan politics’.
17 Snowball sampling relies on referrals from initial subjects to generate additional subjects.
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First take on Elections in Kyrgyzstan
I here want to give a first glimpse of electoral politics in Kyrgyzstan. This is done by 
examining patterns o f electoral competition over time. Let us start by examining the 
average number of absolute candidates, i.e. the numbers o f physical candidates running in 
each constituency (SMD).
Table 3:Average number of absolute (physical) Candidates 1990-2005
10 -  
9 - 
8 -  
7 - 
6
5 - 
4 - 
3 - 
2 -  
1 - 
0 -
* Source: Central Election Commission, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan (Tsentralnaya Komissia, 1996, 2001, 2006). In 
December 2007, in the first ever PR elections there were on average 13.19 candidates per seat (12 registered 
parties with a maximum o f 100 candidates each competing for a total o f 90 seats).
Here we clearly see that there are more candidates immediately after independence, in the 
first ever completely open electoral process in Kyrgyzstan in 1995. In these first post­
independence parliamentary elections there were on average almost nine candidates for 
each available seat.18 The 2000 elections clearly point in the direction o f less fragmentation, 
which in itself is an expected pattern considering the increasing authoritarian tendencies of
18 Here it is important to remember that in the last Supreme Soviet (Parliament) there were 350 seats while in 
the 1995 there were only 105 seats available. In 1990 there were 1032 candidates and in 1995 the number was 
936, i.e. the absolute number o f candidates actually went down. The important figure in terms o f  
competitiveness, however, is how many candidates there were per seat each election year.
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the Akaev administration, as recorded by Freedom House.19 If we only focus on the 
absolute number of candidates, as in Table 3, it seems as if  the 2005 elections were more 
competitive than the 2000 election. This is actually not so, which clearly demonstrates the 
problem with using ‘absolute’ numbers o f candidates. These figures obviously do not tell 
us anything about how many of those ‘absolute’ candidates were marginal in terms o f the 
election outcome, i.e. candidates receiving only minuscule vote shares.
To really understand how competitive elections have been over time in Kyrgyzstan we need 
to look at the ‘'Effective Number o f Candidates' (ENC), which basically measures the 
number of ‘real’ or ‘viable’ candidates, i.e. candidates that really stood a chance in the 
elections (see previous discussion about ENC). This index discounts marginal candidates 
and therefore gives us a more accurate picture of how competitive, or more precisely, how 
fractional the competition was in each constituency was. There are no numbers for the 1990 
elections because disaggregated district level results were never published. However, if  we 
look at all o f the post-independence elections we can discern a clear pattern. It seems like 
competitiveness has steadily been going down if you look at the country as a whole.
Table 4:Average Number of'Effective Candidates'
4.50
4.00
3.50
3.00
2.50
2.00
1.50 
1.00 
0.50 
0.00
* Note: the 2007 elections were conducted under a PR system with a two-fold threshold. The reported number 
here is that o f the election itself. However, the Effective Number o f Parties score for the current parliament is 
a meager 1.46 indicating that the parliament itself is not composed o f competitive blocs.
19 Kyrgyzstan’s Political Rights (PR) score was four in 1994-95 and it went up to five in 1998 and eventually 
up to six in 2000. The 2005 elections brought the score down to five again (FreedomHouse, 2007). Note that a 
high score on the PR scale means high levels of authoritarianism.
2000
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There is clearly a downward trend in terms of electoral contestation using the first post­
independence elections in 1995 as our point of reference. Arguably, ENC levels around 
three indicates a fierce competition and as we will see in the disaggregated results many 
districts in the 1995-2005 elections did go to a second round due to the competitive nature 
o f the first round elections. Table 4 tells us that the 2005 elections were actually less 
competitive than the previous ones, even though there were on average more candidates per 
seat, as was shown in Table 3. Perhaps indicating a stabilization o f support patterns.
Map 2: Map of regions {oblast’) in Kyrgyzstan
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Regional (oblast’) patterns
Another pattern emerges if  we break the numbers down to a regional (oblast’) level. In the 
next table we can see the trends in terms o f competitiveness for each oblast ’ over the whole 
post-independence period. In 1995 the capital Bishkek is the most competitive oblast with
an ENC of 4.42 while the rural districts o f Talas and Batken only have a value of 3.15 and
3.30 respectively. In the 2000 elections all oblast’s have lower numbers o f ENC, but the 
relative proportions are still pretty much the same, with Bishkek and the surrounding Chui 
oblast ’ significantly higher than both Batken and Talas, both peripheral rural districts.
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Table 5: Competitiveness per Oblast’ 1995-2007
4.42
4.2
3.7
3.2
2.98 2.90
2.7
2.322.30
2.2
2.02
1.87
1.7
1.44
1.2
1995 2000 2005 2007
Bishkek 4.42 3.34 2.64 2.90
Batken 3.30 2.65 3.21 1.87
Jalalabad 3.71 2.98 2.80 1.44
Naryn 3.56 2.53 2.60 2.52
Talas 3.15 2.74 2.80 3.42
Chui 4.03 3.64 2.322.50
Issyk-Kul 3.24 2.573.62 3.35
Osh Oblast 4.05 2.79 3.08 1.69
Osh City 3.34 2.22 2.30 2.02
* Batken was previously a part of Osh oblast but was in 1999 granted oblast ’ status. Here I have 
reconstructed Batken oblast’ results going back in time by taking out the Batken SMDs from Osh oblast’.
The finding that the capital region o f Bishkek is more competitive (fragmented) than other 
regions over time is hardly surprising. The literature largely assumes that democratic 
pressures and contestation emerges in urban areas (see chapter 1). The mean score for 
Bishkek for all these three elections is an impressive 3.32 ENC.20 Furthermore if  we 
examine the extreme cases of competitiveness the capital region emerges as one o f the most 
frequently highly competitive regions. Another interesting pattern can be found in the 
northern regions of Talas and Issyk-Kul, both with low levels o f variation from one election
20 But the standard deviation is also high .78, significantly higher than Talas (.31) or Issyk-Kul (.44) 
indicating volatile levels o f ENC from one election to the other.
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to the other.21 Both of these rural districts had persistently high levels of competitiveness, 
with averages above three in each case.
In the other end of the spectrum we have the southern multi-ethnic city of Osh that reveals 
an interesting pattern of persistently lower levels of competitiveness.22 The second least 
competitive district is Batken with a mean ENC of 2.76. There are also occasional low 
performers like Jalalabad in the December 2007 elections with a meager score of 1.44 
indicating severely circumscribed competition. As a matter of fact Jalalabad has also 
figured frequently in the least competitive SMD category in the last three elections, with 
two out of ten least competitive SMDs being in Jalalabad in 2000 and 2005.
Urban/Rural patterns
As already noted, traditional democratic theory would have us expect urban constituencies 
to be more competitive than rural. The underlying assumption here is that urban voters are 
better educated, better informed, more mobile, economically autonomous from the state and 
therefore better positioned to make an informed choice not relying on local formal or 
informal authority as voters in rural communities often do.23 Low levels of contestation in 
rural districts could have, hypothetically, been explained by the presence of strong informal 
institutions that coordinate electoral contests. But, as already outlined previously in this 
chapter, high levels of rural competition could also be explained by district level social 
fragmentation, the so called ‘clan politics’ hypothesis. Let us first examine urban/rural 
patterns in more detail.
21 Variability measured as Standard Deviation (a). Low: Talas .31 o, Issyk-Kul .44 a, Naryn .51 a. High: Osh 
oblast ’ .97 a, Jalalabad .95 a.
22 Osh city has an average of 2.47 ENC (1995-2007) and a standard deviation of .59.
23 For more on this see chapter 1.
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Table 6: Competitiveness per Urban/Rural SMDs 1995-2007
■ 1995 Urban «1995 Rural >2000 Urban 2000 Rural "2005 Urban 2005 Rural *2007 Urban 2007 Rural
* The definition of urban I use in this analysis is a SMD that covers the two major cities in Kyrgyzstan 
Bishkek and Osh. All other districts were defined as rural by default. Another option would have been to also 
include the third city, Jalalabad, as a urban SMD. The difference in terms of the results would have been that 
the urban average in 2000 would have been 3.00 as compared to rural 3.10, putting rural ahead of urban in 
terms o f ENC. The reasons being low levels o f ENC for the SMD covering Jalalabad city in 2000 (ENC 1.96 
and 1.73). However, both these districts also cover parts o f the surrounding countryside.
** There are no disaggregated data available from the 2007 elections yet (and probably never will be).
If we group together urban and rural constituencies and compare over time we see that the 
2005 elections produced higher levels o f competitive districts in rural constituencies than in 
urban constituencies. The difference is substantial and it spurs us to hypothesize that the 
‘democratic theory’ assumptions about urban areas being more pluralistic in terms of 
contestation are not correct in the Kyrgyz case.24 How do we explain this interesting 
pattern? What do numbers of ‘Effective Candidates’ tell us about what is going on in rural 
Kyrgyzstan in times o f elections? How is this competition organized; why is it that the local 
rural elite is unable to ‘control’ the electoral process and therefore reduce uncertainty and 
competition? This opens up interesting questions as to how the introduction o f formal 
institutions, elections in this case, interacts with existing informal institutions. These are all 
central questions in the chapters that will follow.
24 In other cases o f Central Eurasia urban districts are predictably more competitive, and significantly so 
(author’s upcoming PhD dissertation).
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Data collection and challenges
Obtaining information from primary sources is easier in Kyrgyzstan than in many other 
countries in which politically salient sub-ethnic identities are said to play a role, like 
Somalia, Chechnya, or Afghanistan. So if we want to conduct research into ‘clan politics’ 
and elections Kyrgyzstan is a good case to test some hypothesis and to further develop the 
theories involved. However, obtaining disaggregated election results from polling station 
level turned out to be very difficult.
Data was gathered from both written historical and contemporary documents. Limited 
archival research was done, mainly targeting rayon level newspapers. Election statistics 
were compiled using both Central Election Commission, local election commission, and 
results reported in local media. Even though the context was non-democratic, if not 
authoritarian, we have good reasons to believe that the election results largely corresponds 
to the actual ballots cast or at least represent the will of the local strongmen in a particular 
polling station. This problem was, at least partly, solved by crosschecking the data provided 
by official sources with local election observation documentation and their protocols from 
the polling stations.
I was conducting many interviews myself, but at times I was accompanied by a local 
interpreter/assistant. For the survey we interviewed a total of 160 candidates, of which I 
myself conducted a third (see Appendix I). In addition to the survey I interviewed another 
160 plus people for the purposes of this dissertation.
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Table 7: Interviews by the author (candidate survey interviews not counted)
Name of Region (oblast')
Total
interviews
Share of 
total (%)
Bishkek 64 39%
Batken 5 3%
Jalalabad 8 5%
Naryn 9 6%
Osh City 26 16%
Osh 30 18%
Talas 5 3%
Chui 0 0%
Issyk-Kul 16 10%
Kyrgyzstan Total 163 100%
As this table shows there is a Bishkek (capital city) bias in the non-survey interviews. This 
is a very common pattern in research on Central Asia and elsewhere in the developing 
world. Foreign researchers coming into the capital cities and interviewing urbanized upper- 
middle class locals. This is the reason for the rural (non-Bishkek) bias in the actual 
candidate survey conducted (see Appendix 1). Also, for the case study chapter on a ‘clan 
prone’ district (Kara-Kulja) we conducted face-to-face interviews with over 50 voters. 
Whenever in the field, i.e. outside of the capital of Bishkek, I stayed with families that in 
addition to shelter often also provided me with valuable local information. At the beginning 
of my interviews I told my informants that I could protect their identity, by using aliases. 
However, in most cases the informants opted out of this offer.
Survey26
The main unit of analysis in this research project is individual candidates. The selection of 
our sample was done through a selection of Single-Member Districts (SMD) in the 
February 2005 Parliamentary Elections in Kyrgyzstan. The selection was done in two 
phases: 1) random selection and 2) purposeful addition of SMDs of particular interest. The 
selected SMDs and all the candidates in them is the baseline for the sample. The population 
is all candidates that officially registered to run in parliamentary elections in Kyrgyzstan. In
25 For more on this see chapter six.
26 For more information about the survey see Appendix 1.
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addition we decided to backtrack and interview candidates in the same SMDs for earlier 
elections as well, in 2000 and 1995. A total of 160 candidate interviews were conducted, of 
which a third by myself, and the rest by local assistants. All the interviews were conducted 
in the spring/summer of 2008. Roughly half of the conducted interviews focused on the 
2005 elections and the other half focused on the two previous electoral cycles (1995 and 
2000)
A structured questionnaire was constructed partly based on previous experience of similar 
surveys conducted by Professor James Hughes (J. Hughes, 1997). The questionnaire 
contained 41 questions of which 15 were open-ended and 26 were multiple choice type 
questions. Getting the candidates to agree to an interview was not always easy. This is 
partly due to the intensifying political intimidation in 2007/08. Furthermore some of the 
questions asked were of a sensitive nature, e.g. questions about ‘clan politics’, that fore 
some people have connotations of political corruption, tribalism and the like. No other 
study has spent so much effort in trying to gamer insight into how the Kyrgyz define 
themselves. This study has an obvious elite bias in that the sample is made up of 
parliamentary candidates. In the text when I refer to a specific interviewee from the 
candidate survey I only use the respondent number, e.g. #96 for respondent number 96 on 
my list of 160 interviewees.
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CHAPTER 3: CONTESTATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN 
KYRGYZSTAN 1995-2005
This chapter will give the reader an overview of all the parliamentary elections in post­
independence Kyrgyzstan starting with the first ever multi-party elections in 1995 up until 
the 2005 elections that triggered the so called ‘Tulip Revolution’. Parliamentary elections 
in Kyrgyzstan have been competitive, but the nature o f the competition is poorly 
understood in the literature.27 Why only focus on parliamentary elections? Especially since 
the institutional context is characterized by superpresidentialism and therefore a very weak 
legislative branch. As this chapter will demonstrate, parliamentary elections did become a 
key battleground for political elites in Kyrgyzstan after independence. The increasing role 
of the parliament can also be noted in its many legislative initiatives.28 The fact that the 
parliament became more important is not to say that the country became more democratic. 
As a matter of fact, the development since the first liberalizing reforms in early 1990 has 
been up and down, but overall in a more authoritarian direction.
Table 8: Democracy Diagnosis Kyrgyzstan 1991-2007
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* Freedom in the World Comparative and Historical Data, 2009. Both political rights and civil liberties 
reported. The measures are a one-to-seven scale, with one representing the highest degree o f Freedom and 
seven the lowest. I have only included the years when a change in the score has been reported.
27 See introductory chapter.
28 In 1995 only 7% o f the laws were initiated by MPs, the following year that went up to 23% and in 2000 it 
was already more than 50% (Iskakova, 2003, p. 319).
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Here we can see that in the early 1990s the most frequent rating is that of 4, which is equal 
to the Partly Free category.29 This is the level Kyrgyzstan remains on in terms of political 
rights all through the 1995 electoral cycle up until the 2000 Parliamentary elections and the 
re-election of Akaev as president later that same year. At the turn of the millennium 
Kyrgyzstan received its worst ever score and is therefore put in the ‘Not Free’ category. 
This does not mean, however, that elections were becoming less competitive. In this 
chapter I will show that indeed under the surface contestation at the voting booth remained 
surprisingly high all throughout the period studied here.
This chapter gives an overview of the electoral dynamics of each multi-candidate election 
1995-2005. The methodology used here is both quantitative and qualitative. I start by 
outlining the political context for each of the parliamentary elections, starting with a short 
summary of the last Soviet era elections in 1989/1990. The main issues and elite dynamics 
at hand for each of the election years, 1989/1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005, are presented. For 
each of the election years I will give an overview with the following sub-sections: 
competitiveness; accountability, political parties; candidate typology (including gender) 
and candidate selection. In chapters four I will further develop the candidate typology and 
test the explanatory power of a candidates profile for electoral success.
29 Those whose ratings average 1.0 to 2.5 are considered Free, 3.0 to 5.0 Partly Free, and 5.5 to 7.0 Not Free.
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1989/1990 Soviet Elections
The first ever multi-candidate elections in 1989 were conducted in the context of challenges 
to Soviet authority in parts of the Union. Perestroika and glasnost ’ had unleashed societal 
pressures for change in most parts of the communist bloc and elections to the Union-wide 
People’s Assembly (Congress) were therefore an important event in the demokratizatsiia 
process. In contrast to their Baltic and Slavic counterparts no significant democratic or 
nationalist movements emerged in the Central Asian republics. In Kyrgyzstan the Soviet 
system was still intact in 1989 even though the First Secretary, Absamat Masaliev, was 
getting increasingly unpopular (Huskey, 1995, p. 817). A key political issue at the time was 
housing and other social issues. Ethnic tension was another key fissure, with the clashes in 
the southern capital of Osh being the most explicit example (Tishkov, 1995). The Slavic 
minority also felt increasingly uncomfortable with the emerging nationalist agenda.
In March 1989 elections were to be organized for the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies, 
a newly established Moscow based Union-wide body with a total of 2,250 seats. Members 
were to be elected from three sources: Political territories; and ‘all-union social 
organizations’ like trade unions, the CPSU, and the Academy of Sciences.30 The Kyrgyz 
Soviet Socialist Republic had 53 seats, of which 12 were from national-level public 
organizations. For the first time ever the one-party rules were relaxed. Elections were held 
simultaneously all over the USSR. In February 1990, one year later, elections were 
organized to the republican (Kyrgyzstan) level Supreme Soviet. A new national Supreme 
Soviet was envisioned with 350 members. These were to be elected from Single-Member 
Districts.31 Elections to all levels (republican, o b l a s t city, rayon, village and 
neighborhood) were organized, an impressive total of 13 500 seats were to be filled. The 
election itself was neither free nor fair; one problem being the right to nominate candidates 
was given only to labor collectives, educational establishments and military units. Party
30 Info from www.britannica .com accessed I9-Feb-2009.
31 Two-round Single-Member District system, contrary to the multi-member district proposed by the 
September 1989 draft (Huskey, 1995)
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officials, enterprise directors, collective and state farm chairmen, and officials won the 
majority of seats.
The Supreme Council (Soviet) that was elected in the spring of 1990 went on to vote for the 
Communist Party First Secretary, Absamat Masaliev, as the new chairman of the 
Parliament. A notable fraction in the parliament, ‘Movement of 114’, a group of reformist 
deputies, was later formed (Collins, 2006, pp. 127, 180). In the fall of 1990 the Supreme 
Council was supposed to vote for a new president, but none of the three candidates, 
Masaliev from Batken (Osh), Amanbaev from Issyk-Kul, nor Jumagulov from Chui, 
managed to get a majority of the votes. In the final vote in August a political outsider, a 
widely recognized scientist, Askar Akaev, got a majority of the votes.32 Later, after the 
Kyrgyz parliament had voted for independence from the USSR in August 1991, a 
presidential election was scheduled for October that same year with only one candidate, 
Akaev, running.33
32 In the major English books about politics in Kyrgyzstan there seems to be a disagreement as to whether 
Akaev was a member of the Communist Party or not. Collins claims that he was not a member, while 
Anderson claims that he indeed was a member since 1981, but a low profile one (Anderson, 1999, p. 23; 
Collins, 2006, p. 127).
33 This even if parties were allowed to contest the elections (Collins, 2006, p. 232).
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February 1995 elections
The early years of independence were a big challenge to the newly independent state of 
Kyrgyzstan. The battle over the new constitution in 1992-3 eventually led to President 
Akaev’s dissolution of the Soviet era parliament in 1994 mimicking Yeltsin’s forced 
dissolution of the Russian Duma in September 1993.34 The May 1993 constitution initially 
outlined a new 105 member strong professional unicameral legislature. 1994 was the year 
of referendums in Kyrgyzstan, with one in January about Akaev’s policies and presidential 
term, and another one in October about a new constitution outlining a bicameral parliament 
with a 35 seat professional lower chamber Legislative Assembly (El Okuldor Jyiyny), and a 
70 seat upper chamber, People’s Representative Assembly (Myizam Chygaruu Jyiyny). In 
1995-96 people in Kyrgyzstan seemed to have high hopes for electoral democracy.
A majority of the public (56%, up from 49% in 1995) believes the people of 
Kyrgyzstan can change the situation in their country by participating in elections.
About a third (36%, unchanged since 1995) do not agree. Those who believe 
Kyrgyzstan is a democracy are more likely than those who do not to say that by 
participating in elections, people can change the country’s situation (61% to 
48%). Half of the people agree (17% agree completely) with the statement,
‘Voting gives people like me a chance to influence decisions made in our 
country.’ Slightly fewer (43%) disagree (Olds, 1997).
In terms of political issues the period was dominated by economic decline and its social
consequences, and allegations of corruption, especially regarding foreign investors in the
gold extracting industry (Anderson, 1999, p. 27).35 There was also an increased urgency to
manage the north/south divide, with the regionalism that caused the civil war in Tajikistan
fresh in memory. On 22 October 1994 local elections were organized (rayon & city
assembly) and they provided a good training ground for parties and political entrepreneurs
for the upcoming parliamentary elections. In 1994 Kyrgyzstan had an impressive Freedom
House score of four for Political Rights and three for Civil Liberties, classified as ‘partly-
free’, and there was indeed a lot of hope in the international community and among local
democracy activists that this would be a turning point in Kyrgyz history. Turnout in the
34 The Soviet era parliaments in the western parts of the former Soviet Union were all dissolved earlier than 
the ones in Central Asia.
35 The Kumtor gold mine in Issyk-Kul oblast ’ perhaps being the most high profile case.
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1995 parliamentary elections was officially reported at 72.8% (OSCE, 1995).36 The overall 
assessment of the electoral process was according to Collins ‘free and fair’; the OSCE 
Election Report uses phrases like ‘candidates and parties were largely free to campaign’, 
but also note ‘many reports of pressure and intimidation... ballot stuffing and multiple- 
voting’ (OSCE, 1995).37 Nowhere does the OSCE report say that the elections were ‘free 
and fair’, however, they do state that ‘Kyrgyzstan's parliamentary election was much freer 
and fairer than elections or referendums in these other newly independent states of Central 
Asia’ (OSCE, 1995, p. 10).
What were the main electoral issues as determined by the candidates themselves? The 
following table provides an overview of the responses from the candidate survey conducted 
by the author.38
Table 9: Economy and Rule of Law high on the agenda
Sector Sector focus 
(primary)
Sector focus 
(secondary)
Infrastructure^ 13% 7%
Agriculture=2 17% 13%
Social sector=3 10% 13%
Economy=4 30% 33%
Education=5 0% 13%
Rule of Law=6 27% 0%
Corruption=7 3% 20%
n 30 15
* Two options in order of priority. Here we report only the 1995 responses to Q26.
Here we can see that the most common area of concerns was the economy and rule of law. 
Considering the rural bias in the sample it is perhaps not surprising that agriculture is also 
rated a very important issue. The platforms ranged from general positions, being against 
President Akaev (#36), to specific proposals, like creating a unified economic zone among 
CIS countries with common taxes and border procedures (#13). Some candidates were 
explicit about their disapproval of the privatization policies of previous years (#87, 102). In
36 Note that there are conflicting reports about this. Turnout for the first and second rounds of the 1995 
parliamentary elections was officially 62 and 61 percent, respectively (Graybow, 2001, p. 222). Others 
reported a turnout of 43 percent (‘Central Asian Republics,’ Asia 1996 Yearbook, Far Eastern Economic 
Review, p. 108).
37 For the overall assessment see Collins, 2006, p.232, footnote 88.
38 See Appendix I (n=160).
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the survey we also asked about the groups that the candidates were focusing on in their 
campaign efforts. This was asked in an open-ended fashion and later coded by the author.
Table 10: Candidates represent locals’
Group Focus Distribution
w om en= l 0%
youth=2 25%
old=3 13%
locals=4 63%
other=5 0%
8
* Q25. This question was scrapped in the later interviews due to the un-reflected nature of the responses 
(platitudes).
An overwhelming majority of the respondents answered ‘locals’, as in people in their own 
constituencies. This reveals that the majoritarian electoral system indeed produced 
localized contests, where the candidates perceived their role as representing geographically 
determined categories, not broader socio-economic strata or interest groups.
Competitiveness
A post-election survey showed that there was a lot of dissatisfaction with the conditions in 
the country at the time and that the disappointment with the government was high. This 
might be part of the explanation for the high numbers of candidates challenging the 
authorities, in that the lack of socio-economic development would be detrimental to the 
incumbent MP. The average number of absolute candidates was almost nine and in terms 
for the Effective Number o f Candidates score we get an impressive 3.85.39 Clearly electoral 
support was fragmented and in many cases there was no winner in the first round of 
elections. Only 16 of the 105 seats were filled in the first round of elections 5 February 
clearly indicating a high level of contestation. Even in early March only 85 of a total of 105 
seats had been filled. Collins notes some urban/rural patterns, where the capital of Bishkek 
was more competitive than rural surrounding areas (Collins, 2006, p. 238). This is indeed 
corroborated by SMD level data (chapter two).
39 For more on the Effective Number o f Candidates score see Methodology chapter. There are also some 
conflicting reports about the number of candidates. According to some there were 1,400 candidates for the 
105-seats (‘Central Asian Republics,’ Asia 1996 Yearbook, Far Eastern Economic Review, p. 108).
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What do the candidates themselves have to say about competitiveness? Here I examine 
district level competitiveness and how the candidates themselves reason about this 
phenomenon. We wanted to ask the candidates what they thought about the level of 
contestation in their own SMD.
Table 11: High levels of competition
Was your SMD com petitive?40
Answer Options 1 9 9 5
Very 39% 13
Som ewhat 39% 13
Don't know 0% 0
A bit 9% 3
Not at all 12% 4
answered 33
skipped 2
skipped % 5.7%
* District (SMD) competitiveness (1995 only, Q30).
Almost eighty percent of the candidates considered the elections to have been somewhat or 
very competitive. As I have already shown this is confirmed by the reported election 
results; the level of competitiveness in these elections was indeed very high. We also asked 
candidates to compare their district’s competitiveness with the previous election in that 
same district.41
Table 12: More competitive than the 1990 Supreme Soviet elections
Was your SMD more or less 
competitive than previous elections?
Answer Options 1995
More competitive 74% 23
Less competitive 3% 1
Equally competitive 23% 7
answered 31
skipped 4
skipped % 11.4%
* Note that the district magnitude was changed in between elections. This is therefore a somewhat misleading 
question. We left it up to the respondents to interpret the question. (Q31).
40 We specified ‘competitive’ as ‘meaning a tight race in which the outcome was difficult to predict. In 
Russian: E m j i  j ih  Bam OAHOMaHAaTHbifi OKpyr KOHKypeHTOcnocofiHMM (HMeeTca b  BHAy HanpaaceHHtie 
roHKH, b  KOTopux fibuio Tpyzmo CAejiaTb npomo3)?
41 Note that the SMDs were re-delineated in each election and this judgment can therefore only been seen as 
provisional.
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This table illustrates that these first ever post-independence elections were significantly 
more competitive than the last Soviet era elections. This is a tautology, since this was the 
first time that the process was truly open. But as I will later show the perception of the 
elections being competitive is not necessarily always reflected in the real numbers of 
Effective Candidates. In any case, the interesting part is how the candidates themselves 
explain high levels of competition. We asked this question in an open-ended fashion and 
later coded to responses into several thematic categories.
Table 13: Strong candidates explains high levels of competitiveness
Thematic
category Distribution (%)
Strong op pon en ts= l 70%
Incum bency=2 0%
KG Mentality=3 0%
'Clan'=4 4%
Facade=5 0%
Other=6 26%
n 23
* We coded a total of 88% of the responses (total responses n= 111). Here 1995 only (Q32).
Here we can see that the strength of the opponents is by far the most common explanation 
for the competitiveness of a particular SMD in the 1995 elections.
There were many candidates per district and among them there were former MPs 
who had experience from electoral campaigns (#96).
The ‘strong opponents’ category includes things like experienced MPs, rhetorically skilled
campaigners, well-respected local authority figures etc. The ‘other’ category mainly
includes issues like financial resources. As a matter of fact in all ‘other’ responses («=6) the
issue of money is brought up. Not a single respondent considered high levels of
competition to be a fa9ade. In only one case was there an explicit reference to kinship
(‘clan’) dynamics.42
Next, we asked what the candidates thought about levels of falsification.
42 Referring to ‘Strong support from their uruu-voters’ (Q32, #118).
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Table 14: Election results somewhat falsified
Were the election results falsified in your SMD4J
Answer Options 1995
Completely falsified 12% 4
Som ewhat falsified 48% 16
Don't know 6% 2
Not much falsified 15% 5
Not at all falsified 18% 6
answered 33
skipped 2
* (Q35).
A majority thought that the results were either completely or only ‘somewhat’ falsified. The 
question about ‘falsification’, falsifikatsia in Russian, was always a sensitive one. My 
impression is that there was and continues to be some confusion about international 
election standards. In many cases falsification of the election results would be confused 
with harassment of candidates and their campaigners or campaign sabotage, like tearing 
down posters. When talking about falsification I here refer to what is going on in the 
polling station on Election Day, everything from ballot stuffing to the counting and 
tabulation procedures. So what if the results were falsified, what did the candidates do 
about it? Only three out of 35 candidates in the 1995 sample made a formal complaint. This 
in itself can be taken to indicate a lack of trust in the rule of law in Kyrgyzstan, or perhaps 
even more intriguingly that there was not serious widespread falsification.
Accountability
Apart from competitiveness, one of the key issues in this research project is that of electoral 
accountability. In a semi-authoritarian context like Kyrgyzstan we are interested in voting 
behavior and local loyalties. One of the main questions in the literature is whether elections 
actually empower the citizenry or whether it is just another way of local elites battling it out 
among themselves (R. A. Dahl, 2005). Another question is the role of incumbency. The 
ultimate test of accountability is whether incumbents really do lose elections. In cases 
where this is theoretically possible, but has never happened there is reason to doubt the
43 Specified as to what extent the final CEC numbers reflect the intention of the voters in your SMD.
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democratic nature of the contest.44 In the 1995 elections 20 former Supreme Council 
representatives were re-elected, but there were also some interesting cases of losing MPs:
Among the losers was former parliament Speaker Medetkan Sherimkulov, 
Akaev's bete noir, who charged that officials in his election district had connived 
to ensure his defeat. On February 27, Akaev established an independent public 
commission to investigate these allegations (OSCE, 1995, p. 9).
There were also other high-profile cases of losing incumbents.
Table 15: No incumbents in a majority of the SMDs
Were any incumbent Member of 
Parliament running in your SMD?
Answer Options 1995
No 61% 19
Yes (please name) 16% 5
answered 31
skipped 4
* (Q37).
Here it is important to note that there were far fewer seats available in the 1995 elections, 
only 105 as compared to the 350 in the Soviet era assembly. As already noted, in some 
cases strong incumbents prevailed, perhaps partly due to falsification, but in most cases the 
competition was still stiff. Let us examine how candidates themselves explain the 
phenomena of incumbency in Kyrgyzstan. In cases where there was a winning incumbent, 
we asked the reasons for them winning, and in cases of losing incumbents we asked about 
the reasons for them losing.
Table 16: Government support and good reputation are essential
Winning incumbent
Reason %
Govt support 29%
'Good guy' 14%
Money 14%
Other 43%
n 14
Losing incumbent
Reason %
No Govt support 22%
’Bad guy' 33%
No Money 11%
Other 33%
9
* Note: I have here coded the responses into the major thematical areas. (Q38).
In these elections governmental supports seems to have been very important, especially in 
explaining winning incumbents. Financial resources, while already important in early
44 This corresponds to Przeworksi et.al.’s definition of democracy (Przeworski, 2000).
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1990s, is not considered as important as in the following two elections. Some candidates 
were said to have performed well due to their oppositional platform (Ibraimov), while 
others performed badly due to being ‘too oppositional’ (Turgunaliev).45 Government 
support would translate as ‘adminresurs ’ in Russian -  i.e. a different type of electoral 
manipulation, not outright falsification as in ballot-stuffing or incorrect tabulation of 
results. The ‘other’ category includes issues like campaign experience and financial 
resources.
Political parties
Already by the beginning of 1993 the Justice Ministry had registered 12 political 
movements or parties.46 The Communist party had been deregistered after the failed coup in 
Moscow 1991, but regained its official status as a party in early 1992 47 Akaev expressed at 
a very early stage his desire to see the emergence of a coherent and strong party system. 
Ethnic and religious parties were explicitly banned. Not surprisingly the reinstated 
Communist Party emerged as the strongest party organization. The Democratic Movement 
of Kyrgyzstan (DMK), created in May 1990, provided a platform for other parties to 
emerge. As a spin-off from DMK Erkin Kyrgyzstan (ErK) was created by Turgunaliev and 
Tekebaev in early 1991. Tekebaev later went on to form the Ata Meken (Fatherland) party 
in late 1992. At the far end of the nationalist spectrum there was the nationalist Asaba party 
lead by Bazarbaev which propagated for an ethnically ‘pure’ society, using the slogan 
‘Kirgizia for Kirgizians’ (Hvoslef, 1995). Prior to the election in September 1994 a poll put 
the Communist Party up as the most popular party with 10% nation-wide support, closely 
followed by 9% for Ata-Meken, 5% for ErK, 4% for DMK, 2% for Asaba, and only 1% for 
the newly established Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan (SDPK). There are also some 
interesting regional patterns, where the capital of Bishkek and the surrounding region, 
Chui, report very high numbers for people that will not take part in the elections, almost a 
third. Also, the Communists and Ata Meken are doing far better in peripheral oblasts 
(Anderson, 1999, p. 38).
45 Ibraimov in Alai (#96, #97) and Turgunaliev in Ala-Buka/Aksy (#71).
46 According to OSCE and Collins the number of registered parties prior to the 1995 election cycle was 12 
(Collins, 2006, p. 185; OSCE, 1995).
47 Late 1993 according to Collins.
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Less than a fifth of the total number of candidates were nominated by political parties and 
of those that got elected only 14% (18% according to CEC) were party candidates.48 One- 
quarter of all the party nominated candidates («=161) were from the Communist Party. 
Nine parties managed to get a member elected: SDPK three seats; United Kyrgyzstan, 
Erkin Kyrgyzstan, Ata-meken and Kyrgyz Communists all took two seats; and one seat 
each for Agrarian, Agrarian-Workers, Kyrgyzstan’s Democratic Movement, and the 
Republican Party 49 But the biggest groups were clearly the ‘independents’, who won 86 % 
of the seats in the 1995 election.50 After the election there was a re-configuration of the 
positions with several of the independent candidates reportedly aligning themselves with 
the Social Democrats after the election (Collins, 2006, p. 233).51
Just as a point of reference I here present a post-election survey conducted by IFES in late 
1996. When asked to name a party that represents the views of the respondent the 
Communist Party comes out on top with 12%, followed by DMK 6%, Asaba 5%, Erkin 
Kyrgyzstan 5%, and Ata-Meken 4% (Olds, 1997).52 The survey also asked about the ideal 
number of parties, as a way to gauge the support for a multi-party system. One-quarter said 
that one party would be the ideal number, 14% said that two would be ideal, and 43 said 
that several (>2) would be ideal.
Candidate typology and candidate selection
Many of the elected MPs were former kolkhoz directors or officials, but the businessman 
category was also well represented. The 1995 elections were also the first ones where new 
business elites, some of them suspected of financial impropriety, emerged as an important 
elite category. The persons elected were not disposed to view Akaev favorably, as with the 
many cases of local bosses being returned to the parliament after being challenged by a 
candidates appointed by the center (Anderson, 1999, p. 52). After the elections Akaev is
48 The number of party candidates is taken from the OSCE Election Report (OSCE, 1995). The number for 
elected party MPs that Collins gives is 21.9% (23 MPs) (Collins, 2006, p. 232).
49 Asaba (Banner) also took one seat in the upper house (not according to the CEC though).
50 ‘Out of 35 members of the Legislative Assembly, 23 are independent; out of 105 members of the Assembly 
of People's Representatives, 69 are independent’ (Namatbaeva, 1995, p. 3).
51 According to President Akaev himself, only 84 of the 105 MPs elected in 1995 had a party affiliation 
(Brauer, 1995).
521 here report the numbers from the second cohort, December 1996, w=1494. The respondents were shown 
card with party names on them.
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said to have claimed that ‘the existing election law allowed members of the old elite and 
representatives of criminal groups to be successful’ (Anderson, 1999, p. 52). In the IFES 
survey they also asked whether the respondents knew the name of the MP from their 
district. A majority said that they did not know.53 Let us now examine how the successful 
candidates can be characterized in terms of professional categories. Here is a list of all MPs 
elected in 1995 and how their professional profile is distributed in the population.
Table 17: Nomenklatura candidates doing well
Elite segm ents SMD (percent)
State apparatus (power in Russian) 29%
Industry, construction, transportation, agriculture 29%
Local governm ent 14%
Entrepreneurs (Businessm en) 7%
* Source: CEC (Tsentralnaya Komissia, 1996).
There is also an indication that some criminal elements were involved in the campaigning, 
with one of the candidates being assassinated in Bishkek 16 February.54 As for gender 
balance I note that only four women were elected out of 105, three in Legislative Assembly 
and one in People’s Assembly, totalling less than four percent.55 Half of the female MPs 
were elected in the capital of Bishkek and none of them were incumbents.56 A more 
detailed typology of candidates, based on interview data (candidate survey) will be 
presented in the next chapter.
S u m m a r y
The 1995 elections were clearly highly contested and the dispersion of the vote well 
illustrates the fragmented nature of politics in this immediate post-independence period. 
Contrary to many other post-colonial settings there was no prior large-scale mobilization 
for independence, no strong organizational basis for popular movements, no charismatic or
53 The number from the July 1995 cohort is 45% ‘no, do not know the MPs name’, while the number of ‘no’ 
is up to 55% in December 1996.
54 Central Asia Monitor, news summary, no. 2,1995.
55 It should be noted that the fall in the representation of women was typical across the former Soviet bloc 
(Matland & Montgomery, 2003).
56 We do not know the third Legislative Assembly MP though.
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prolific leaders in Kyrgyzstan.57 The only established party organization, the Communist 
Party was banned after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and even if it was later 
reinstated its organizational capacity was clearly circumscribed. In the 1995 elections 
political parties were extremely marginal and the contest was instead organized around 
local elites with positioning towards the Akaev administration as a key variable. In many 
cases local bosses were returned to the parliament after being challenged by centrally (pro- 
Akaev) appointed candidates (Anderson, 1999, p. 52).The socio-economic crisis was the 
main concern of both voters and candidates according to our candidate survey and other 
surveys conducted at the time of the election. The elections were perceived to be highly 
competitive, at least by the candidates themselves. Many members of the old Soviet era 
assembly decided not to run, but there were also several cases where they did run, and in 
most cases successfully so. But there were also cases of losing incumbents, indicating that 
elections were perhaps becoming meaningful in the sense of uncertainty of outcome and 
holding representatives accountable. Private sector entrepreneurs, aka businessmen, were 
still a fairly small category of candidates and the role of financial resources was still not as 
important as it will later become (see next chapter).
After the 1995 parliamentary elections the democratic opposition became even more 
marginalized (Collins, 2006, p. 228). Later in the fall of 1995 Akaev surprised many by 
expediently urging for Presidential elections for December 1995. There was speculation 
that the reasons he called the elections early was the fear of increasing economic 
dissatisfaction, that would get worse all the time, and mobilization in the southern parts of 
the country for the Soviet era republican leader, Absamat Masaliev (Namatbaeva, 1995, p. 
2). In the elections Akaev got 72% of the votes in the first round.
57 Like in some of the other post-Communist countries, like Walesa in Poland or Havel in Czechoslovakia, or 
Nkrumah in Ghana or Nyerere in Tanzania.
February/March 2000 elections
This was a challenging time for the people of Kyrgyzstan and for their elected leader, 
President Akaev. The Freedom House electoral process scores and economic growth 
figures provide a good description of the trend in late 1990s and early 2000s:
Table 18: Electoral democracy declining and economy growing
Indicators 1997 1998 1999 2001 2003
Electoral Process (FH) 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.75 6 .00
Civil Society (FH) 4 .50 4 .50 4 .50 4.50 4 .50
GDP growth (annual %) 10 2 4 5 -0
* Freedom House Nations in Transit scores range from 1 representing the highest level and 7 the lowest level 
of democratic development. GDP figures are from World Bank WDI indicators.
Here we can see that there was no significant change in the civil society score during this 
period, but that the electoral cycle in 2000 worsened the ranking in terms of the democratic 
nature of the electoral process itself. The impact of the Russian financial crisis in 1998 can 
also be seen in the fall in economic growth. For the 2000 elections a new bicameral 
parliament was adopted, based on the 1999 revision of the election code and the 1996 
constitution (amended in 1998). This was the first time that a mixed electoral system was 
used, with 15 out of 105 seats elected from a party list (14%). Two chambers were 
envisioned, a 60-seat professional Legislative Assembly, of which 45 members elected 
from SMDs and 15 from national party list, and a 45-seat People’s Representative 
Assembly with 45 members from SMDs (Iskakova, 2003, p. 386).
As a general trend it can be noted that people were getting more and more satisfied with the 
post-Soviet developments. The economy grew and the chaos of the early years of 
independence was waning.
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Figure 1: Increasing levels of dissatisfaction
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* Source: IFES poll (Pototskii & Sharma, 2002).
However, as we will see this is not the whole story. According to some observers there 
were three major sets o f issues that dominated the pre-election scene: corruption, economic 
stagnation, and regional disparities (R. Abazov, 2003b, p. 546). In terms of corruption 
Kyrgyzstan was at the rock bottom of Transparency International’s corruption index, 
ranked 87th out of a total o f 99 countries. Red tape, corruption, and a weak property rights 
regime were especially annoying for the emerging new entrepreneurial class. The 
staggering economic decline of the first years o f independence also contributed to the 
tensions in the country. The aggregate level growth figures only give us part o f the picture, 
since the capital of Bishkek and the surrounding Chui oblast’ attracted 70% of all 
investments (R. Abazov, 2003b, p. 547).Regional disparities created a lot o f discontent in 
rural areas, and especially so in the southern parts of the country. Turnout in the 2000 
elections was just below 60% in the first round and 65% in the second round (Graybow,
2001, p. 222).
What were the issues if we ask the candidates themselves? The following table provides an 
overview of the responses from the candidate survey conducted by the author.
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Table 19: Economy and the social sector in focus
Sector Sector focus 
(primary)
Sector focus 
(secondary)
Infrastructure^ 10% 25%
Agriculture=2 14% 0%
Social sector=3 24% 8%
Economy=4 34% 17%
Education=5 7% 8%
Rule of Law=6 10% 17%
Corruption=7 0% 25%
n 29 12
* 2000 only (Q26).
Here we can see that in terms of area focus the most common first priority issue is still the 
economy. This largely follows the priorities of the populace as reported in polling 
conducted by IFES (Olds, 1997; Pototskii & Sharma, 2002).58 The social sector is also 
emerging as an ever more important sector. In the 1990s the Soviet era social safety nets 
were dismantled and this left many groups vulnerable. This might explain the fact that there 
was a renewed focus on the social sector among the candidates in the 2000 elections. Issues 
of infrastructure and corruption also come up as important second priorities, but among the 
voters only 2% claim to be dissatisfied due to high levels or corruption, and for democracy 
that same number is 1% (Pototskii & Sharma, 2002). Several candidates specifically 
mentioned democracy as an important focus area.59 The campaign platforms of the 
candidates ranged from general positions, like being against privatization, to specific 
proposals, like granting a particular mountainous district a ‘high altitude’ status and 
therefore increasing the subsidies (#65: Q26). The transitional years of the 1990s were 
heavily present in the minds of the candidates. One candidate uttered: ‘People do not 
believe in the reforms of the early 1990s, the western experiments’ (#67).
Competitiveness
In the first round of elections in February there was on average 4.7 absolute candidates in 
each SMD. However, the average Effective Number o f Candidates (ENC) score was 3.1,
58 Where the reasons for people being dissatisfied were (in order or importance): Unemployment 24%, Low 
living standards 20%, Inflation 10%, Economic recession 10%, Lack of social protection 9%.
59 However due to the small number in the total sample we decided to not code this as a separate category.
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understandably lower than the absolute number, but still a very high number. A total of 420 
candidates were registered to stand in the SMD for both chambers. Eleven parties contested 
the 15 available proportional seats. The Legislative Assembly had 230 candidates 
challenging the 45 seats, an average of 5.1 candidates and ENC 3.1. The People’s 
Assembly had 186 candidates running for the 45 seats, 4.1 on average and an ENC of 3.05, 
almost exactly the same as for the Legislative Assembly. Competition was clearly very high 
if on average there were three effective candidates, meaning three equally strong candidates 
receiving roughly the same share of the votes each in each SMD.60
What do the candidates themselves have to say about competitiveness? Here I examine 
district level competitiveness and how the candidates themselves reason about this 
phenomenon. We wanted to ask the candidates what they thought about the level of 
contestation in their own SMD.
Table 20: Very high levels of competition
Was your SMD competitive?
Answer Options 2000
Very 63% 19
Som ewhat 30% 9
Don't know 0% 0
A bit 3% 1
Not at all 3% 1
answered 30
skipped 3
skipped % 9.1%
♦ (Q30).
Over ninety percent of the candidates considered the elections to have been somewhat or 
very competitive. It is interesting that the candidates consider the election to have been very 
competitive since this is the time the international community considers a low point in 
Kyrgyzstan’s ‘democratic development’ (see Table 18). This just goes to show that the 
international community is obsessed with high-profile national level politicians, like Felix
60 Some of the competition might be attributed to the re-drawing of the districts for the 2000 election (see later 
chapters).
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Kulov or Danyar Usenov in the 2000 elections, but that they failed to recognize local level 
dynamics outside of these heavily exposed SMDs.61
We also asked candidates to compare their district’s competitiveness with the previous 
election in the same district.62
Table 21: A majority considers elections more competitive than in 1995
Was your SMD more or less competitive 
than previous elections?
Answer Options 2000
More competitive 54% 15
Less competitive 18% 5
Equally competitive 29% 8
answered 28
skipped 5
skipped % 15.2%
* Note that the district magnitude was changed in between elections. This is therefore a somewhat misleading 
question. We left it up to the respondents to interpret the question (Q31).
This table illustrates that elections were becoming more and more competitive over time. 
This might seem strange considering that the first post-independence elections in 1995 had 
been established a very high baseline category for comparison. There might be some 
idiosyncrasies due to the sampling frame (see methodology appendix). Or it might be due 
to the subjective nature of the question. In any case, the interesting part is how the 
candidates themselves explain high levels of competition. We asked this question in an 
open-ended fashion and later coded to responses into several thematic categories.
Table 22: ‘Strong candidates’ explain high levels of competition
Thematic
category Distribution (%)
Strong op pon en ts= l 55%
Incum bency=2 0%
KG Mentality=3 10%
'Clan'=4 0%
Facade=5 5%
Other=6 30%
n 20
* We coded a total of 88% of the responses (total responses n= 111, Q32).
61 For more on these high-profile cases see previous chapter on history of elections in Kyrgyzstan.
62 Note that the SMDs were re-delineated in each election and this judgment can therefore only been seen as 
provisional.
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Here we can see that the strength of the opponents is by far the most common explanation 
for the competitiveness of a particular SMD. The other category mainly concerns financial 
resources, but previous campaign experience is also mentioned in a few cases. Only 5% 
considered high levels of competition to be a fa9ade. The great majority of these responses 
show that even though the electoral process did not reach international standards in terms of 
free and fair elections, they nevertheless were competitive and the competition was real. 
Some responses to this question also mentioned that the position of MP is indeed a very 
attractive position, and that many therefore wanted to win.63 Next, we asked what the 
candidates thought about levels of falsification.
Table 23: Elections somewhat falsified
Were the election results falsified in your SMD64
Answer Options 2000
Completely falsified 23% 7
Som ewhat falsified 35% 11
Don't know 10% 3
Not much falsified 16% 5
Not at all falsified 16% 5
answered 31
skipped 2
* (Q35).
A majority considers the 2000 elections to have been somewhat or completely falsified in 
terms of the officially reported results. On the other hand one third considers the elections 
to have been not falsified.
Accountability
In these elections 38 of the incumbent parliamentarians were re-elected, a significantly 
higher number, as a total of the new composition, than in the 1995 elected parliament. This 
goes to show that there was clearly a break in terms of representation with the breakup of 
the Soviet Union in Kyrgyzstan and that by 2000 there was a new political elite emerging. 
But most of the incumbents did not manage to get re-elected in the first round. There are 
also some interesting cases of Election Day turnover, for instance Abyt Ibraimov in Kara-
63 #30 and #61.
64 Specified as to what extent the final CEC numbers reflect the intention of the voters in your SMD.
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Kulja, a case that we will examine in more detail in a separate chapter. Examining how the 
candidates themselves explain the phenomena of losing incumbents, or alternatively how 
they explain the power of incumbency we get the following patterns:
Table 24: Why did the incumbent win/lose?
Winning incumbent
Reason %
Govt support 7%
'Good guy' 36%
Money 29%
Other 29%
n 14
* (Q38).
Losing incumbent
Reason %
No Govt support 0%
’Bad guy' 50%
No Money 50%
Other 0%
4
Here we can see that being a ‘good’ representative and having money are seen as the most 
important features in securing re-election in 2000. In this sample we only have four 
comments about losing incumbents and in all of the cases fellow candidates blame that on 
them being ‘bad guys’, i.e. not properly serving their own constituencies. The other 
category also includes one explicit allegation of the use of bandit gangs, something that will 
become more important in the 2005 election (#113). Also, in one of the winning cases it 
was mentioned that ethnicity played a large role in the sense of all the Uzbeks voting for 
the Uzbek candidate. Since the district had an Uzbek majority the incumbent Uzbek patron 
therefore easily secured re-election (#139).65 Financial resources is also clearly becoming 
much more important, at least as an explanation for securing re-election.
Political parties
By the time of the February 2000 elections 42 parties were officially registered. A total of 
11 parties nominated candidates for the 15-seat party list proportional element. The 
competitiveness score for the party list was a very high 5.7 (ENC), with the Communists 
coming out on top receiving 28 % of the vote. The bloc ’Union of Democratic Forces got 
19% and the Democratic Party of Women of Kyrgyzstan did relatively well with 13%. The 
seat distribution in the final parliament is as follows:
65 District no. 34, the city of Osh, in the 2000 elections.
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Table 25: Election Results and fractions
Category Orientation Party Name
Party List 
Seats
SMD
Seats
Total
Seats
Presidential
Orientation
Pro-Presidential Union of 
Den. Forces
4 8 12
Dem. Party 
of Women
2 0 2
Party of 
Afghan W. 
Vet.
2 0 2
Pro-
Government/Centrist
Maya
Strana
1 3 4
Agrarian 
Labor Party
0 1 1
Independent 73 73
Candidates
Oppositional
Orientation
Opposition People's
Party
0 2 2
DMK/Ar-
Namys
0 0 0
Leftist Opposition Party of 
Communists
5 1 6
Opposition/Centrist Erkin
Kyrgyzstan
0 1 1
Ata-Meken 1 1 2
* This table is taken from the OSCE Election Observation Report (OSCE, 2000, p. 20).
Some parties had some pre-election procedural problems, like People’s Party and Ar- 
Namys that were both denied registration. Others like DMK was at first registered, but later 
de-registered (OSCE, 2000). Erkin Kyrgyzstan did not win any seats in the PR election, but 
one of their members won a SMD seat (Tursunbai Bakir-Uulu). The parties positioned 
themselves in relation to the Akaev regime, with the Communist Party aggressively coming 
out against the neoliberal marketization reforms. Asaba (national resurrection in Kyrgyz) 
on the other hand attacked the President for ‘unnecessary concessions’ to ethnic minorities 
and not being nationalist enough (R. Abazov, 2003b, p. 548).
Candidate typology and candidate selection
So what kinds of candidates were running in 2000, and more importantly what kinds of 
candidates were successful? In terms of the successful ones this is how Freedom House
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reported the results: ‘A mix of government officials, intellectuals, and clan leaders captured 
82 of the 105 seats in that vote’ (Graybow, 2001, p. 222).66 As was already shown in the 
table above, the biggest category of successful candidates were independents. These were 
candidates that represented local and regional bosses (R. Abazov, 2003b, p. 549). 
According to the Central Election Commission the professional distribution is as follows:
Table 26: Engineer is the most common professional background of MPs
Category %
Engineers 33%
Economists 17%
Historians 10%
Lawyers 8%
Doctors 6%
Agronomists 4%
Military 3%
* Others: Philologists 2, Physicists 2, Journalists 2, Architects 1, and Teacher 1. CEC data, both LA and PA 
(Tsentralnaya Komissia, 2001).
Here we can see that a third of all the new MPs had an engineering background, a 
profession that during the Soviet era often meant influence in the collective farms and other 
industries. The intellectuals are also a fairly big category, if we include historians, lawyers, 
doctors, journalists, and teachers, totalling almost one third of the candidates. In terms of 
gender balance I note a small increase from the previous parliament, with seven women out 
of the total of 105 MPs, six in the Legislative Assembly, of whom three from the party lists, 
and one in the People’s Assembly, totalling 7%. Three out of four of the female MPs were 
from SMDs in the capital of Bishkek, indicating a weak female rural representation. It 
seems as if a plurality system does not favor women, since only four women made it to the 
parliament from SMDs and half of them were Russian. This will be further explored in later 
chapters.
Summary
The 2000 electoral cycle was characterized by several high-level cases of intimidation, 
including de-registration of leading candidates. However, under the surface the competition 
remained fierce. Even compared with the very competitive elections of 1995, a majority of
66 Note the use of the ‘clan’ concept. Here the author gives an impression of ‘clans’ existing as corporate 
groups whos ‘leaders’ somehow get elected to the parliament.
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the surveyed candidates reported higher levels of competitiveness for the 2000 elections 
compared to the previous one. Clearly local elites were taking elections serious even if their 
participation was not channeled through political parties. High levels of contestation also 
go together with high levels of reported irregularities, both in the pre-election form and 
actual Election Day falsification. The authorities were involved in attempts to deliver a 
particular result, but due to the fierce local level inter-elite battles they were not able to 
completely stifle the competition. Many MPs from the 1995 elected parliament managed to 
secure another mandate period, but in most cases only after being forced to a run-off. There 
are also interesting cases of losing incumbents. The role of money seems to be on the rise 
starting with these elections. Financial resources are mentioned as a key explanation for 
both easy re-election, in cases of a lot of resources to spend, and failure to secure re- 
election in cases where the incumbent had insufficient funds.
The parliamentary elections in the spring of 2000 were followed by even more flawed 
presidential elections in the fall of 2000.67 The years following the 2000 elections were 
increasingly difficult years for President Akaev. The discontent finally led to the Aksy 
tragedy and cemented the opposition’s attitude, especially in the southern parts of the 
country.68
67 OSCE/Odihr reports that the elections ‘despite some positive features failed to comply with OSCE 
commitments for democratic elections and failed to reverse the negative trends identified during the 
parliamentary elections’ (OSCE, 2000).
68 On 17 March 2002 in the southern Aksy district, police opened fire on a demonstration in support of a 
jailed local politician. Five demonstrators were killed and several others injured. The event sparked month 
long nationwide protests (Radnitz, 2005).
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February/March 2005 elections
In the spring of 2005 the national context was one of preparation for the upcoming 
presidential elections where Akaev had announced his intention of stepping down. The 
international context was one of ‘colored revolutions’, with regime changes in both Georgia 
and Ukraine. The discontent with Akaev was especially strong in the southern parts of the 
country, following events in Aksy in 2002 and the border settlement with China.69 There 
was a disappointment with the development achievements of Akaev’s economic 
transformation (marketization) and political liberalization (democracy). The first round of 
elections in February 2005 led to small-scale local protest around the country, a 
mobilization that after the second round coalesced into a sustained national protest 
movement. On March 24 a crowd of demonstrators ousted Akaev, in what was later termed 
the ‘Tulip Revolution’.
These were the first elections since the adoption of a new constitution in 2003, which 
created a unicameral 75-member parliament to be elected from SMDs. Even though the 
election procedures in the previous election cycle had been rated low by international 
standards, the voters still believed in their ability to affect the outcome.70 However, in a poll 
conducted in April 2005, right after the elections, 76% of the respondents said that the 2005 
parliamentary elections had indeed been unfair (IRI, 2005). In the regional distribution of 
trust in the electoral process there are some interesting details. One could have expected 
relatively high numbers of dissatisfaction with the electoral process in the southern parts of 
the country and especially in the Jalalabad region, where the ‘revolution’ later started. The 
region in which the largest proportion thought that the elections were unfair, however, was 
the northern oblast’ of Naryn (87%), while in the southern district of Jalalabad, where the 
post-election demonstrations started, the number who thought the elections were unfair was 
the lowest (64%). In any case a very high number, but if the main issue of the post-election 
mobilization was discontent with the electoral procedures one could have expected
69 For more on the tragedy in Aksy see (Radnitz, 2005). For more on the border dispute and its settlements see
(Gullette, 2006a).
70 69% in a USAID survey (n=1500) responded positively to the question ‘Does your participation in 
elections at any level influence the results of such elections? (Q10) (USAID, 2004).
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demonstrations to start in Naryn or Bishkek instead. My interpretation is that disgruntled 
local elites in the form of losing incumbents used the ‘falsification’ narrative to keep their 
supporters mobilized. These local pockets of dissatisfaction later coalesced into a nation­
wide movement that key opposition leaders picked up.
In any case, this was always going to be in an interesting election since Akaev’s term was 
coming to an end and there had been discussions about extending his term. Some people 
claim that pro-Akaev candidates were supported by the presidential administration with this 
clear aim in mind. What were the issues if we ask the candidates themselves? The 
following table provides an overview of the responses from the candidate survey conducted 
by the author.
Table 27: Economy and the Social sector most important (still)
Sector Sector focus 
(primary)
Sector focus 
(secondary)
Infrastructure^ 16% 0%
Agriculture=2 13% 0%
Social sector=3 19% 40%
Economy=4 25% 33%
Education=5 6% 0%
Rule of Law=6 16% 27%
Corruption=7 6% 0%
n 64 15
* 2005 only (Q26).
Here we can see that in terms of area focus the most common issue concerns the economy, 
followed by, social sector, and rule of law (human rights) issues. This largely corresponds 
with the attitudes among the voters, as reported in polling conducted by EFES, IRI, and 
others (IFES, 2005; USAID, 2004). The platforms ranged from general positions, like 
being against President Akaev, to specific proposals, like organizing elections for local 
police commissioners. Three candidates were explicit about their disapproval of the 
privatization policies of the previous years. Another exclaimed: ‘Socialism was fair. Today
71we are lost. Where are we going?’ (#51). Several also brought up the issue of migration. 
And others were candid about their mission: ‘Distributing budgetary means to Alai rayon 
[candidate’s home region]4 (#89).
71 #24, 50, and 151.
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Competitiveness
In the 2005 elections there were an average of 5.2 (physical) candidates in the 75 single 
member election districts. This seems to imply that there was at least a certain degree of 
contestation for the available seats. If we look at particular constituencies a different story 
emerges. In three districts there was only one candidate. If we look at the measure Effective 
number o f Candidates (ENC) we see that on average there were 2.8 ‘viable’ candidates in 
each district. In any case, this figure clearly shows that there was a real choice in most 
constituencies. Furthermore, rural districts were slightly more competitive than urban 
districts.
What do the candidates themselves have to say about competitiveness? Here I examine 
district level competitiveness and how the candidates themselves reason about this 
phenomenon. As already noted, there are some interesting patterns of competitive SMDs in 
Kyrgyzstan, one of them being the fact that competitiveness is spread out all over the 
country, even in rural peripheral areas. We wanted to ask the candidates what they thought 
about the level of contestation in their own SMD.
Table 28: Very high levels of competition
Was your SMD competitive?
Answer Options 2005
Very 62% 47
Som ewhat 17% 13
Don't know 0% 0
A bit 8% 6
Not at all 13% 10
answered 76
skipped 2
skipped % 2.6%
* 2005 only (Q30).
Around eighty percent of the candidates considered the elections to have been somewhat or 
very competitive. This is roughly the same as in the two previous elections, even though the 
real ENC numbers differ between the elections. The number of districts that are perceived 
as not at all competitive increased significantly compared to the 2000 elections, up from 
3% to 13%. I will later examine in more detail the cases of complete lack of competition, as 
in the district of Kadamjai in Batken oblast’ where there was only one candidate. We also
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asked candidates to compare their district’s competitiveness with the previous election in 
the same district.72
Table 29: More competitive than the 2000 elections
Was your SMD more or less competitive 
than previous elections?
Answer Options 2000
More competitive 54% 15
Less competitive 18% 5
Equally competitive 29% 8
answered 2 8
skipped 5
skipped % 15.2%
* Note that the district magnitude was changed in between elections. This is therefore a somewhat misleading 
question. We left it up to the respondents to interpret the question (Q31).
This table illustrates that elections were becoming more and more competitive over time. 
At least that is the perception of the candidates. The Freedom House scores also confirm 
this trend, with Kyrgyzstan being labelled ‘Not Free’ (PR 6, CL 5) in 2000 and ‘Partly 
Free’ (PR 5, CL 4) in 2005 In any case, the interesting part is how the candidates 
themselves explain high levels of competition. We asked this question in an open-ended 
fashion and later coded responses into several thematic categories.
Table 30: ‘Strong candidates’ explain high levels of competition (again)
Thematic
category Distribution (%)
Strong op pon en ts= l 43%
Incum bency=2 15%
KG Mentality=3 4%
'Clan'=4 4%
Facade=5 2%
Other=6 30%
n 46
* We coded a total of 88% of the responses (total responses n= 111, Q32).
Here we can see that the strength of the opponents is by far the most common explanation 
for the competitiveness of a particular SMD. The other category includes issues like
72 Note that the SMDs were re-delineated in each election and this judgment can therefore only been seen as 
provisional.
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ethnicity, criminal networks, and financial resources. Only 2% considered high levels of 
competition to be a fagade.
There were 12 candidates in my district. Four of them put up as candidates with 
the purpose of taking votes away from me. Before, my village belonged to Kara- 
Kulja district, but these elections it was attached to Myrza-Ake district in order 
to split the vote. Everything was done on purpose and against me. The powers 
did it all (#159).
But these kinds of anecdotes are rarely found in our responses. The great majority of these 
responses show that even though the electoral process did not reach international standards 
in terms of free and fair elections, they nevertheless were competitive and the competition 
was real. Some responses to this question also mentioned that the position as a MP is 
indeed a very attractive position, and that many therefore wanted to win.73 It is especially 
interesting in a context of superpresidentialism, that local elites would consider the 
parliament as being an attractive and influential body (#83). Several interviewees brought 
up the issue of candidates having gathered experienced since the first post-Soviet elections 
and that voters as well better understood what elections was all about.74 Or as one put it 
‘There were many candidates for one district, some of whom were former MPs and 
experienced in election campaigns’ (#96). Again, this illustrates the thesis about elections 
in themselves generating competitiveness over time.75
Other pointed out the deep distrust of authorities and the heightened political battles in this 
transition period. One candidate said ‘Maybe [the elections were competitive] because 
presidential elections were soon to take place. Therefore, the then President Akaev wanted 
to push his own MPs in to the parliament to ensure support in the future’ (#18). The main 
dividing line seems to have been the position towards the authorities. A lot of pressure was 
put on many political activists and potential candidates, but this also created counter­
reactions: ‘Authorities started losing power and started pressuring people. People did not 
like this’ (#53). In some cases candidates were asked to join the pro-presidential party 
Alga: ‘The Governor [Shaidiev] personally invited me to see him and demanded that I 
withdraw my candidacy and work for Alga party’ (#143). In only a few cases were explicit
73 #30,61,63,86.
74 #28, 54, 60, 65, 96, 101, 105, 121, 138,148, 150. Some mentioned specific skill sets that candidates had 
developed, like rhetorical (oratory) sills (#97, 106, 154).
75 What I have termed the Lindberg thesis (Lindberg, 2006).
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kinship (‘clan’) dynamics mentioned as an explanation to high levels of competition, and in
7 f\these cases always in conjunction with localism, nepotism, and traibalizm (#59?, 128). 
Next, we asked what the candidates thought about levels of falsification.
Table 31: Some falsification on Election Day
Were the election results falsified in your SMD
Answer Options 2005
Completely falsified 25% 19
Som ewhat falsified 22% 17
Don't know 10% 8
Not much falsified 23% 18
Not at all falsified 19% 15
answered 77
skipped 1
* (Q35).
Note that those that consider the officially reported election results as completely or 
somewhat falsified have decreased somewhat over time. Still almost half of the respondents 
rate the election results are having been falsified. So what if the results were falsified, what 
did the candidates do about it? It has been shown by others that disgruntled candidates can 
be a very potent force (Radnitz, 2006b). A third of the candidates filed a formal complaint 
(Q36). This is a very high number and it shows an upward trend, which in itself indicated a 
certain measure of trust in the system.
Accountability
In 2005 there were 27 incumbent parliamentarians that managed to get re-elected. By far 
the most successful incumbents, at least proportionally, where the ones in Talas oblast’, 
while Issyk-Kul oblast’ incumbents where all unsuccessful. In the city of Osh there is also 
a strong rate of re-election, while in the oblast’ it is the other way around. Once again it is 
worth remembering that the post-election protests started in Osh and Jalalabad, both with 
relatively low re-election rates. Disappointed incumbents were key actors in the ensuing 
post-election mobilization. Several of the winning incumbents were also on the 100 richest 
persons in Kyrgyzstan list. In two of these cases there were only one candidate running in
76 One claimed that due to the vast size of the districts there were many ‘local’ (elites) that wanted to take 
their chances (#128).
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their district, Baibolov in Bishkek and Sabirov in Osh. The ‘against all’ votes were 
exceptionally high in both cases, perhaps demonstrating dissatisfaction with the candidate 
registration process. At least this voting system gave the voters an opportunity to show their 
dissatisfaction.77
Several of the incumbents only got around a third of the vote in the first round. We do not 
have any data on pre-election turnover, i.e. retirements. But we do have data on incumbents 
who lost in 2005. We start by looking at incumbents who served two terms before they 
were humiliated at the voting both. By all accounts these candidates had to be well prepared 
for securing re-election. After serving two terms one would assume that they would have 
perfected their personal and organizational skills. It is therefore surprising that seven two- 
term incumbents lost, and even more surprising that the support levels for three of them 
was below 10 percent. This clearly demonstrates that some accountability mechanisms 
were at play. This is not to say that the voters decided, it might well have been a decision 
by pro-presidential state structures as well.
Table 32: Two-term incumbent MPs losing in February 2005
Name SMD % in 1995 % in 2000 % in 2005
Usubaliev Turdakun 1995:22PA
2000:22LA
2005:33
78 99 24
Ibraimov Abyt 1995:25LA
2000:33LA
27 3 n/a
Artykov Anvar 1995:26LA
2000:26LA
2005:42
35 29 19
Pronenko Alevtina Pavlovna 1995: 4 LA 
2000:43LA  
2005:6
19 43 9
Sadybakasova Sharipa 1995:21PA  
2 0 0 0 :4PA 
2005:6
52 29 38
Zhuraev Borubai 1995:22LA
2000:31LA
2005:42
42 36 9
Kanimetov Zhangoroz 1 9 9 5 :17PA 
2 0 0 0 :18LA 
2005:71
33 54 7
* First round vote-shares. LA = Legislative Assembly, PA = People’s Assembly. In 2005 there was a 
unicameral parliament.
77 The ‘against all’ vote was also practiced during the Soviet time.
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Two of the losing two-term incumbents were female MPs, both of them elected from the 
party list component in 2000. This goes to show the gender effects of the majoritarian 
electoral system. Women were indeed doing well when they were running on a nation-wide 
party list for a specific Women’s party. For the 2005 elections the party list component was 
scrapped and the women that had been elected from the party list did not manage to beat 
their male counterparts at the booth. Of the losing two-term incumbents it is notable that 
three of them got less than ten percent in the first round in 2005.
What if we ask the candidates themselves to explain the phenomena of losing incumbents? 
Table 33: Money explains why incumbents win
Winning incumbent
Reason %
Govt support 14%
'Good guy' 14%
Money 64%
Other 7%
n 14
Losing incumbent
Reason %
No Govt support 3%
'Bad guy' 39%
No Money 8%
Other 50%
36
* (Q38).
Here we can see that those incumbents that get re-elected largely succeed because of 
financial resources, at least if you ask the losing candidates themselves. In 14% of the cases 
they win due to outright governmental support and in 14% they win because they simply 
are ‘good guys’, i.e. they deserve to win. Incumbents that lose generally do so for some 
other reason, but in forty percent of the cases allegedly due to them being ‘bad’ 
representative for the local communities in their district. In some cases it was pointed out 
that incumbents simply promised too much and failed to deliver.78 As you can see the 
‘other’ category is very large when it comes to explaining losing incumbents. This category 
includes things like: the candidate gave up (did not campaign actively); minority nationality 
(uzbek); wrong gender (female); not known locally etc. In several of the districts where 
incumbents lost there were two or even more incumbents in one and the same district. Since 
the districts had been redrawn and the number of MPs was reduced, all of the incumbents 
could not have won a seat in any case. Some of these districts illustrate the complete lack of
78 ‘flenyraT  He BbinojiHHJi o6emaHH», x o t s  6 m j i  H36paH TpHamw. i io h b jih j ic h  t o j h >k o  nepea BbiGopaMw’ 
(#148). Or #49, 54, 148.
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pre-election coordination among the local elites, or how else could one explain the high 
numbers of candidates and also the high levels of vote dispersion (competitiveness). A 
possible explanation could be the lack of an established balance of power between different 
local forces, a sort of uncertainty if you will. In such a context, and especially with 
constantly changing district boundaries, you cannot really blame local elites for filing their 
own preferred candidates instead of uniting behind a joint consensus candidate.
Political parties
17 % of the nominees were party nominated, a majority of them from the pro-presidential 
Alga Kyrgyzstan (Forward Kyrgyzstan). A third of the 75 elected MPs were party members, 
of which only two were non Alga Kyrgyzstan members. There were 12 parties actively 
involved in the election campaign in February/March 2005. The main pro-presidential 
parties in the 2005 parliamentary elections were: Alga Kyrgyzstan and Adilet. Bermet 
Akaeva, the daughter of the President played a leading role in the former while the latter 
was run by the Head of the presidential Administration. There were also four opposition 
groups, People’s Movement of Kyrgyzstan (NDK), the Civic Union for Fair Elections, Jani 
Bagit (New Direction), and Atajurt (Fatherland). All these coalitions were formed back in 
2004. In addition to these you also had two communist parties and Felix Kulov’s Ar-Namys 
(Honour) party. Before the elections all these seven oppositional groups formed Forum of 
Political Forces with the idea of cooperation during the electoral campaign.
It is a challenge to measure the relative strength of these parties when only a few candidates 
used the party label in the campaign. One way to measure a party’s organizational strength 
is to look at the ability to nominate regional and local election commission members and 
local election-day observers. If we look at the data we can see that Adilet and Alga 
Kyrgyzstan had substantially higher numbers of SMD level election commission members 
than any other parties. In total 25 parties had their members represented in SMD level 
election commissions, all in all 289 members which is approximately 26 per cent of all 
SMD election commission members. Note that one third of the members of the polling 
station commissions had to be party members according to the law. One interviewee said 
that these are only a fa9ade, that they come up with fictive protocols, fictive organization
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membership.79 If we look at the numbers of election observers over the whole country we 
see that in total there were almost two thousand party representatives observing the voting 
procedures on both 27 February and 13 March. There were over nine thousand domestic 
election observers out on the Election Day and also almost seven hundred international 
observers mainly from the OSCE and CIS. Eight parties had managed or decided to take 
part as election observers. It can be noted that Alga Kyrgyzstan did not observe the election 
at all. The strongest parties in terms of mobilizing election observers were Adilet and 
Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan. Parties were most successful in getting their 
candidates registered in Batken, Bishkek and Chui oblasts, where parties nominated around 
20 percent of the registered candidates. In Jalalabad on the other hand only 9 percent of the 
candidates were party nominated.
Candidate typology and candidate selection
389 candidates participated in the election (425 were originally registered). 13 of the 
candidates had been members of the legislative assembly and 13 had been members of the 
People’s assembly. Over half of the elected MPs were pro-Akaev and approximately one 
third had close ties with informal business (Radnitz, 2006b). Like in previous elections, 
parties, worker collectives, or the candidates themselves were allowed to nominate. In some 
cases the initiative came from voters in the hometown (village) of the candidate or perhaps 
their workplace. However, most candidates decided to register as self-nominated, largely 
due to easier registration requirements. There were also some high-level cases of candidate 
de-registrations. Concerning gender balance, I note with disgrace that not a single female 
MP was elected.80 There were five constituencies where women got over 10 percent.81 
Three of these five districts were in Bishkek. It seems as if women are facing real 
difficulties in rural districts. Also, several high-level court cases demonstrate that even 
formal complaint mechanisms might prove difficult for women.
79 Interview, Maatov, Uzgen, 22-Jun-2006.
80 Bermet Akaeva, the daughter or president Akaev, was actually elected at first, but was later deprived of her 
seat after the ‘Tulip revolution’.
81 SMD no. 6 with Sharipa Sadybakasova, who got more than Eshimkanov, but a court case later gave the seat 
to him. Interview, Sadybakasova assistant, 10-Mar-2008.
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Summary
These elections were by far the most dramatic ones in the history of Kyrgyzstan. The 
elections provided a crucial organizational logic for the revolution that followed. Already 
established campaign organizations and fully mobilized voters were utilized in the post­
election protests. There were yet no strong political parties, but out of disparate local 
contests grew a protest movement that in the end managed to topple the sitting President 
Akaev. There are several interesting factors to note about the 2005 election as compared to 
previous electoral cycles. First of all, competition remained at very high level both in terms 
of Effective Number o f Candidates, but also in terms of perceptions of competitiveness 
(Table 28). And what is even more important there is a perception among the candidates 
themselves that competition was becoming ever more fierce. Also, the role of financial 
resources significantly increased in the 2005 election. But the level of perceived 
falsification decreased for the first time since independence in 1991. This might seem a bit 
paradoxical considering that the perception of a flawed electoral process triggered the 
‘Tulip Revolution’.
The spring events of 2005 in Kyrgyzstan severely altered the power balance in the country. 
Two former Prime Ministers played a key role in the post-revolution developments. 
Kurmanbek Bakiev quickly took over the presidency, while the formerly imprisoned 
oppositional politician Felix Kulov was put in charge of the security apparatus. Later in the 
spring these two agreed to a so called tandem agreement, whereby Kulov would not run in 
the presidential elections scheduled for July 2005 and would instead be appointed Prime 
Minister after the elections.
Chapter 3 Conclusions
Since the first multi-candidate elections introduced during the Soviet era there has been, on 
average, a fairly high number of candidates challenging each seat in Kyrgyzstan. 
Exceptionally high as a matter of fact, considering that we are talking about a regime that 
can at best be classified as Partly Free. An examination of particular constituencies 
illustrates this well.82 In some constituencies there has been only one candidate, while in
82 Which is the topic of the constituency level chapter (6).
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others there has been over twenty. This figure clearly shows that there has been a real 
choice in most constituencies in all post-independence elections. Another clear pattern is 
that women fare much better in urban constituencies. It can also be noted that there was a 
complete break in terms of women incumbency in 2005.
The perception of competitiveness on a district level has been persistently high with on 
average 83% rating the election as either ‘very’ or ‘somewhat’ competitive. It is interesting 
to note that perceptions of competitiveness do not correlate with international ratings of the 
electoral process. Freedom House lowered the Electoral Process score for Kyrgyzstan in the 
wake of the 2000 election, but the perceived level of high competition was 93% for that 
year. This just goes to show that the international community is obsessed with high-profile 
national level politicians, like Felix Kulov or Danyar Usenov in the 2000 elections, and 
failed to recognize local level dynamics outside of these heavily exposed SMDs.83 
Furthermore, when asked to compare levels of competition with the previous election in the 
same district there is also a fairly stable majority that rates the elections as becoming more 
and more competitive for each time. When asked to explain high levels of competition 
candidates simply say that there are many strong candidates with the campaign experience, 
networks, and the resources needed to get votes. However, as already noted high levels of 
competition does not mean that it was a fair battle. As a matter of fact the level of 
falsification on Election Day has been persistently high. In terms of trends over time there 
are nevertheless some interesting patterns. The perception of falsification is going down 
over time, with the 2005 elections being the first time ever a majority does not rate the 
elections as having been ‘completely’ or ‘somewhat’ falsified. Also, encouragingly the 
number of candidates that make formal complaints about falsification is dramatically going 
up over time, perhaps indicating increasing levels of trust in the rule of law.
83 For more on these high-profile cases see previous chapter on history of elections in Kyrgyzstan.
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CHAPTER 4: BUSINESSMEN AND BUREAUCRATS 
COMPETING FOR VOTES -  CANDIDATE PROFILES AND 
CAMPAIGNING EXPERIENCES IN KYRGYZSTAN
Why do they compete? Evidently because they seek allies from the outside, as 
their strength comes from the numbers that follow them. And how do they 
compete? Clearly, by promising benefits and advantages to their followers. The 
consequence is that the unorganized majority of the politically inactive becomes 
the arbiter in the contest among the organized minorities of the politically active.
So, no matter how oligarchic the organization of each minority is when 
examined from within, nonetheless the result of the competition between them is 
democracy (Sartori, 1978, p. 71?).
The issues in this chapter can be formulated in several different ways, but the underlying 
puzzle is what happens on an elite level when political liberalization occurs. Does the elite 
continue to be homogenous and monolithic, therefore implying continuity or what some 
authors refer to as adaptation.84 Or is there a pattern of a differentiated and polyarchic elite 
emerging, i.e. is there a brake with the Soviet era patters that can be labeled elite 
competition?
We have established that Kyrgyzstan is an interesting and perhaps unlikely case of political 
pluralism. Parliamentary elections in this newly independent state were surprisingly 
competitive in the post-independence period, with election results demonstrating extreme 
levels of vote dispersion. There were actually single-member districts (SMD) where ten 
candidates competed for one seat and where the votes were spread out fairly equally.85 In 
this chapter I address three key areas of interest in terms of electoral politics in Kyrgyzstan: 
1) who are the candidates; 2) how are they selected, whom do they represent and how do 
they compete; and finally 3) how do different candidate types perform. In the first part of 
the chapter I dwell on the type of persons that were running in each of the elections and the 
campaign experiences as reported by the candidates themselves. What I am interested in
84 See the special issue on elites in Governance, Volume 6 Issue 3 , Pages 303 - 460 (July 1993).
85 For instance in Chatkal-Alabuka SMD, Jalalabad oblast’, in 2005, there were nine candidates and the top 
five all got around 15%, and the rest got around 5% each. This district got an Effective Number o f  Candidates 
score of 5,96, indicating that there were almost six candidates that were competitive.
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here is to develop a typology of candidates so that I can later measure their respective 
success electoral performance over time. In the second part I present the campaign 
experiences of the candidates focusing on candidate selection and the role of political 
parties, but also on actual campaign techniques. The final part of this chapter consists of a 
first attempt to test the predictive power of candidate categories over election results.
In this chapter it is demonstrated that bureaucrats and incumbents continue to perform well, 
even though a post-Soviet economic elite is challenging them. The big losers are 
intelligentsia type of candidates and marginal societal groups, like farmers, pensioners, or 
unemployed people.
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Who are they? Outlining a Candidate Typoiogy
I begin by examining the kind of persons that were running in parliamentary elections in 
Kyrgyzstan 1995-2005, and based on this I develop a candidate typology. The idea here is 
to shed light on elite composition and study patterns of change and continuity in this 
volatile post-Soviet period. First I give an overview of the socio-biological and positional 
profiles of the sampled candidates. Thereafter I review the political experience of the 
candidates. This lays the ground for the latter part of the chapter where the hypothesis to be 
tested is that the role of business elites over time has increased and that the 2005 elections 
demonstrate the high point in this development.86
Socio-Biological and Positional
Where are the candidates from, how old are they, where did they get their education, and 
what was their main profession at the time of the election? There are many dimensions of a 
candidates’ life that could explain electoral performance. Let us start by examining the 
birthplace of the candidates. In most cases the birthplace of the candidate is in the district 
(SMD) where they eventually decide to run. This is a good illustration of the power of 
‘primordial ties’, i.e. that loyalty to their native locality is high among political 
entrepreneurs in Kyrgyzstan.87 It is possible that the candidates estimated their chances in 
the capital of Bishkek, or perhaps in the southern cities of Osh or Jalalabad, to be minimal 
due to a lack of horizontal networks (Radnitz, 2006a). The candidates might also have 
considered elections easier to manipulate in their home villages, both in terms of actual 
election day manipulation, but perhaps mostly in terms of voters being more susceptible to 
the lures of material gifts in impoverished rural communities.
The average age of a candidate at the time of the election was forty-seven years, with the 
youngest being twenty-three and the oldest seventy-one. And in terms of gender balance, as 
I showed in the previous chapter, the trend over time in Kyrgyzstan has been consistently
86 Tekebaev, among others described this trend to me in great detail, see also (Radnitz, 2009).
87 A local observer also noted that being native to a particular SMD actually triumphs ’clan’ (kinship) ties, in 
reference to the district of At-Bashy in Naryn oblast ’ (Baktibek Isakov, 28-Apr-2009, Harvard University).
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downward in terms of women’s representation, with the 2005 elected parliament eventually 
ending up as a male-only assembly.
If we now turn to educational background I note that a majority of the sampled candidates 
had graduated from a higher educational institution.
Table 34: Candidates are highly educated
Name of Institution
Number of
Students
(n = 160)
Kyrgyz National University 
(Balasagyna) 54
Kyrgyz State Technical University 24
Kyrgyz Agrarian University 16
Osh Humanitarian-Pedagogical Institute 10
Kyrgyz State Medical Academy 6
Tashkent Polytechnic Institute 4
Kyrgyz State Academy for Sports 3
Tashkent Higher Party School 3
Moscow Automobile-Road Institute 3
Osh Technological University 3
* Here we list all the educational institutions that had more than two of the interviewed sample attending 
them. Other institutions: Kyrgyz State Jurisprudence Academy 2, Academy of the Interior Ministry (MVD) 2, 
Moscow Commercial University 2, Frunze Economic Academy 2, Samarkand Cooperative Institute 2,
Andijan Agriculture Institute 2, Frunze Polytechnic Institute 2 (Q8).
Here we can see that candidates in Kyrgyzstan in general are quite a well-educated group of 
people. Furthermore, a third of them attended the major Kyrgyz National University. 
Educational background does not tell us very much about the candidates. Positional 
information is far more revealing. In the literature on post-Soviet transitions there are two 
ideal types of elite transformation that allegedly took place. One school of thought claims 
that the new elites were simply a reproduction of old Communist Party networks, a 
privatization of the nomenklatura of sorts (Kryshtanovskaya & White, 1996). Another point 
of view emphasizes elite competition and fragmentation, dividing post-Soviet elites into 
‘old’ and ‘new’ formations (Lane & Ross, 1999). However, as Hughes has pointed out age, 
or the generational dynamic, was also a significant factor in determining elite patterns (J. 
Hughes, 2001, p. 685).
In this chapter nomenklatura is defined as ‘a monolithic group of Party-Komsomol 
functionaries and technocrats ‘ (Lane & Ross, 1999, p. 160).
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... the Soviet elite was monolithic in nature, extending across all spheres o f  
party, state and social life. Its monolithic character was assured by the fact that 
all its members were communists, and by the manner in which all leading 
appointments had to be made or at least approved by higher-level party bodies 
(Kryshtanovskaya & White, 1996, p. 713).
Another concept is that o f an apparatchik, ‘an agent of the governmental or party
apparatus’. In this project I only consider representative political elites, i.e. elites that
engage in the politics of representation (elections, party work etc.). As a first take, and
arguably a rough one, I present the following distribution in the case o f Kyrgyzstan:
Table 35: Businessmen the largest group of Candidates
Coding
Total
2005 2000 1995 By­elect.
Response 
Percent 
..(% ) . . . .
Response
Count
Businessman 35% 51 33% 2 2 30% 9 36% 12 53%
Bureaucrat 33% 48 34% 2 3 40% 12 33% 11 13%
Intelligentsia 19% 27 12% 8 20% 6 27% 9 27% 4
Experienced
politicians
13% 19 21% 14 10.00% 3 3% 1 7% 1
answered 145 6 7 30 33 15
skipped 15
* Open-ended question ‘What was your main job at the time o f running?’ Responses were recoded into these 
four categories. For instance a lawyer, NGO professional, Academic was coded as Cultural. This division 
follows the main categorization o f post-Soviet elites (J. Hughes, John, & Sasse, 2002) (Q9).
Perhaps surprisingly only thirteen percent were experienced politicians, while thirty-five 
percent were businessmen. Obviously a candidate could fall into more than one category. 
However, based on a straightforward coding o f the reported responses this is the 
distribution we get. Over time there are some interesting patterns, with the proportion of 
businessmen and bureaucrats remaining largely stable, while intelligentsia candidates being 
significantly reduced from 27% in 1995 to less than half of that in 2005 (12%). 
Experienced politicians on the other hand are increasing over time going from a meager 
three percent in 1995 to over a fifth o f all candidates in 2005. In the final section o f this 
chapter I will go deeper into the different types o f candidates, going beyond this simplified 
way of categorizing candidates.
In terms o f work related experience it can be noted that over two-thirds o f the candidates 
had previously worked for the state. This might not come as a surprise since the state was 
indeed ever present in one form or the other during the Soviet era.
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Table 36: Two-thirds had worked for the State
Had you at the time of the elections (year X) ever worked for the State?
Answer Options
Total
2005 2000 1995 By-e lection sResponse
Percent
Response
Count
Yes 68% 106 70% 5 3 70% 2 3 73% 2 4 43% 6
No 32% 50 30% 2 3 30% 10 27% 9 57% 8
answered 156 7 6 33 33 14
* T h e  q u e s tio n  in R u s s ia n  w a s: Pa6oT anH  jih  B bi K oraa-JiH 6o b roccT pyK T ype a o  Bbi6opoB  X r. (Q 1 0 ) .
The table shows that the number of candidates that had previously worked for the state is 
fairly constant over time in our sample. As has been noted in the literature the Soviet 
nomenklatura largely remained in power in Kyrgyzstan, even if  President Akaev was a bit 
o f an outsider (Nogoybaeva, 2007). Nothing surprising here in other words. Let us now 
continue by examining the experience variable in more detail.
Political experience
We are here interested in the personal profile and prior political experience o f candidates. 
O f special interest is election related experience. If we start by examining the number of 
elections that our sample has participated in we see that the sampled candidates («=160) 
have participated in an average o f 1.76 elections.
Table 37: Many Candidates run repeatedly
Here we focus on the X elections, but have you ever ran 
in another parliamentary election? If  so, what years?
Answer Options Response
Percent
Response
Count
1990 9% 14
1995 42% 67
2000 41% 65
2005 55% 88
2 0 0 7 (PR) 16% 25
Other years (by-elections) 14% 23
answered 160
Total 282
Average 1.76
* Note that these are the aggregated numbers for the whole sample as o f  spring 2008. This does not say 
anything about the number o f elections that candidates had participated in prior to the year X (the year o f  
focus in each particular interview, Q2).
For each o f the interviews we focused exclusively on a particular election year (year X), but 
clearly many of the candidates had participated in elections prior to year X, and in many
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cases they did take part in elections after year X. We will get back to this fact later, but 
suffice to say that in all likelihood previous election related experience prepares the 
candidates for successful campaigning in the future. One of the secondary hypotheses in 
this project is indeed that the fairly open contest in the 1995 and 2000 elections gave a lot 
of people a first time direct experience with running their own campaigns and therefore as a
consequence the 2005 elections were surprisingly competitive, even with the frequent
88efforts to suppress competitiveness from the side of the authorities.
This argument can be taken further by not only examining national level elections, but also 
local elections. The assumption being that any election related experience gives political 
entrepreneurs an opportunity to hone their skills and therefore be better prepared for the 
next election, regardless of what level. Furthermore, if successfully elected to either local of
89national office, that position obviously provides a good platform for further contests. In 
terms of previous experience with local level elected office over forty percent say they have 
that experience. This is possibly of relevance in that it shows the professionalization of 
politics, where the local level elections provide a breeding ground for future politicians.
Table 38: Many have experience of local elected office
Had you ever been elected to a local assembly or office (oblast, rayon, village level) at 
the time of the X elections?
Answer
Options
Total
2005 2000 1995 By-e lection sResponsePercent
Response
Count
Yes
(specify)
42% 65 49% 3 8 34% 11 35% 1 2 31% 4
No 58% 91 51% 3 9 66% 21 65% 2 2 69% 9
answered 156 7 7 32 34 13
skipped 4 1 1 1
* (Q3).
88 This largely follow the argument put forward by Lindberg, i.e. that elections themselves over time lead to 
more competitive and democratic regimes (Lindberg, 2006). This has been challenged by others (Levitsky & 
Way, 2008), pointing out the stability o f non-democratic regimes. For more detail see introductory chapter.
89 Note for instance that in the case o f Georgia, Mikhail Saakashvili got elected to the city council in Tblisi in 
2002 and this gave him a platform to organize the ‘Rose Revolution’ in the fall of 2003. The case of 
Madagascar in March 2009 can be seen as even more contemporary evidence o f this phenomena, where Andy 
Rajoelina, a former local politician (mayor in the capital) managed to oust the incumbent president. Clearly 
we need to recognize local elected office as a potential platform for national level contests.
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Here we can see that the number o f candidates with prior local level elected-official 
experience is substantially higher in 2005. This makes sense since the number of 
opportunities to get elected increase over time, as Kyrgyzstan have introduced new forms 
of local elections as part o f a decentralization drive.90 Next I address to issue o f dynastic 
patterns, i.e. whether close family members had previously been elected to the Parliament 
and what affect this has on family members running. The following table illustrates that in 
an overwhelming majority o f the sampled candidates, 90%, an immediate family member 
had not been a MP.
Table 39: Family members of MPs rarely participates
Has anyone in your family ever been a Member of Parliament (also going back to the 
Soviet time)?
Answer Options Total
2005 2000 1995 By-e lection sResponse
Percent
Response
Count
No 89% 138 89% 6 8 78% 2 5 97% 3 3 92% 12
Yes
(name&location)
11% 17 11% 8 22% 7 3% 1 8% 1
answered 155 76 32 34 13
skipped 5 2 1 1
* (Q4).
This suggests that we are not dealing with family cliques o f ‘clans’ in the sense o f lineages. 
In the following section I wanted to examine more closely the political profile o f the 
sampled candidates. What are the defining features of the candidates’ political profile? 
What role do specific political issues play and what is the role o f ideology, if any? Clearly a 
certain ideological vacuum characterized politics in Kyrgyzstan in the post-independence 
period. This is understandable after years of official Marxist-Leninist ideological 
indoctrination. Most politics after the breakup of the Soviet Union was structured around a 
binary pro-govemment/oppositional line. In analyzing politics in Kyrgyzstan the one­
dimensional left-right axis was something that both foreign and local analysts tried to 
apply, but without much success (OSCE, 2000). To start off this analysis we wanted 
candidates to place themselves on a left-center-right scale.
90 In 2004 local elections were organized where several thousand candidates were filed (OSI report on 
decentralization).
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Table 40: All candidates are ‘centrists’ now
Chose an ideological label that suits you best91
Answer
Options
Total
2005 2000 1995 By-e lection sResponse
Percent
Response
Count
Left 11% 16 11% 8 11% 3 16% 5 0% 0
Center 75% 109 75% 5 5 86% 24 63% 2 0 83% 1 0
Right 14% 20 14% 10 4% 1 22% 7 17% 2
answered 145 73 28 32 12
skipped 15 5 5 3
* (Q40).
Evidently the extremes on this one-dimensional scale are uncomfortable categories for the 
respondents, with 75% placing themselves in the comfortable ‘center’ category. Those that 
placed themselves in any o f the other categories are also o f interest. For instance a Member 
of Parliament from the oppositional Social-Democratic Party defined himself as on the 
‘right’, even though one would assume, by western standards, that they would be on the left 
or at least center-left.92 By far more important than left-right is the position towards the 
rulers at the time o f the elections. We have a lot o f evidence of the oppositional mindset of 
the Kyrgyz (Beshimov, 2009). Since the 2005 elections were such an important event and 
the attitude towards the former President, Askar Akaev, such a hot topic we decided to ask 
directly about this.
91 This question was one o f the last questions in the survey and it needs to be noted that ‘left’ and ‘right’ are 
also categories that the Kyrgyz use as names of ‘tribal confederations’, like the Ong and Sol kanat (ref?).
92 Murat Dzhuraev from Batken oblast
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Table 41: Many were anti-Akaev during the ‘Tulip Revolution’, March 2005
What was your role in the March 2005 'Revolution'
Answer
Options
Total
2005 2000 1995 By-e lection sResponsePercent
Response
Count
Active anti- 
Akaev 42% 63 45% 3 4 30% 9 50% 16 31% 4
Active pro- 
Akaev 5% 8 7% 5 3% 1 6% 2 0% 0
Passive 47% 71 45% 3 4 50% 15 44% 14 62% 8
Other
(specify) 5% 8 3% 2 17% 5 0% 0 8% 1
answered 150 7 5 30 32 13
skipped 10 3 3
* (Q41).
Not surprisingly only a few admitted being actively pro-Akaev during this particular point 
in time. In terms of performance at the voting booth, it can be noted that the admitted 
relationship with the ‘Tulip Revolution’ mobilization or ones’ position on a left-right 
ideological scale does not correlate with vote share in the first round. Finally, since the 
interviews were conducted in the immediate aftermath of the December 2007 elections we 
also decided to ask about the role that the sampled candidates played in this first ever party 
list (PR) election.
Table 42: A majority participated in the early elections, December 2007
What was your role in the December 2007 elections?
Answer
Options
Total
2005 2000 1995 By-e lection sResponsePercent
Response
Count
Candidate 21% 31 27% 2 0 23% 7 0% 0 31% 4
Campaigner 28% 43 24% 18 26% 8 44% 14 23% 3
Passive 44% 66 44% 3 3 32% 10 56% 18 38% 5
Other
(specify) 7% 11 5% 4 19% 6 0% 0 8% 1
answered 151 7 5 3 1 3 2 13
skipped 9 3 2 3
* (Q42).
Here we can see that a majority of the sample actively took part in the elections, either as 
candidates or as active campaigners. Those that ran in the 1995 elections, however, a 
majority of them were passive in these elections.
I l l
S e c t io n  S u m m a r y
To summarize this section on candidate experiences from professional life, electoral 
politics, and socio-biographical characteristics I note that candidates in Kyrgyzstan are 
middle-aged males, largely following patterns in established democracies. Many candidates 
have experience from running in earlier elections, either on local or national level. Again, 
this might be a plausible explanation for persistently high levels of competitiveness all over 
Kyrgyzstan. There are simply a lot of candidates that are campaign-experienced. In terms 
of generational dynamics and ideology, I note that parliamentary election candidates in 
Kyrgyzstan are highly educated and ‘centrists’ in ideological orientation. Ideologically this 
transition period caused a lot of confusion, with the traditional left-right scale rendered 
meaningless. One of the few organizing principles in electoral battles during this time, in 
terms of positioning, is whether the candidates view the incumbent President and his 
administration favorably or not. Finally in terms of elite composition and our four-fold 
typology I want to stress that businessmen actively take part in the electoral process, more 
often than not as candidates. However, as we shall see, their success rate is not as good as is 
often assumed in the literature.
Concerning the typology of candidates, one could envision either a parsimonious 
categorization and try by force to fit a diverse group of candidates into only a few 
categories, like above. Or, one could create a broader categorization. I will further elaborate 
on this in the final section of this chapter, but suffice to say that the question about the role 
of new economic elites is indeed very interesting. As the case of Russia demonstrates, the 
often uneasy balance of power in the 1990s later reach a new equilibrium with Putin, when 
state elites regained control and economic elites had to stay out of politics (Frye, 2003). 
However, this was not the case in Kyrgyzstan, where the new emerging economic elites 
openly challenged central authorities, among other things, as candidates in parliamentary 
elections. For instance almost half of all the 100 richest persons in Kyrgyzstan where also 
running in the 2005 parliamentary elections:93
93 100 Samykh Bogatykh Lyudei Kyrgyzstana 2004 Goda [Fergana: The 100 Richest People in Kyrgyzstan], 
www.akipress.kg. accessed Jul-06.
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Money lends itself to power in Kyrgyzstan: forty-eight of the wealthiest 100 
Kyrgyz ran for parliament. Twenty-eight of them won their seats, sixteen in the 
first round and twelve in the second. Of the twenty losers, six defeats were to 
other candidates from the list. Only eight of the forty-eight lost to somebody who 
was neither an Alga candidate nor another member on the ‘wealthiest’ list. The 
most formidable candidates were those on both lists—all eight candidates who 
were on the ‘100 wealthiest’ list and representing Alga won seats (Radnitz,
2006a, p. 153).
This quote nicely illustrates the power of both money and pro-presidential orientation. Even 
though the number of wealthy candidates might seem high and therefore all pervasive, the 
events after the election, the co called ‘Tulip Revolution’, clearly indicates the weakness of 
the ties between moneyed elites and the Akaev regime.
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How are they selected and whom do they represent?
In this section the focus is on the immediate campaign experience of the candidates, 
starting with covering the crucial candidate selection phase and the role that political parties 
played. This is followed by an overview of reported campaign techniques. Again, the 
average number of elections per interviewed candidate was 1.76, with 34 candidates having 
participated in three or more elections. Clearly a quite experienced groups of candidates. 
Here I also want to reiterate that over 40% of the sampled candidates had been elected to 
local office prior to running in parliamentary elections, indicating political experience that 
in turn could explain the competitiveness of the elections.94
C a n d i d a t e  s e l e c t io n
One of the most secretive and least studied dimensions of the electoral cycle is the 
candidate selection procedure.95 This is especially so in the post-Soviet context where 
parties were marginal in the candidate selection process. The question asked in the survey 
was ‘How were you selected as a candidate?’ and the answers were left open-ended. We 
asked the candidates to shortly describe the process: who nominated; how was it organized 
etc.
Table 43: A majority were self-nominated
Nominated by Distribution %
Self 61%
Collective 24%
Party 8.6%
n/a 7%
n 151
* Non-response rate only 2% (Q19).
We can see that most candidates were self-nominated. The reasons for this is both the weak 
party system at the time, but also the fact that nominating oneself was much easier, even if 
one did belong to a party. One candidate said ‘Alga [the main pro-presidential party in
94 Q3 in the survey.
95 Sometimes referred to as the ‘secret garden’ of politics (Gallagher & Marsh, 1988).
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2005] nominated me at their congress because some American organization did a survey 
and found out that I was really popular’ (#36). Another said that he was nominated by a 
labor cooperative, but that he registered as self-nominated due the simpler procedures 
(#39). One candidate even turned down an offer to stand for the pro-presidential party Alga, 
claiming that he preferred independence and only wanted to serve his own district (#58). 
Another said ‘I on purpose did not go for Alga, because their authority had already 
weakened’ (#83). A candidate’s strategic decisions in the selection phase obviously involve 
many factors, of which party affiliation is only one. Being closely attached to a party, even 
if it is a weak one, obviously compromises ones’ room for maneuver. There were also 
particular challenges for party nominated candidates in Kyrgyzstan in the elections covered 
here, like requirements on how the party congress had to be organized etc.
Many candidates also had to consider in what district to run. For instance, what if other 
prominent candidates announce their candidacy in the same district where you intend to 
run?
As I was akim [local mayor] of Kyzyl Kiya town it was Kyzyl-Kiyans who 
wanted to nominate me but as Masaliev [Communist Party chairman] proposed 
his candidacy there, I did not want to compete with him and he also asked me 
not to put forward my candidacy. I had to run in my [native] rayon as residents 
asked me to (#103).
This quote shows the calculated nature of picking a district, perhaps not that different from 
the behavior of prospective candidates in established democracies. Again, remember that a 
very high number of incumbents were running in the 2005 elections, partly due to the fact 
that there were fewer seats available.96 In general people run in districts where they have a 
family connection.97 But even after a decision has been made on district and party, there is 
still room for articulating other affiliations and perhaps indicate whom one intends to 
‘represent’. When asked a straightforward question about this we get the following 
responses.
96 The 2003 election reform stipulated 75 seats in stead of the 105 that were elected in the mixed system 
elections in 2000.
97 For more on family connections and the alleged importance of kinship see ‘Clan politics’ case study 
chapter.
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Table 44: Business and ‘Locals’ well represented on the ballot
Target
group
Primary
choice
(% )
Secondary
choice
(% )
Locals 28% 24%
Businessm
en
27% 3%
Youth 21% 48%
Intelligents
ia
11% 7%
Women 10% 3%
Elderly 3% 14%
n 71 29
* The respondents were asked to give two choices. Here we only have answers from half o f the interviewees. 
Early on in the process we realized that this was not a good question. The responses that we were given were 
mere platitudes and we therefore decided to cut out the question in later interviews (Q20).
This table shows that when asked to pick a group that they focused on in their campaigning 
most people, not surprisingly, said ‘locals’. Interestingly many said that they represented 
the business community. Another seemingly important category, and perhaps a requirement 
in terms o f political correctness, was youth. More importantly, we wanted to now what role 
political parties play in the pre-election phase. Remember the survey question about 
ideological position (Table 40), where three quarters placed themselves in the ‘center’ 
category. So what was the relationship between candidates and political parties?
Table 45: Only one-quarter were Party members on E-day
Were you a party member at the time of running?
Answer
Options
Total
2005 2000 1995 By-e lection sResponse
Percent
Response
Count
No 72% 111 68% 5 2 74% 2 3 74% 2 5 79% 11
Yes (name  
party) 28% 44 32% 2 4 26% 8 26% 9 21% 3
answered 155 76 31 34 14
skipped 5 2 2 1
*(Q 21).
This shows that an overwhelming majority of the candidates were not a member o f any 
party at the time of the election. This pattern is fairly stable over time. Based on this 
diagnosis of an extremely weak party system many later argued that Kyrgyzstan needed to 
move to a proportional party list system (Juraev, 2008). This was often heard in the run up 
to the constitutional referendum in the fall of 2007, a referendum that also contained a
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proposed electoral law reform. As a follow-up to those that were a member o f a party we 
asked whether that same party formally nominated them.
Table 46: Half of the party members chose self-nomination
I f  yes, were you nominated by this party in the X elections?
Answer
Options
Total
2005 2000 1995 By-e lection sResponse
Percent
Response
Count
Yes 47% 18 45% 10 50% 3 50% 4 50% 1
No, why 
not? 53% 20 55% 12 50% 3 50% 4 50% 1
answered 38 2 2 6 8
Skipped 6
* Note that only those that responded positively to Q 21 were included in this question (Q22).
In specifying why their party did not nominate them, some said that the party had 
nominated another candidate in their particular district. Others seemed to have thought 
more strategically about their party’s low levels o f popularity and therefore decided to go it 
alone. A couple o f them emphasized that the procedures for being nominated through 
parties was much more complex, requiring more paper work, than simply registering as an 
independent (self-nominated). Several were surprised at the question, saying that the 
system back then was not a party system, but a SMD system, as if  those two would exclude 
each other. We also followed-up by asking why they had chosen this or that particular 
party. Some seemed to have chosen party based on the leadership, others based on the ideas 
and the platform of the party. A couple of the Communist Party candidates put it bluntly, 
noting that they had been members for several decades by now and that their membership 
was rather automatic. Here it is important to note that later chapters will deal with issues of 
local level informal institutions, like aksakals (local elders), and their alleged role in the 
candidate selection procedure.
Campaign issues and techniques
Next I examine the kind o f issues that candidates reportedly focused on in their campaigns. 
The ambition is here to get a better sense of how the electoral process works in Kyrgyzstan, 
with a special focus on what interests candidates represent. We asked the candidates to 
name two of the most important issues in their campaign platforms. The following table 
shows both the coding and the percentage distributions:
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Table 47: It’s the Economy stupid!
Sector Sector focus 
(primary)
Sector focus 
(secondary)
Economy=4 27% 27%
Social sector=3 19% 16%
Rule of Law=6 16% 11%
Infrastructure^ 14% 18%
Agriculture=2 14% 6%
Education=5 6% 10%
Corruption=7 4% 11%
n 134 62
* Two options in order of priority. Nine persons skipped this question (was not asked? Q26).
Here we can see that in terms of area focus the most common issue concerns the economy, 
followed by, social sector, and rule of law (human rights related) issues. This largely 
corresponds with the attitudes among the voters, as reported in polling conducted by IFES, 
IRI, and others (IFES, 2005; Olds, 1997; Pototskii & Sharma, 2002; USAID, 2004). The 
platforms ranged from general positions, like being against President Akaev, to specific 
proposals, like organizing elections for local police commissioners (referring to American 
style sheriff elections). Three candidates were explicit about their disapproval of the 
privatization policies of previous years. Another exclaimed: ‘Socialism was fair. Today we 
are lost. Where are we going?’ (#51). Several also brought up the issue of migration (ref). 
And others were candid about their mission: ‘Distributing budgetary means to Alai rayon 
[candidate’s home region]4 (#89).
Next we wanted to know what methods campaigners use to attract votes in Kyrgyzstan. 
Again, this says something about who the candidates were. The questions about 
campaigning techniques were purposely kept open-ended with the intention of allowing for 
maximum freedom for the interviewees to frame the response. Asking around about this 
sensitive issue, especially right after a very contentious election (December 2007) was 
naturally a high-risk strategy. In analyzing the responses we need to be cautious and 
account for the context, and especially the position of the respondent at the time of the 
interview. For instance a candidate that played an active role in the ‘Tulip Revolution’ 
mobilization and then went on to serve as proponent of the new regime (pro-Bakiev) would 
naturally be predisposed to emphasize the corrupt nature of campaigning during the Akaev- 
era, while they would be more positive when commenting on the most recent election 
(December 2007). In any case I coded the responses with an eye to the ‘vote buying
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discourse’, which clearly is one of the key elements in any discussion about campaigning in 
Kyrgyzstan.
Table 48: ‘Other’ candidates use votebuying, but not me!
'Others campaigned 
like me'
Yes 21%
No 79%
n 104
Votebuying
Me 2%
Others 88%
Both 10%
n 88
Admininstrative
support
Me 0%
Others 100%
n 19
* Here I decided to code the responses focusing on whether the interviewee alleged others to have used dirty 
techniques (graznye tekhnologii in Russian, Q27&28).
Here we can see that only 2% admitted themselves to using vote buying as a technique, 
while 88% claimed that other candidates in their districts used this technique. Hardly a 
surprising finding, but it nevertheless clearly illustrates the ‘vote buying discourse’ in 
Kyrgyzstan. Everyone talks about it and everyone is supposedly engaged in it, but no one 
admits it when it comes to themselves. This even if the President at the time, Akaev, 
publicly stated that it voters should take money if offered, but vote for whomever they like. 
Vote buying obviously comes in many different forms, but the most common goods 
distributed are lamb meat, flower, gifts, computers, electricity generators (Q28:#60). As a 
matter of fact, many things that in the West would not be considered vote buying is 
considered vote buying in Kyrgyzstan, like offering tea to potential voters (chaipite in 
Kyrgyz).98 A common way of characterizing other people’s campaigns is by the Russian 
word rp«3H L ie T exH O Jio rnn , meaning dirty tricks.99 In analyzing this further one could 
hypothesize that those who do not blame others for vote buying are more pro-governmental 
in orientation and therefore receive larger shares of the vote. That is, do high achievers (in 
terms of vote share) mention vote buying at all? Statistical analysis confirms that there is no 
significant association between these two variables.
How about administrative resources, that is the use of public office for electoral gains? This 
campaigning technique comes in many forms, but the support from local authorities, both 
in terms of personnel and logistical support seems to be crucial, especially in rural districts.
98 KbiprM3KH naemiTHe (‘chaipite’, i.e. offering sheep meet and tea) (#5, 71). This is pretty much like offering
hot dogs at political rallies in Western countries.
" # 28, 100, 143.
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One losing candidate said that administrative resources, like using the village council (aiyl 
okmotu) or schools staff, favored the leading candidate in their district.100 Again, no one 
admitted to using administrative resources for themselves (see previous table). Other 
techniques that the candidates mentioned include: help with local infrastructure (road 
improvements, #127); construction of Mosques (actually mentioned by several 
respondents).101
In this last part of this section I want to say something about the discourse on falsification 
of election results. As a lead-in question, I asked the candidates whether they were 
surprised by the reported election results (Q34). A majority said they were indeed surprised 
about the officially reported results. This indicates either a certain level o f hubris, in that 
they actually thought they would get more votes, or outright falsification of the results. 
Next, we asked what the candidates thought about levels o f falsification.
Table 49: Falsification slightly going down over time
Were the election results falsified in your SMDlS^
Answer Options
Total
2005 2000 1995 By-e lection sResponsePercent
Response
Count
Completely
falsified
20% 31 25% 19 23% 7 12% 4 7% 1
Somewhat
falsified
30% 46 22% 17 35% 11 48% 16 13% 2
Don't know 12% 19 10% 8 10% 3 6% 2 40% 6
Not much 
falsified
20% 31 23% 18 16% 5 15% 5 20% 3
Not at all 
falsified
18% 27 19% 15 16% 5 18% 6 20% 3
answered 154 7 7 31 33 15
skipped 6 1 2 2
* (Q35).
Note that those that consider the officially reported election results as completely or 
somewhat falsified have decreased somewhat over time. So what if the results were
100 Referring to Alymbekov in one o f the Issyk-Kul districts, but quickly added that ‘he is a good guy’ (#142).
101 #46,53,94,96,103,104. Half o f these cases (n=3) are cases were the candidates themselves openly admitted 
to constructing mosques as a campaign technique.
102 Specified as to what extent the final CEC numbers reflect the intention o f the voters in your SMD.
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falsified, what did the candidates do about it? It has been shown by others that disgruntled 
candidates can be a very potent force (Radnitz, 2006b).
Table 50: Not many formal complaints filed
I f  complete!'/  or somewhat falsified, did you file a complaint?
Answer
Options
Total
2005 2000 1995 By-e lection sResponsePercent
Response
Count
Yes 22% 27 33% 18 21% 6 10% 3 0% 0
No (why 
not?) 78% 97 67% 36 79% 23 90% 28 100% 10
answered 124 54 29 31 10
skipped 36 24 4 4
* (Q 36).
As we can see not many filed formal complaints and this in itself can be taken to indicate a 
lack o f trust in the rule of law in Kyrgyzstan. Interestingly, however, the number of 
candidates that did file a complaint is dramatically increasing over time.
Section summary
In this section I have shown that parliamentary candidates in Kyrgyzstan were 
predominantly self-nominated in the period covered here, 1995-2005. Many candidates 
perceived of their constituency as ‘locals’ or business interests. Political parties were 
exceptionally marginal in the whole electoral process, with even active party members 
deciding to go it alone, i.e. without the party’s formal endorsement. In terms of salience 
issues economy comes out on top. The electoral process itself is characterized by 
irregularities, like vote buying, intimidation, and outright falsification at the polling 
stations. That is if we ask the candidates themselves. Quite predictably those candidates 
that consider the election result as falsified are also those with lower reported vote shares.
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Table 51: Perception of falsification and Vote share (crosstab)
Falsified?
Mean
Vote share 
% N Std. Deviation
completely 10.37 31 7.99
som ewhat 11.53 45 11.45
don't know 6.85 18 5.86
not much 17.64 28 13.28
not at all 24.55 24 20.20
* P < .01 (Anova table)
Winning candidates do not consider the results falsified, while losers do. Nothing new or 
surprising here.
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Revised Candidate Typology and analysis of Performance103
As already stated, the candidate typology that I presented in the first section was highly 
insufficient. Furthermore, apart from only analyzing the candidates themselves, we also 
want to say something about how they perform at the voting booth. In this final section I 
will examine how different elite categories are performing in terms of vote share in the first 
round of elections. As already stated it is often alleged that financial resources are 
becoming more and more important. If this was the case we should observe higher 
proportions of votes over time for this category as compared to other candidate types. 
However, the classification of a particular candidate is never unproblematic due to the 
multiple identities and the multitude of experiences that most aspiring politicians have. As 
a solution to this problem I have decided to use three different ways of coding the 
Professional Category variable. In order to do this I had to re-organize data from the 
candidate survey, complement it with written sources and interviews with local observers. 
The first candidate typology variable (professional category, profcatl) is the baseline for 
the analysis and the data is here taken directly from the candidate survey (Q9):
Table 52: Simple Candidate Typology (profcatl)
Coding Category Examples (Decision rule)
1 Experienced politicians (pro- 
Govt/Opp.)
MPs, Party workers
2 Bureaucrat (State administrators) Experience from State institutions
3 Businessmen Private sector entrepreneur
4 Cultural (intelligentsia) Lawyers, NGO professionals, 
teachers
The problem with question nine (Q9) in the survey is that the candidates themselves decide 
how to present their professional profile. This is not necessarily a correct characterization 
since they might be motivated to play down certain experiences, like working for the state 
or being involved in business deals. It is also problematic that incumbency is included in 
this typology, since candidates that at the time of the election were sitting parliamentarians 
often answered Deputat (MP) as their ‘job at the time of the elections’. The incumbency
103 Cut-down version for MPhil.. .(no ProfCat2, no Experience (no.Elect)
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effect naturally boosts the Experienced Politicians category and blurs the effect of non-MPs 
that were nevertheless experiences politicians. The solution to this is to recode the 
professional experience (position) of an MP into another category that fit them, in many 
cases unsurprisingly political leaders.104 The new candidate typology is labeled profcat2b:
Table 53: Simplified Detailed Candidate Typology (profcat2b)
Coding Category Decision rule
1 Political leaders All levels CP secretaries, also -ispolkom chairmen
2 Administrative
officials
(Senior) all levels -kom & -ispolkom officials
3 Interest group 
officials
Trade union officials, Political Party functionaries, and 
NGO professionals
4 Economic leaders Directors of state and private enterprises, directors of 
sovkhozy and chairmen of kolkhozy
5 Professional Directors of schools, higher education institutes, 
universities, research institutes, and chief doctors in 
hospitals
6 Other Pensioners, unemployed and students
Even though this is a more precise coding of the professional category profcatl, it still does
not allow us to properly analyze the entrepreneurial class, or what is sometimes referred to 
as simply businesmen. In order to do this we need to distinguish between very rich 
businessmen and all other candidates that might be considered businessmen, but of the 
more petty type. This is inherently problematic in a country like Kyrgyzstan where so much 
wealth is not registered and not much data published. Before the 2005 elections, however, 
there was a list published with the 100 richest individuals in Kyrgyzstan on it.105 This was a 
list compiled by local journalists and its reliability can in general be deemed quite high 
(Radnitz, 2006a; Stamov, 2004). I label this variable profcat3. The distinction here is 
between successful businessmen that conceivably have both financial resources available 
for campaigning, but also possess a certain political clout in their districts.
So much for the coding of the professional category variables. In what follows I will 
systematically examine the whole cohort and the first round election results for each 
different coding of professional experience: profcatl, profcat2b, and profcat3. Furthermore, 
I also look at the performance in terms of being elected or not. Finally I examine how
104 This largely follows the elite typology provided by James Hughes (J. Hughes, 1997).
105 100 Samykh Bogatykh Lyudei Kyrgyzstana 2004 Goda [Fergana: The 100 Richest People in Kyrgyzstan], 
www.akipress.kg. accessed Jul-06.
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different categories are doing over time. In this section we are only considering sampled 
candidates that ran in the ordinary elections, 1995, 2000, or 2005, not those that 
participated in by-elections.
Simple Candidate Typology
The sections are divided into examining the relationship between candidate typology and 
vote share, candidate typology and eventual electoral success, and analysis of developments 
over time for different candidate categories.
First Round Vote Shares
So how are the different professional categories performing?
Table 54: Experienced politicians are getting higher vote shares
PROFCAT1
Mean
Vote share 
(%) N
Std.
Deviation
Experienced politicians 19.92 17 14.49
Bureaucrat 15.61 44 13.80
Businessman 14.16 48 14.79
Intelligentsia 6.66 26 6.60
Total 13.91 135 13.67
* P < .01 (Anova table). Note: Here sorted in descending order for the mean vote share (column 2).
Here we can see that intelligentsia and businessmen candidates seems to have a hard time 
getting votes compared to experienced politicians and bureaucrats. This might come as a 
surprise since the common wisdom is that businesmeni are indeed performing very well in 
parliamentary elections (Stamov, 2004). Examining the last column tells us that there is a 
lot of variation in the businessman category.106 In other words it seems as if some 
businessmen are doing very well, while others not.
Actually winning
What about the relationship between candidate typology and eventual success in getting 
elected to parliament? The following cross-tabulation gives us a an idea:
106 Businessmen has the highest Standard Deviation score on all four categories.
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Table 55: Cross-tabulation of Elected yes/no and Profcatl
PROFCAT1
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Elected no Count 12 38 41 26 117
% within 70.6% 88.4% 85.4% 100.0% 87.3%
yes Count 5 5 7 0 17
% within 29.4% 11.6% 14.6% .0% 12.7%
Total Count 17 43 48 26 134
% within 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
* y l  = 8.27, df = 3, P < .05. Lambda not applicable (the within-category mode (Elected=no) is the same as the 
overall mode. Cramer’s V .248, which can be considered strong relationship. Note that y2 based scores (like 
Cramer’s V) are problematic if cells contain less than 5 counts, as is the case for instance in the 
intelligentsia/yes cell.
Here we can see that experienced politicians (here including incumbents) are doing well 
when it comes to eventually being elected.
Vote share over time
So it seems as if Experienced politicians and Bureaucrats are doing fine in terms of vote 
shares, and that the success of businessmen has been exaggerated. However, as we can see 
in the table above, businessmen are proportionally more likely to get elected as compared 
with bureaucrats. There might also be some interesting patterns over time that we need to 
account for.
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Figure 2: Bureaucrats on the rise
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* Only general elections, not by-elections (>7=142).
It is here clearly visible that the businessmen category is actually going down in the 2005 
elections and that the bureaucrat-type o f candidates are doing well. This indicates a pattern 
of re-consolidation of the state and the marginalization o f candidates with no experience 
working for the state. We might get a better picture if we disaggregate the professional 
category.
Detailed Candidate Typology
Here we do not include the incumbency dimension in that we recode the professional 
experience (position) of an MP into what other category that might fit them, in many cases 
unsurprisingly political leaders. This new categorization borrows from James Hughes work 
on Russian elites (J. Hughes, 1997).
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First Round Vote Shares
If we examine the mean vote-shares for each candidate using the modified profcat2b we get 
some interesting results.
Table 56:Detailed Candidate typology (profcat2b)
PROFCAT2B
Mean
Vote share 
(%) N
Std.
Deviation
Political leaders 20.76 8 11.56
Economic leaders 18.07 38 17.01
Administrative officials 14.20 32 13.73
Other 11.94 21 9.67
Interest group officials 7.33 11 8.66
Professional 6.63 21 6.16
Total 13.57 131 13.46
* Significant at the .01 level. Note: Here sorted in descending order for the mean vote share (column 2).
This table shows that political leaders are doing well and that there is quite a small variation 
around the mean vote-share.107 Political leaders therefore seem to be a fairly homogenous 
group. As a contrast we have the Economic leaders category with an average vote-share of 
18%, but with a much higher variation. An interpretation for this could be that economic 
leaders are heterogeneous and that we might need to find a sensible sub-division that would 
allow us to analyze economic leaders with lower levels of variation. One solution here 
could be picking out the really rich candidates from this group (which incidentally we will 
do in the next section).
Actually winning
If we examine the simplified profcat2b we get the following results in a cross-tabulation:
107 Standard Deviation of 11.56, significantly lower than for economic leaders and administrative officials.
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Table 57: Cross-tabulation ProfCat2b and Elected yes/no
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* y l  = 12.1, df = 5, P < .05. Lambda not applicable (the within-category mode (Elected=no) is the same as the 
overall mode. Cramer’s V .306 at the .01 level, which can be considered strong relationship.
From this table we can see that where a candidate is situated in terms of profcat2b does go 
together with eventual election success. Political and Economic leaders are performing well 
in terms o f securing a seat.
Vote share over time
We have seen that the detailed candidate typology, profcat2b, partly predicts how well a 
candidate fares in terms of mean vote-shares and election success if  we analyze all 
candidates at once, irrespective of election year. What happens if we examine 
developments over time? Are there any interesting temporal patterns?
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Figure 3: Politicians and Bureaucrats perform better (profcat2b)
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The graph above makes the trends very obvious, three categories are performing better over 
time, Politicians, Bureaucrats, and Interest Groups officials, while Businessmen and 
Professionals are finding it hard to keep up. But economic leaders (businessmen) are still 
doing quite well in 2005, hovering around 20%.
A detailed candidate typology (profcat2b) can in part predict both vote-share and electoral 
success. In comparing mean vote-shares for different categories there is a significant 
difference between different groups, with political leaders coming out on top, closely 
followed by economic leaders. Over time economic leaders and professionals are receiving 
less and less votes. The same goes for the ‘marginals’ category, a group that was well 
represented in the rubber-stamp representative bodies during the Soviet era.
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Rich Candidates or Petty Businessmen (2005 only)
It has been established that we need to distinguish between very rich businessmen and all 
other candidates that might be considered businessmen, but of a more petty type. For a
10Rconvenient operationalization of this we use the widely cited 100 richest list.
First Round Vote Shares
Let us start by examining what features correlate. Does whether or not you are on the 100 
richest list have any relationship with the vote share in the first round of elections or 
number of elections participated in?
Table 58:100 richest list (survey sample) and vote-share in 2005
PROFCAT3B Mean N Std. Deviation
Not on the 100 richest list 14.28 59 13.93
On the 100 richest list 32 .90 8 12.64
Total 16.50 67 14.98
*P <.01 .
So far we have only focused on the sampled candidates. The table above illustrates that 
there is a huge gap between rich and poor candidates in terms of vote share.
As a next step I analyzed all the 100 persons on the richest list, not only those that were 
included in my sample. Of those 100 persons on the list 41 of them were running in the 
2005 elections. This is a very good indication of the overlapping of business and politics in 
Kyrgyzstan. There is also some really interesting variation in the 100 richest group, with 
some rich candidates receiving over 95% while others only 1%. Clearly just having 
financial resources is not enough to secure a high vote share. Mr. Khon Valerii, a Bishkek 
based businessman only got 1% of the votes.
108100 Samykh Bogatykh Lyudei Kyrgyzstana 2004 Goda [Fergana: The 100 Richest People in Kyrgyzstan], 
www.akipress.kg, accessed Jul-06.
Table 59:100 richest list (all Candidates running in 2005) and vote-share in 2005
Statistics
Vote share 
(%)
Rich guy mean vote share 39 .68
Mean vote share if rich guy 'lost to other rich guy7 18.01
Min (low est score for rich guy) 1.18
Max (highest score for rich guy) 95 .45
* n=41, out of which 15 actually won a seat. In six cases there were two rich candidates in the same SMD. St. 
dev. of mean 20.99.
This table shows compared to the population mean of 15.84 (2005 elections) that rich 
candidates do indeed fare much better in the total population of rich candidates. Also, in the 
population of candidates rich candidates do fare much better than in the sample.
To summarize, rich candidates, who are predominantly male, actively take part in 
parliamentary elections, and surprisingly often they end up losing to other candidates on the 
richest list (in six cases). There is also a notably high variation among rich candidates and 
some interesting extremes in the range that need to be explored further. Going back to our 
candidate survey sample I can visualize the extremes by showing statistical outliers for 
2005.109
109 Those candidates that are more than 1.5 times above (or below) the Inter-Quartile Range (IQR, i.e. the 
box).
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Figure 4: Several outliers in both categories
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This table shows that there are three outliers among the ‘not rich’ candidates that perform 
well in the first round. Let us shortly analyze these three candidates. Abdyldaev had been 
running in two elections before the 2005 election and was therefore well prepared for the 
2005 campaign. All three candidates had been working for the state before, Abdurasulov as 
the former as the head o f Kashgar-Kyshtak village council and Alimov as village (ayil 
okmotu). In all cases a close family member had been previously been a Member of 
Parliament. Two of these ‘not rich’ high performers are ethnic Uzbeks, Abdurasulov and 
Alimov. One o f them was a member of the pro-presidential ‘Alga Kyrgyzstan’, while 
another was a Communist Party member. Two of them claim that the results were not at all 
falsified, while the third says that the results were completely falsified. In terms of pro- 
Govemment/Opposition orientation, it can be noted that these outliers each place 
themselves in different categories, one as an anti-Akaev, another as pro-Akaev, and the 
third as passive.
Actually winning
What happens if  we also examine the second round of elections and the final results from 
the sampled districts?
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Table 60: Cross-tabulation ProfCat3b and Elected yes/no
ELECTED * PROFCAT3B Crosstabulation
PROFCAT3B
Not rich Rich Total
ELECTED no Count 52 4 56
% within 92.9% 7.1% 100.0%
yes Count 7 4 11
% within 63.6% 36.4% 100.0%
Total Count 59 8 67
% within 88.1% 11.9% 100.0%
* y l = 1A1, df = 1, P < .01. Lambda not applicable (the within-category mode (Elected=no) is the same as the 
overall mode. Cramer’s V .334 at the .01 level, which can be considered strong relationship.
Yes, quite predictably, rich candidates not only get a large vote share in the first round, but 
they also end up winning a seat.
Summary of the Performance Analysis Section
Experienced politicians are faring better than other candidate types, both in terms of vote- 
shares and in terms of actually securing a seat. However, over time the biggest gains have 
been by the bureaucrat category. Furthermore, yes, money seems to play a role, especially 
for those with a lot of it. Candidates that are on the 100 richest list are outperforming all 
other categories, but the generic businessman category, i.e. both successful and petty 
businessmen, are actually lowering its vote-share over time in our sample. This suggests 
that the role of financial resources has been exaggerated in the literature. Businessmen do 
not necessarily get elected.
To conclude this section on performance analysis I present some hitherto not analyzed 
features of a candidate and how they go together with vote share in the first round of 
parliamentary elections. When examining the association between age and vote share in the 
first round there is nothing significant whatsoever. Age is therefore not a factor that seems 
to affect the election performance.110 How about the gender dimension? Yes, there is a 
significant and positive association between being a male and performing well in the first 
round. Male gender is also positively correlated with having been elected to local office. 
When examined whether educational background is associated with good performance in
110 The mean age at the time of the election: 1995 45 years (n=36, st.d 7.4), 2000 46 years («=33, st.d 5.6), 
2005 48 years (n=73, st.d 7.8).
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parliamentary elections it does not generate any statistically significant results. 
Furthermore, none of the political profile questions (ideology or role in ‘tulip revolution’) 
were associated with good performance in the first round. Finally, candidates whose family 
members have previously been MPs fared significantly better than their counterparts.
Chapter 4 Conclusions
In this chapter I have shown that post-Soviet elites in Kyrgyzstan were far from monolithic. 
Yes, some elements of the old communist nomenklatura were able to transfer their pre- 
independence influence into post-independence power, but there was an abundance of 
challengers. For local elites, running for a seat in the parliament became something of a 
great game where a plethora of players bet a lot of resources on the prospects of winning a 
seat. I can only speculate about the motivational factors of these political entrepreneurs, but 
it is well known that the rewards, if a seat was secured, were good in terms of both 
protecting existing resources, by gaining immunity, but also by opening up new avenues for 
amassing more wealth and influence. This might come across as a cynical interpretation of 
the motivation of aspiring politicians in Kyrgyzstan, but anecdotal evidence supports these 
claims.
Much of the competition was organized, in terms of positioning, around views of the 
incumbent President and his administration. The weak capacity of the central authorities, 
both in terms of coercive capacity (stick), but also financial incentives (carrot), seems to be 
a condition for this dynamic to work. Also, the question about the role of new economic 
elites seems to be of central importance. The transition process in Kyrgyzstan produced an 
open elite structure. I tested the hypothesis that the role of business elites over time has 
increased and found that some rich businessmen are indeed outperforming other candidate 
categories. But there were also many petty businessmen that participated in the elections 
and more often than not with meager results.
Election campaigns since the last Soviet era elections contained a lot of dirty tricks 
including vote buying and the use of administrative resources. However, since almost 
everyone was using these techniques the field strangely leveled. Furthermore there seems to 
be a resigned acceptance among candidates of the fact that elections in Kyrgyzstan contain 
irregularities. Also, the party system was extremely weak and the explanation is partly
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found in the institutional incentives with tough requirements on party nominations, while 
almost none on self-nominated candidates. Even though this might seem like a un-intended 
systematic glitch there is evidence that the authorities tried to undermine the creation of a 
new strong party system (Jones Luong, 2002).
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CHAPTER 5: POLITICAL ENTREPRENEURS AND THE 
IMAGINATION OF ‘CLANS’ IN KYRGYZSTAN
M o h  a jjp e c  He ao m  h  He y jra u a , m oh a a p e c  - C o b c tc k h h  C0103! (TyxMaHOB, 
,H|aBHfl Oe^opOBHH, 1966)
Thus, it is the very process of the formation of a sovereign civil state that, among 
other things, stimulates sentiments of parochialism, communalism, racialism, 
and so on, because it introduces in to society a valuable new prize over which to 
fight and a frightening new force with which to contend (Geertz, 1963, p. 120).
The failure to create a homo sovieticus is well illustrated by the narrow and ‘primordial’ 
identity discourse in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan. Once citizens of a multiethnic federation, 
Soviet Union, now the citizens were free to define themselves in other categories. But the 
Kyrgyz identity itself was not frilly developed due to suppression during the Soviet era. 
Also, the territory that constituted the newly independent Kyrgyzstan was in itself a 
multiethnic mosaic, with large populations of Slavic, Uzbek, and other minorities. Nowhere 
was this quest for identity more visible than in the highly politicized and surprisingly open 
electoral campaigns. Where loyalty before, at least formally, was to the Soviet Union (see 
the quoted song), now it became an issue for exclusive groupings, often with direct
references to kinship groups. This is the context were kinship categories, like ‘clans’
became politicized and nostalgia for the old inclusive Soviet identity was first felt.111
The Kyrgyz nation-building effort is a prime example of ‘modular nationalism’, a process 
that originated in Europe in the end of the eighteenth century and was later transplanted 
elsewhere (Anderson, 1999, p. 4). The process was one where the state actively promoted a 
‘nation-people’ in order to fit it with the boundaries of the state, thereby creating a nation­
state. This was the track that the Kyrgyz state took in the 1990s. The state machinery 
promoted a standardized vernacular, reformed public education, and built monuments of
111 In one of the candidate interviews the reaction to the question about ‘clans’ was to quote very famous song 
that illustrates the loyalty to the transnational Soviet era identity project (homo sovieticus): ‘My address is 
neither a house nor a street -  My address is the Soviet Union’ (#67).
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commemoration, all in line with similar experiences of nation-building elsewhere. A good 
illustration of this was the 2003 celebrations termed the ‘Year of Kyrgyz Statehood’, when 
the supposedly 2,200-year-old Kyrgyz state was to be celebrated. Tracing the roots of the 
‘nation’ (ethnogenesis) has often been a core element in the making of nations. However, 
political identity projects never operate in a vacuum. Political institutions clearly have an 
affect on the outcome of different identity projects. The Kyrgyz identity project ended up 
encouraging divisive elements when it revived sub-national kinship-based identities 
(‘clans’) as part of the revitalization of national heritage. The politization of ‘clans’ is a 
good illustration of this logic. The incentive structure of single-member plurality systems 
produces localized battle lines. Political entrepreneurs organized their electoral campaigns 
exclusively focusing on a particular district and this produced high-pitched allegations of 
‘clan politics’ and tribalism among both local and international observers.
In this chapter I will show that local identities emerged as key features of politics on a 
constituency level. In order to get a better picture of how politicians, both successful and 
aspiring ones, define themselves politically and in terms of identity categories we 
conducted a survey of 160 candidates. In this chapter I present some of the findings from 
this unique survey. I am especially interested in the identity discourse and the role of 
informal institutions, kinship-based social units (‘clans’), and lineages. Three basic 
questions are being addressed in this chapter: 1) How do candidates identify themselves in 
terms of genealogical categories; 2) How can we explain the emergence of politicized 
kinship; and 3) Is a strong ‘clan’ identity a prerequisite for a successful candidacy. I find 
that a ‘clan’ in the Kyrgyz sense of the word necessarily involves kinship, therefore 
refuting metaphorical conceptualizations of ‘clans’. Furthermore, under conditions of a 
single-member plurality formula local identities become a potent force, even if only 
discursively.
The chapter is concerned with the genealogical narrative, i.e. the ‘clan’ dimension. The first 
part is a section on ‘clans’ in the Kyrgyz sense of uruu/uruk. The second part is a 
discussion on how the respondents reacted to us asking ‘clan’ related questions.
‘Clans’ in Kyrgyzstan
In the case of Kyrgyzstan a ‘clan’ is something specific, especially for the titular nationality 
in rural areas. A ‘clan’ in Kyrgyz denotes a nameable patrilineage, which comes with an
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elaborated set of stories and founding myths.112 This cannot be equated with the purely 
residential category like mahalla in the case of Uzbekistan. The Kyrgyz word for ‘clan’ is 
uruk or uruu, depending on what level we are referring to.113 The most cited level is that of 
uruu, like for instance the Sarybagysh, the uruu of the previous President Askar Akaev and 
the Teiit, the uruu of the current President Kurmanbek Bakiev. In this chapter I will use the 
English word ‘clan’ to denote any relevant level, be it uruu or uruk.u4 Strictly speaking, the 
focus in this chapter is on 'uruu (or uruk) politics’, but this is an utterly incomprehensible 
term for both the Kyrgyz themselves and for the larger scholarly community. The most 
commonly used equivalent concept in English language literature on the region is that of 
‘clan’. In the political science literature the concept of a ‘clan’ in Kyrgyzstan has been used 
in an overly metaphorical way (R. Abazov, 2003b; Collins, 2006). This way of using the 
concept can be both confusing and frankly orientalistic.115 In some writings on regionalism 
and localism in Kyrgyzstan the concept of ‘clans’ has been equated with larger territorial 
concepts like north and south:
Kyrgyzstan’s clans... are bound by informal arrangements and rules, and their 
power is based on representing regional interests. The so-called northern clan 
represents the Chui, Issyk-Kol, Naryn, and Talas oblasts [region], while the so- 
called southern clan represents the Batken, Jalal-Abad, and Osh oblast (R.
Abazov, 2003a).
Here the concept of a ‘clan’ is used to denote a vast geographical territory that would never 
be associated with an uruu or an uruk in the Kyrgyz sense. Also, there was never a 
genealogical narrative of relatedness that covered the ‘south’ of Kyrgyzstan.116 Collins at
112 A lineage is a descent group that is able to demonstrate a common descent from a known ancestor.
113 In the anthropological and ethnographic literature on Kyrgyzstan, uruu is often equated with the English 
tribe and Russian plemya, while uruk has the equivalent or clan in English and rod in Russian. In the context 
of the Russian language, the word klan is also used, but often in a pejorative sense. An uruu is simply a larger 
kinship unit consisting of several uruks. An uruk is a ‘lineage’ in the strict sense of the word (Beyer, 2006, p. 
160).
114 This is problematic from the viewpoint of established anthropological distinctions (see previous footnote). 
However in ordinary use in the villages examined here (Kara-Kulja) the distinction between uruu and uruk is 
fluid. In this region the most widely used term for a ‘clan’ is uruu. Furthermore, in this chapter I focus on sub- 
tribal dynamics, a level below the Adigine tribe. For more on the ‘tribal structure’ of the Kyrgyz see 
Abramzon (Abramzon, 1963, p. 175).
115 Only by using the ‘clan’ and ‘tribe’ terminology one projects a view of an unruly and uncivilized people 
that were not even been able to set up a centralized state structure in the period prior to the Russian conquest.
116 It is popular to point out the north/south cleavage in analysis of Kyrgyz history and contemporary political 
divisions. Here they usually refer to the areas on both sides of the Tian Shan mountain range. However, as 
anyone who ever studied the map can see, the more proper geographical division would have to be north- 
east/south-west.
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one point refers to the ‘Issyk-Kul clan’ and the ‘Chui clan’, which is clearly misleading 
since these are purely administrative and geographic units (Collins, 2006, p. 126). These 
two examples illustrate how the concept of a ‘clan’ has been used in a loose and 
metaphorical way that misses the point of uruus and uruks and their emic meaning in 
contemporary rural Kyrgyzstan. I argue that applying foreign categories, like ‘clan’, a 
concept that has a unique emic meaning to the Kyrgyz, in such a loosely defined way 
qualifies as orientalism. An uruu identity necessarily involves kinship; it cannot be a 
geographically determined administrative category, like an oblast’ (region). But even if 
there exists a genealogical narrative about these kinship-based groups it does not mean that 
these groups dictate politics locally, that they are groups that actually do things in an 
organized way. Yes, people do talk about their uruu belonging and possibly even give an 
impression of them existing as corporate groups. And yes, in mid 1990s at the height of the 
political and economic transition in Kyrgyzstan there was a lot of confusion about the 
identity of the Kyrgyz, their social organization, and what consequences this would have 
for politics. However, now we have reached a point in time when we can sort out some of 
the confusion and at the same time strip the ‘clan’ concept of some of the most distorted 
connotations in the literature. Again, I want to reiterate that when I use the ‘clan’ concept I 
do not intend to imply that there actually are ‘clans’ in contemporary Kyrgyzstan that are 
organized as corporate groups. I narrowly define ‘clan’ as kinship-based social units.
Genealogical narrative
How do parliamentary candidates identify themselves in terms of kinship categories? A lot 
of these categories are contested both in the anthropological and ethnographic literature, but 
there is also some confusion among the Kyrgyzs themselves. This is understandable since 
these identities were not dwelled upon during the Soviet era. With the collapse of the Soviet 
Union however there was a significant renewed interest in historically important identity 
categories for the Kyrgyzs. In the rural districts that we focused on for this survey we do 
not see much of that confusion. Respondents had quick and clear-cut answers to most of the 
genealogical questions, indicating that these are indeed issues that people have active 
knowledge on. This might especially be true of political entrepreneurs that need to 
legitimize their candidacy as a representative of a particular discursively constructed 
‘mythic’ kinship group.
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The discourse on relatedness in Kyrgyzstan is surprisingly well structured and was very 
much in vogue during the period covered here (1990-2007). Sanjyra is the Kyrgyz word 
that refers to genealogical information combined with accounts of the past. This is 
especially relevant in the studies of particular ‘clans’ and ‘tribes’. Key actors in the 
discourse on relatedness are the sanjyrachi, local specialists on genealogical descent and 
the history of particular ‘clans’ and ‘tribes’. In this research project the questions related to 
genealogy were exclusively aimed for the titular nationality, the Kyrgyz («=146). Since the 
focus of this project is on the Kyrgyz discourse on relatedness it does make sense to 
exclude respondents of minority nationalities. In Kyrgyzstan as a whole the Kyrgyz make 
up two-thirds of the population (1999 census). The total number of sampled candidates 
therefore over-represents the titular nationality as a proportion of the true values in the 
population (see Methodology appendix). In this chapter we do not need to consider this, 
since only the Kyrgyz respondents will be analyzed in this chapter.
‘C lan’ identities in Kyrgyzstan
I am here engaged in a diagnosis of the ‘clan discourse’ in Kyrgyzstan. On an ontological 
level it is debatable whether there really exists such kinship-based entities like ‘clans’ in 
contemporary Kyrgyzstan. The question being, are there really coherent emic entities that 
we reasonably can label ‘clans’ and if so, what are the implications for electoral politics? It 
is clear that an element of ‘imagination’ is involved, but do they actually exist as coherent 
entities, are they really groups? Here I borrow from the conceptual apparatus of Brubaker 
et.al and instead talk about categories and groups (Brubaker, 2006):
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If by ‘group’ we mean a mutually interacting, mutually recognizing collectivity 
with a sense of solidarity, corporate identity, and capacity to concerted action, or 
even if we adopt a less exigent understanding of group, it should be clear that a 
category is not a group; it is at best a potential basis for group-formation or 
‘groupness’ (Brubaker, 2006, p. 11).
Following Brubaker I am here examining the political processes through which categories
get invested with varying degrees of groupness. The reason for adopting this cumbersome
language is simple. I want to avoid substantialist language that presupposes groups as
agents. As I will show, this is especially relevant in an analysis of ‘clans’ in Central Asia.
Taking categories as our starting point, instead of groups, allows us to focus on the
processes and relations rather than the substance.117 Taking a cue from Brubaker, the aim
here becomes to outline ‘the organizational and discursive careers of categories’, in this
case ‘clans’.
A key act in the recognition of a group is naming, i.e. coming up with a collective name of 
the group.118 The Kyrgyz word for ‘clan’ is uruk or uruu, depending on what level we are 
referring to.119 The most cited level is that of uruu, like for instance the Sarybagysh, the 
uruu of the former President Askar Akaev and the Teiit, the uruu of the current President 
Kurmanbek Bakiev. In this chapter I will use the Irish/English word ‘clan’ to denote any 
relevant level, be it uruu or uruk.120 I want to reiterate that when I use the ‘clan’ concept I 
do not intend to imply that there actually are ‘clans’ in contemporary Kyrgyzstan that are 
organized as corporate groups. I narrowly define ‘clan’ as a kinship-based social unit based 
on an identifiable linage that comes with an elaborate set of genealogical information.
The designation of a particular person as a member of this or that ‘clan’ is here purely 
aggregative, a generalization if you will. President Akaev identifying himself as being 
Sarybagysh {uruu) does not imply anything about the salience of this self-identification in
117 For more on Brubaker’s critique of ‘groupism’ see the article Ethnicity without groups (Brubaker, 2003).
118 This goes for all kinds of ethnic groups (both national and sub-national levels). On the importance of 
naming see (Smith, 1986, p. 24).
119 In the anthropological and ethnographic literature on Kyrgyzstan, uruu is often equated with the English 
tribe and Russian plemya, while uruk has the equivalent or clan in English and rod in Russian. In the context 
of the Russian language, the word klan is also used, but often in a pejorative sense. An uruu is simply a larger 
kinship unit consisting of several uruks. An uruk is a ‘lineage’ in the strict sense of the word (Beyer, 2006, p. 
160). Or in the words of Gullette: ‘Some said that sometimes they refer to their uruk as ichinen uruu (Kyrgyz: 
‘a plemya within a plemya'). I have even heard uruk being described as kichine uruu (Kyrgyz: a ‘little 
plemya')' (Gullette, 2006a, p. 60).
120 This is problematic from the viewpoint of established anthropological distinctions (see previous footnote).
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relation to the myriad of other self- and other-ascribed identification. A ‘clan’ is here not 
understood as a solidary or bounded group, but rather as a set of category members. Let us 
be clear about this point. Being a member of a certain ‘clan’ does not imply that the 
aggregated ‘group’ of members is anything more than just that, a set of category members. 
Again, the language adopted here might come across as cumbersome, but as I will show, 
the usage of the ‘clan’ terminology in describing politics in Central Asia has hitherto been 
insufficiently precise.
In this research project I consciously chose not to use the Russian word klan, but instead 
the Kyrgyz word for ‘clan’ uruu. This even if the interview was conducted in Russian. The 
question about the ‘clan’ belonging was put to the interviewee rather straightforwardly, I 
simply asked the interviewees to identify their uruu}21 The results are presented in the table 
below:
Table 61: Naming one’s ‘clan’ and ‘sub-clan’
What is the name of your 
uruu ('clan')?
What is the name of your 
uruk ('clan' sub-group)?
Answer Options
Response
Count Answer Options
Response
Count
answered 142 answered 131
skipped 4 skipped 15
answered % 97.3% answered % 89.7%
skipped % 2.7% skipped % 10.3%
* (Q13&14).
Here I can see that an overwhelming majority, 97 percent, did not have any problems in 
responding to the question about their uruu}22 Even the question about the sub-group, the 
next level in the kinship group hierarchy, the uruk was not an issue for almost 90 percent of 
the candidates. This clearly indicates a certain ‘clan’ discourse fluency among the political 
elites sampled here. However, if I closely examine the answers themselves I note that there 
seems to be a degree of fluidity in these identity categories. The classical ‘tribal structure’ 
in Kyrgyzstan can be represented by the Abramzon taxonomy. The list of uruus can be seen
121 In Russian the question was: ‘Nazovite imya vashego uruu’ and in Kyrgyz ‘Sizdin uruunuzdun aty emne 
As noted by Dr. Madeleine Reeves the latter is a rather literal translation (ref. e-mail correspondence 
25Feb08).
122 For more details about how the candidates reacted to the question about ‘clan’ identities see the section 
‘Clans’ and electoral politics later in this chapter.
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in the column to the right in the following figure (starting with Sarybagysh, the uruu o f the 
former President, Askar Akaev).
Figure 5: Abramzon (1963) ‘Pre-Revolutionary Tribal Structure’ Taxonomy
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According to this figure there were historically a total of 46 uruu level kinship groups in 
Kyrgyzstan. In the survey I basically wanted the candidates to place themselves in one o f 
these categories. However, after testing out several different ways o f posing the question, 
with and without showing interviewees the Abramzon taxonomy, I decided to simply ask 
the uruu identification question in an open-ended fashion without any guidelines as to what 
exact level I wanted the interviewees to place themselves in. The idea here being to verify
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whether the often cited Abramzon pre-1917 taxonomy has any relevance today.123 Three 
quarters of the candidates immediately placed themselves in one of the Abramzon’s uruu 
categories. This demonstrates the continued relevance of the Abramzon pre-revolutionary 
taxonomy to contemporary Kyrgyzs.
Table 62: Uruu identification
What is the name of your uruu ('clan')?
Answer Options Percentage
Response
Count
Uruu name (Abramzon 
right-hand column) 74% 105
Uruu name (non- 
Abramzon uruu level) 25% 35
Do not know 1% 2
answered 97% 142
skipped 3% 4
* (Q13).
It is here notable that well over 90% of the Kyrgyz respondents had a straightforward reply 
to this question.124 Replying in itself does not tell us much, however, the nature of the reply 
does. What we are interested in here is to what extent the reported uruu identity 
corresponds to the traditionally considered key uruus in Kyrgyzstan (i.e. the Abramzon 
categories). In the table above we can see that 74% gave an uruu name that correspond to 
one in the right-hand column in Figure 1. The ones that placed themselves in any of the 
Abramzon uruu categories («=105) placed themselves in 26 of the available 46 uruus. The 
rest that did respond to the question about their uruu responded with a non-Abramzon uruu 
category. The 35 candidates that did reply to the question about their uruu (Q13) with a 
non-Abramzon uruu category are distributed in the following way: 10 with a higher level 
group (first or second column in Figure 1), Adigine or Ichkilik; 10 with a sub-group, often 
with the Kyrgyz prefix kara- or saru- (‘black’ and ‘water’ respectively); and 15 responded 
with a non-identified (non-Abramzon) category. How about those Kyrgyz respondents that 
did not give an answer or that responded ‘do not know’ (n=6)? Do we have any reasons for 
their refusal to provide an answer? Perhaps they felt intimidated by the fact that a foreigner
123 As evidence of being often cited I note that during fieldwork this exact taxonomy was published in one of 
the local Kyrgyz language newspapers (Agyn, October, 2008).
124 If we combine the ‘do not know’ answers with the ‘skipped question’ responses we still get an impressive 
96% that replied to this question.
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wanted to know such a private thing. There might also be interesting developments over 
time that we need to account for.
In two cases of non-response (missing value), the candidates were nevertheless able to 
name their uruk (‘clan’ sub-group), indicating a certain knowledge about these issues. 
Actually, the problem with non-response might lie in the Abramzon taxonomy itself. This 
can be illustrated by the response given by Abdiev (#27) from the southern mountain 
district of Kara-Kulja. His ‘clan’ is Tengizbai, which is an anomaly in that it does not fit the 
Abramzon taxonomy. The alleged reason is that Tengiz (without the bai -  boy suffix) 
according to the legend was an orphan. When asked about uruu Abdiev does not answer, 
but when asked about uruk he answers with Tengizbai. In two other cases the question was 
not asked at all, since we already knew the uruu identity of the candidate (Tagaev and 
Ibraimov).125 The two remaining cases on non-response were both candidates in the 1995 
elections, and only one of them seems to really not know his uruu (Primov #135).
Let us now turn to the question about the sub-group, or what we here are referring to as 
uruk. Again, we have a very high response rate, 90%. One fifth or the respondents 
answered this question with an uruu level category (the right-hand column in Figure 1). 
However, in most of the cases (40%) the answer is a recognizable sub-group, sometimes in 
the form of a Kyrgyz prefix (see above).
Table 63: Uruk identification
What is the name of your uruk ('clan' sub-group)?
Answer Options Percentage
Response
Count
Uruu name (Abramzon) 19% 27
Uruk name (non- 
Abramzon) 40% 56
Ancestor's name 26% 37
Geographical area 1% 2
Do not know (d/k) 4% 5
answered 90% 127
skipped 10% 14
*(Q13).
125 Also, both of the candidates were quite intimidated by the overall interview and we therefore sought to 
bypass some of the sensitive questions.
To my knowledge, there is no Abramzon uruk taxonomy. In terms of the responses on 
uruks, in one quarter of all the cases the answer is with a recognizable Kyrgyz name 
(Ancestor’s name). On a closer examination this should not surprise anyone, since names 
are indeed used to denote patrilinear groups (lineages). Perhaps one of the most important 
findings here is that only 1% of the respondents related their uruk name to a geographical 
term and in one of these cases only as a suffix to an already existing Abramzon uruu 
category.126 This clearly shows that Collins is wrong in using the ‘clan’ concept in a 
metaphorical way that incorporates geographical terms as well.127 For the Kyrgyz an uruu 
is an emic category that does not follow administrative or geographical boundaries.
So we have established that the Kyrgyz political elites, if that is how we want to understand 
candidates, possess a lot of genealogical information about themselves. But what about 
ordinary citizens? Is the genealogical discourse only restricted to the elites? In my case 
study on a single election district I showed that there is also a high level of ‘clan’ fluency 
among locals, at least in rural areas (Sjoberg, 2008). However, in the context of the 
candidate survey we continued by asking candidates if they knew the uruu identity of their 
fellow candidates.
Table 64: Knowing the uruu of other candidates
Do you know the uruu identity of the other candidates in your SMD?
Answer Options Percentage
Response
Count 2005 2000 1995
Yes 68% 92 65% 41 74% 20 69% 22
No 32% 43 35% 22 26% 7 31% 10
answered 135 63 27 32
skipped 12 6 4 1
skipped % 8.2% 8.7% 12.9% 3.0%
* (Q17).
Over two-thirds of the elites claim that they indeed knew the uruu identity of all the other 
candidates in their election district. So how about the voters, do the candidates think that 
the voters also knows the uruu identity of all the candidates?
126 The response was ‘Avat-Tokmok’, where Avat is an uruu group and Tokmok is a city in Chui oblast’.
127 Collins at one point refers to the ‘Issyk-Kul clan’ and the ‘Chui clan’, which is clearly misleading since 
these are purely administrative geographical units (Collins, 2006, p. 126).
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Table 65: Voters knowledge of candidate’s uruu
Do all the voters in your SMD know the uruu identity of all the candidates?
Answer Options Percentage
Response
Count 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 0 1 9 9 5
Always 51% 69 45% 28 67% 18 53% 17
Som etim es 18% 24 16% 10 7% 2 28% 9
Don't know 16% 21 16% 10 22% 6 3% 1
Rarely 11% 15 19% 12 4% 1 6% 2
Never 4% 5 3% 2 0% 0 9% 3
answered 134 62 2 7 32
skipped 13 7 4 1
skipped % 8.8% 10.1% 12.9% 3.0%
* (Q18).
As we can see candidates believe that a majority of the voters always knows the uruu 
identity of all the candidates in the district.128 I also wanted to find out more about the 
‘clan’ narrative and the sizes of these groups. First we asked about the ‘geographical 
heartland’ of the uruu:
Table 66: Knowing the heartland of one’s uruu
Do you know the geographical heartland 
for your uruu? Name rayon (and possibly a 
few villages)
Answer
Options Percentage
Response
Count
Yes 96% 109
No 4% 5
answered 114
skipped 32
skipped % 22%
* (Q15).
Clearly most candidates had an idea about the geographical heartland of their kinship-based 
group. And as noted by Smith, the ability to associate an ethnic (or sub-ethnic in this case) 
with a particular locus or territory is of utmost importance (Smith, 1986, p. 28). Knowing 
the heartland of one’s uruu is another good indicator of ‘clan’ fluency. We followed up this 
question by asking them to estimate the proportion of fellow uruu members in their own 
election district. Again, most of the respondents did not have a problem with answering this
128 In my case study voter survey («=50) I showed that voters do not necessarily always know the uruu 
identity of all the candidates (Sjoberg, 2008).
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question, even though the answers themselves might be biased, either exaggerating of 
playing down to numerical strength of one’s ‘clan’.
Table 67: Estimate proportion of one’s own uruu
Can you estim ate the percentage of fellow 
uruu m em bers in your SMD?
Answer
Options Percentage
Response
Count
Less than 10% 39% 49
10-29% 26% 33
30-49% 23% 29
50-69% 5% 6
More than 70% 7% 9
answered 126
skipped 21
skipped % 14.3%
* (Q 1 6 ) .
This table tells us that most of the candidates belong to numerically insignificant uruus, 
with only 12% openly admitting that their uruu is in a majority position in the constituency. 
Due to the sensitivity of uruu mathematics it is conceivable that these numbers are low 
estimates, but it nevertheless provides us with another source of information about the 
genealogical fluency of the candidates.
So far we have exclusively focused on the genealogical narrative dimension. Let us now 
turn to the more intriguing question about the effect that all of this has on electoral 
dynamics. Let us start by looking at campaigning. A key thing in any campaign is to have a 
lot of loyal followers in one’s election district. You need local activists that will do the hard 
work of convincing others to vote for you, organize events, and in general defend your 
interests as a candidate, serve on election commission, observe the voting etc. Electoral 
campaigns all over the world provide a good opportunity for candidates to reactivate their 
networks and ask their friends, relatives and colleagues for favors. To elaborate on this we 
asked the candidates to identify the most important categories of persons involved in their 
campaign.
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Table 68: Important persons in the SMD
What kind of person 
for you in your cam
s in your SMD were m ost useful 
paign? (pick maximum 2)
Answer Options Percentage
Response
Count 2005 2000 1995
Relatives 77% 112 76% 54 70% 21 85% 28
Colleagues 49% 71 39% 28 60% 18 61% 20
School friends 39% 56 45% 32 40% 12 33% 11
Local state admin 12% 17 11% 8 10% 3 9% 3
Fellow party memb 9% 13 13% 9 7% 2 6% 2
Business friends 8% 11 6% 4 10% 3 3% 1
answered 145 71 30 33
skipped 15 7 3 2
answered % 91% 91% 91% 94%
* Note that two answers were possible. The response alternatives were presented in this exact order, i.e. not 
randomized (Q25).129
The role of relatives sticks out as the most important category of useful persons in a 
campaign. It is hardly surprising that only a few chose local state officials or business 
colleagues as their most important human assets in the campaign. After all local state 
officials are by law prohibited to participate in campaign work. Businessmen on the other 
hand could potentially be a sensitive category, since the influence of money on elections is 
not considered ethically correct. Furthermore, with extremely weak parties it cannot 
surprise anyone that less than ten percent picked fellow party members as the most valuable 
category of people. It is also notable that the importance of ‘fellow party members’ is 
increasing over time. What this table does show is the essential role that relatives play in 
the organization of the campaign. Also, predictably the percentage relying on relatives is 
much higher in rural election districts
What about voting behavior? Does deep genealogical knowledge and a reliance on relatives 
imply unconditional support for fellow uruu members at the voting booth? In many cases 
yes, but this does not seem to be a straightforward mechanism. In order to fully determine 
this we would need to conduct a thorough ethnographic overview of all the election districts 
and then see if the results in the first round of the elections correspond to the uruu
129 At first we also intended to ask more specific questions about particular individuals, like campaign 
managers and other leading activists. Due to the sensitivity of the matter we decided, after conducting several 
pilot interviews, to avoid exploring this issue further in the format of the formal interview.
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proportions in each district. Due to the difficulty of the task, we have decided to approach 
this through a detailed case study of a particular election district instead.130 However, in the 
context o f the voter survey we wanted to ask the candidates what they themselves think 
about voting behavior and the role o f uruu identity.
Table 69: Voting for one’s uruu
Are people in your SMD usually voting for someone from their own 
Uruu (or 'Nationality' in the case of non-Kyrgyz respondents)?
Answer Options Percentage
Response
Count 2005 2000 1995
Yes, always 36% 54 30% 22 42% 13 45% 15
Sometimes 45% 69 43% 32 45% 14 42% 14
Uruu not important 19% 29 27% 20 13% 4 12% 4
answered 152 74 31 33
skipped 8 4 2 2
skipped % 5.0% 5.1% 6.1% 5.7%
* Note that this question is not only directed at Kyrgyz respondents only, but to the whole sample (Q39).
Here we can see that less than a fifth o f the candidates think that uruu is irrelevant when it 
comes to voting. Clearly most candidates consider uruu (or ethnicity) to play some kind of 
role in voting behavior, but the proportion that considers people always voting for someone 
from their own group is steadily going down over time.
Diagram 1: Trends o f ‘voting for one’s uruu’
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Interestingly enough in the sample we note a significant increase in the candidates deeming 
it not important in the 2005 elections compared to the two previous electoral cycles. Uruu 
is said to be especially relevant in the first round of the parliamentary elections (#35). One
130 See case study chapter (6) on Kara-Kulja.
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candidate identified invoking uruu identities as an explicit campaign technique (Q28).131 At 
times candidates would be introduced with their uruu identity at local rallies and an uruu 
loyalty would be invoked in appealing for the vote, like when at a rally in Talas oblast ’ the
audience was told ‘Let us vote for kushchu [an uruu]‘ or in Kara-Kulja rayon where voters
1 ^were asked to cast their vote for fellow uruu members (#36, #29: Q28). Or when 
Shemiyazov, a leading candidate in one of the Talas oblast’ districts, said about a fellow 
candidate, the incumbent Borubaev: ‘[he] played the uruu card’ (#38:Q28). Another former 
MP, Chekiev, in Jalalabad, also claimed that other candidates appealed to uruu loyalties 
(#53:Q28).
Let us examine some emerging patterns when it comes to candidate’s views how people 
vote. For instance one could assume that respondents that think voters always knows the 
uruu of the candidates also would think this played a role in terms of deciding whom to 
vote for.
Table 70: Voters knowing the uruu of Candidates and Voting for fellow uruu 
members (crosstab)
VOTERURUUKNOW
always som etim es do not know rarely never Total
always Count 34 2 5 5 0 46% 50.7% 8.3% 25.0% 33.3% .0% 35.1%
som etim es Count 27 16 8 5 2 58z
M % 40.3% 66.7% 40.0% 33.3% 40.0% 44.3%1-O does not Count 6 6 7 5 3 27
> matter % 9.0% 25.0% 35.0% 33.3% 60.0% 20.6%
=)
Total Count 67 24 20 15 5 131CL
ZD % 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
*X2 = 26.97, df = 8, P < 0.001, y = 0.466
This table shows that there is indeed an association between candidates thinking that voters 
know the uruu of the candidates and them thinking that voters vote for someone from their 
own uruu. Examining those who think that voters always know the uruu of the candidates, 
i.e. the upper left comer, and comparing that with those in the lower right comer clearly 
reveals the pattern. Of those 67 respondents that say that voters always know the uruu of all
131 ‘Oni pri vstrechakh c izbiratelyami delili kandidatov na uruu’ (#105, Q28:#121).
132 ‘Davai galasuem Kuschu’ (#36).
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the candidates a majority (34 candidates) think that voters always vote for someone from 
their own uruu. On the other hand, a majority of those respondents («=5) who consider 
voter never knowing the uruu all the candidates 60% say that uruu never plays any role in 
voter’s decision at the booth. Next we will examine regional differences when it comes to 
the strength of the ‘clan’ identity discourse.
Table 71: Oblast’ and Voters knowing the uruu of Candidates (crosstab)
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o rarely n 2 0 1 3 1 2 6 0 0 15
Z)3
% 10% 0% 20% 14% 9% 15% 13% 0% 0% 11%
never n 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 53 % 0% 67% 0% 10% 0% 0% 0% 0% 9% 4%
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Here we see that the urban oblast’s of Bishkek, Chui, and the city of Osh behave 
predictably, with lower levels of voter’s knowing the uruu of all the other candidates 
(according to the candidates that is). If I do the same regional cross-tabulation, but with 
uruuvoting instead of uruuknowing, I also get the same pattern and yet again a result that is 
statistically significant (P < 0.01). I can therefore conclude that there is clearly a regional 
pattern when it comes to the strength of the genealogical discourse on ‘clans’. So how does 
being a member of a large uruu affect the results in the first round? Fitting a simple scatter 
plot produces the following pattern:
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Diagram 2: Candidate's uruu group proportion (%) and vote share in the first round 
(scatter plot)
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As we can see there is only a tiny positive association between being a member o f a large 
group (uruu proportion) and the vote share, a fitted line produces a R2 of 0.009. 
Furthermore if I do a cross-tab with being a member of a majority uruu and vote share in 
the first round I do not get any statistically significant results. The same happens if  I 
crosstabulate the proportion of uruu with the dichotomous variable elected/not elected.
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'Clans’ and electoral politics
Asking a Kyrgyz about their ‘clan’ affiliation is not something that other survey type 
research has done before. The phenomenon of uruu/uruk, and the overall genealogical 
narrative is often confused by foreigners with explicit political phenomena, like political 
corruption or regionalism. In this project I wanted to ask the questions about the 
genealogical narrative in a mostly open-ended and straightforward fashion. Of particular 
interest therefore is the reaction of the respondent to the posed questions. In the guidelines 
for the collectors (interviewers) I specifically asked them to write down the reactions of the 
respondent (candidates) to the questions about ‘clans’. This allows us to make further 
inferences about the phenomena, granted, through the subjective eyes of the data 
collector.133 All in all I have 128 comments by the interviewers on the respondent’s 
reaction to the uruu related questions.134 As a first step I decided to code the answers in the 
following way:135
Table 72: Coding of the comments to ‘clan’ questions
Attitude to 
Question
Attitude to the 
Uruu
phenomenon
Relevance of 
Uruus in politics?
Uruu bad for 
politics
l= ca lm ,
interested,
2 = indifferent, 
3 = hostile, 
nervous
l=im portant,
2=indifferent,
3=nonsense
l= h ig h ,
2=m edium ,
3=none
l= Y es, 0=No
* (Q43).
In addition to this I here provide some anecdotal evidence on the issue of ‘clans’ and 
electoral politics. I present the findings separately for each election year, starting with the 
most recent. At the end of this section I will summarize die findings for each year and look 
for notable trends.
133 For more information about the survey see Methodology appendix.
134 Total number of Kyrgyz 146, i.e. we have additional comments for 88% of the Kyrgyz candidates.
135 This was done manually by the PhD Candidate himself.
Table 73: 2005 sample ‘clan’ question comments
Attitude to 
Question (l= ca lm , 
interested,
2 = indifferent,
3=hostile,
nervous)
Attitude to the 
Uruu phenomenon  
(l= im portant,
2 = indifferent, 
3=nonsense)
Relevance of 
Uruus in politics? 
(l= h ig h , 
2=m edium , 
3=none)
Uruu bad for 
politics (l= Y es, 
0=No)
1 967% 72% 45% 93%
2 0% 8% 39%
3 3% 21% 16%
0 7%
N 60 39 31 15
* (Q43).
For the 2005 candidates we have a total of 64 comments. On the ‘attitude towards the uruu 
question’ (Q13&14) we see that most respondents were calm and curious, but we also got 
tense and hostile reactions from a few candidates. When the PhD Candidate did the 
interviews the respondents often felt a need to explain the uruu phenomenon and if the 
collector was a native Kyrgyz they would at times ask for the uruu of the collector. At only 
a few instances was the reaction to the uruu question uncomfortable (#147). In terms of the 
attitude towards the phenomenon (uruu) itself, I note that on several occasions the 
interviewees responded that knowing your uruu is indeed important for the Kyrgyz (72% of 
all that brought this up saw it as important). Many pointed out that the discourse on 
uruu/uruk is of great historical relevance to the Kyrgyz, an important ‘part of the past’ as 
one respondent put it (#127). Several pointed out that the genealogical narrative is only 
relevant for the history, but irrelevant in peoples everyday lives in contemporary 
Kyrgyzstan (#148). Here I can add that none of the comments were about the other possible 
non-political spheres of life where uruu/uruk still plays an important role, life-cycle rituals 
and the like.
So what kind of open-ended comments do we get on the uruu questions related to politics? 
Several candidates expressed frustration about the role that uruu plays in rural 
constituencies (#51, 52). Or in the words of one of the candidates:
The belonging existed during the feudal system, but now the biggest role is 
played by localism [zemlyachestvo] as the practice demonstrates. Uruu 
belonging exists and existed only during the creation of the history of Kyrgyz, it 
is their origin (#85).
However, in some areas it still plays a significant role. For instance in Batken oblast’ where 
a candidate in the 2006 by-elections said:
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I organized meetings in every village as well as in every individual clan {uruu).
Every clan needs its own meeting (#14: Q27).
Some said that an uruu loyalty meant that there was a lot of free (cheap) labor for the 
candidates in their constituencies, i.e. that fellow uruu members were used for campaigning 
without remuneration. Concerning voting behavior and the role of uruu loyalty, one 
admitted that usually voters vote for someone from their own uruu.n6 At times the uruu 
belonging would be used by political entrepreneurs, like the candidates talking about 
‘playing the Adygine [see Figure 1] card’ (#83). One candidate even told us that uruu is 
only important for politicians (chinovniki), in that they use these categories in their 
campaigning (#144). Some of the losing candidates blamed their failure on the fact that 
they came from a minority uruu (#94, 151). In a few interviews the uruu question came up 
even before the interviewer reached the uruu related questions on the questionnaire (#56). 
A quarter of the comments were explicitly about the negative effects of the uruus on 
politics. The role of uruu in Kyrgyz society is by some considered to be disruptive, or 
bringing the country to an explosion, ’jaryluuga alyp kelet’ in Kyrgyz (#63). Or as another 
candidate pointed out: '‘uruu is the engine (sail) of political corruption.137
Next I turn to the comments from the 2000 sample.
Table 74: 2000 sample ‘clan’ question comments
Attitude to
Question (l= ca lm ,
interested,
2=indifferent,
3=hostile,
nervous)
Attitude to the 
Uruu phenomenon  
(l= im portant, 
2=indifferent, 
3=nonsense)
Relevance of 
Uruus in politics? 
(l= h ig h , 
2=m edium , 
3=none)
Uruu bad for 
politics (l= Y es ,  
0=No)
1 95% 94% 50% 100%
2 0% 6% 36%
3 5% 0% 14%
0 0%
N 22 16 14 10
* (Q43).
For the 2000 candidates I have a total of 24 comments recorded by the interviewees. The 
striking thing about the comments here is that the attitude towards the phenomenon seems
136 ‘Obichno izbirateli predpachitayut otdavats svoi golosa za predstavitilei svoego uruu’ (#156).
137 ‘Prinadlezhnost’ k uruu -  eto parus korrumpirovannogo parlamenta. Eto vsegda ispolzovannye metody 
nechistoplotnikh lyudei’ (#132).
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to be very positive in that 94% consider it important. Also, not a single one of the 
comments contain anything about uruus not being destructive or bad for politics. Most 
respondents would be very interested in these issues, but a bit surprised that a foreigner 
asks around (#114).
Knowledge about uruu is a personal question. It is a private matter for of each of 
us, and no one other has the right to know about it. Also it should not concern 
elections. In Kyrgyz history the Khans used to elect. But we are now living in a 
democratic society. Clans and uruus are necessary for our children so that they 
do not forget the past. (#3).
Many pointed out that for the Kyrgyz themselves it is essential to know one’s uruu (#5, 
117). One of the respondents got really interested and asked for copy of the Abramzon
11Rtaxonomy that the PhD candidate had brought with him for the interview (#1). Another 
respondent provided an ex tempore division of the Kyrgyz into: 1) national 2) uruu 3) uruk 
4) jeti-ata (Kyrgyz respected elders) levels, all delivered in a friendly and pedagogical spirit 
(#45). In the comments for the 2000 elections we also have a good illustration of how uruu 
identities are being used in elections, as with the candidate who said ‘Four candidates from 
my own uruu was put against me (all of them Baziz). He went on to say that this is what is 
meant by ‘Politeknologi pa Kyrgyz’, i.e. a peculiar Kyrgyz technique of organizing 
elections. One respondent emphasized that in certain parts of the country ‘tribe-clan’ 
(Roda-Plemennye) relationships are very important, here referring to Jalalabad as ‘down 
there’ (#46). Others pointed out the relative novelty of this phenomenon:
It is exactly these years [1995] that uruu divisions began. Before it did not play 
any role as there was a different system in USSR. After the independenc of 
Kyrgyzstan we began returning to history and started studying who came from 
where, who his parents were. Now it became fashionable. But for the democratic 
society and for managing politics uruu should not play any role. Politics is about 
politics, but history should remain without being trampled down (#99).
This quote illustrates the ideological vacuum and the nation-building challenges that
Kyrgyzstan faced in the early independence period. As the Soviet Union was dismantled a
new identity project was begun.139 Another respondent also brought up the same theme:
'uruu became important only after the fall of the USSR, as the ideology of USSR
138 This respondent confused his uruu belonging, first saying that he was a Tengizbai, and then after looking at 
the Abramzon document, he said that he was a Joru. Joru and Tengizbai are not related.
139 For more on this see D.Gullette’s PhD dissertation.
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disappeared and people turned to the Manas epic’ (#114).140 There are also some interesting 
comments regarding gender dynamics. One of the female candidates expressed frustration 
about the role of women in this ‘tribe-clan’ system:
An uruu never supports its daughters, but it is handy for male politicians. It is 
quite old method of governing. Uruu belonging should play a role only during 
writing an autobiography of a man, during the study of one’s kind and history of 
one’s land (#108).
The 2000 sample did not have any problems with ‘clan’ related questions as such and they 
confirmed that it is an interesting phenomenon that has significant influence over the 
elections. The ones that included a value statement in their comments were all skeptical 
about the influence of ‘clans’ on elections.
Finally I have the 1995 candidate comments. Here I have a total of 29 comments. A 
strikingly high number felt uncomfortable when this question was asked, with over 11% of 
the collectors reporting hostility or nervousness on the part of the candidates. Also notable 
is the high number of respondents that consider uruu to be explicitly bad for politics.
Table 75: 1995 sample ‘clan’ question comments
Attitude to
Question (l= ca lm ,
interested,
2=indifferent,
3=hostile,
nervous)
Attitude to the 
Uruu phenomenon  
(l= im portant, 
2=indifferent, 
3=n on sen se)
Relevance of 
Uruus in politics? 
( l= h ig h ,  
2=m edium , 
3=none)
Uruu bad for 
politics (l= Y es , 
0=No)
1 83% 92% 70% 57%
2 6% 8% 20%
3 11% 0% 10%
0 43%
N 18 13 10 7
* (Q43).
Here follows some notable comments from the 1995 sample. Many pointed out that 
knowing your uruu is essential for the Kyrgyz, like the candidates that said:
The Kyrgyzs need to live and respect their uruu. This is a part of their life. In 
history there are occasions when were punished if they did not know their uruu 
(#98).
Or as the candidate that with pride in his eyes said:
140 ‘Uruu stala vazhno tolko prosle razvala SSSR, t.k. ideologiya SSSR ischezla I lyudi obratilis’ k eposu 
Manas idr’ (#114).
159
Knowledge about uruu is very important to the Kyrgyzs. There are very few  
peoples in the world with such a history (#112).
A high percentage (70%) claim that uruus are indeed very relevant in politics, but there are
also diverging opinions, as with the candidate claiming that the 1995 elections had been
above uruu divisions, but that it became more prevalent in the next couple of electoral
cycles (#21). In conclusion, the comments for all three elections (1995-2005) highlight that
for an overwhelming majority o f the candidates the uruu discourse is not sensitive and that
the phenomenon itself for many is a source o f pride and great interest. But it is clear that
the trend is downward in terms of the importance of uruus.
Diagram 3: Attitude to the uruu phenomon (coded by author)
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About half o f the comments reveal that the political relevance of uruu is high, even though 
the trend is towards less and less relevance. Also, the number of people that consider the 
phenomenon completely nonsensical is increasing. So much for the attitudinal dimension, 
but what about the relevance of all o f this for politics?
Diagram 4: Relevance of uruus for Politics (coded by author)
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Here we can see that the number of candidates considering uruus to be highly relevant for 
politics is steadily going down over time. Finally I note that an overwhelming majority of 
the candidates consider uruus to be bad for politics and something that should be kept away 
from politics.141
Chapter 5 Conclusions
The un-weighted results of the candidate survey illustrate several key things about politics 
and identity in post-independence Kyrgyzstan.142 For one, ‘clan’ identities are strong and 
this is by some candidates believed to have straightforward implications for voting 
behavior. However, a majority of the respondents say that ‘clans’ should not play any role 
in politics, that it is a purely historical identity phenomena with no place in a modem 
democratic Kyrgyzstan. Furthermore, candidates in rural districts are acutely aware of the 
number of fellow uruu members, the size of the ‘clan’ so to speak, with more than 85% 
responding to the question about the uruu proportions in their district. But the implications 
of strong ‘clan’ identification for voting behavior remain a puzzle. Voting for someone 
from one’s own village or town is hardly a unique Kyrgyz phenomenon. This kind of 
electoral localism is seen all over the world. So the question really becomes: what exactly 
does the ‘clan’ component determine in an election and what is the role of locality? In the 
case of Kyrgyzstan it is clear that there is no such thing as a ‘clan’ that actually does things, 
i.e. coordinated action among locals. At most, it is a symbolic reality, an imagined 
community if you will. Political entrepreneurs gladly utilize the ‘clan’ language in 
describing their candidacy, but this does not mean that there actually are sanction 
mechanisms at hand for ‘clan elders’ to enforce decisions on candidate selection or voting. 
This is not to say that ‘clans’ do not exist as culturally important categories and that life­
cycle rituals are at times organized around these kinship units.
It has here been illustrated that ‘clans’ are indeed discursively present in times of 
heightened political battles (elections). The question in the Kyrgyz case is: under what 
condition does an emic category like uruu become a ‘klan’, as in a politicized kinship
141 Even though on this particular issue we have some interesting finding in the 1995 sample, where over 40% 
did not consider uruus to be bad for politics.
142 For more information see Table 87 in the Methodology appendix.
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group? Relying on ‘clans’ as a key component in the new identity project in post-Soviet 
Kyrgyzstan was an intentional strategy deployed by the Akaev administration. In an ironic 
twist, ‘clans’ replaced the communist party, as something that you had to pay lip service to. 
A ‘new conformism’ developed, partly as a result of the ideological confusion in this 
transitional period.143 This new conformist narrative was especially strong in rural areas. 
But the fractionalizing nature of the single-member district (SMD) system also contributed 
to the persistent focus on ‘clans’. There were no incentives for political entrepreneurs to 
reach beyond their district in their campaigning. The majoritarian SMD system in 
Kyrgyzstan allowed for localized identity formations to be exploited in election campaigns. 
The switch to a nation-wide party list system in late 2007 ended all of this, turning the 
contest more into a question about trust in authorities and oppositional mentalities, not 
kinship categories.
143 The concept of ‘New Conformism’ was suggested by my supervisor, Prof. James Hughes at LSE.
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CHAPTER 6: TESTING THE ‘CLAN POLITICS’ 
HYPOTHESIS IN A RURAL DISTRICT IN KYRGYZSTAN
I have selected a rural and mountainous district in the southern part of Kyrgyzstan to 
illustrate local level dynamics in times of elections. This is not a representative district in 
Kyrgyzstan, but rather a critical case for the ‘clan politics’ hypothesis. The selected district 
might be peripheral in geographic terms, but it is nevertheless a politicized district that has 
fed the national arena with both leading pro-government and oppositional politicians. The 
election results show that the contest for a seat was surprisingly open in this semi­
authoritarian setting. This is not to say that the electoral process was free and fair, quite the 
contrary actually. I nevertheless claim that due to the process of political liberalization in 
the early 1990s, the regime in Kyrgyzstan was opened up to local level dynamics. This was 
something of a Pandora’s box, but something that the first post-Soviet president, Askar 
Akaev, had to accept in a great bargain for the institutional framework for this newly 
independent state.144
Here I will show that ‘clans’ were at least discursively present in post-independence 
politics in Kyrgyzstan. Instead of corporate groups (‘clans’) engaging in the electoral 
processes as actors (organizations) we have something of a poetic toolbox with 
genealogical narratives that political entrepreneurs use in times of elections. The loyalties 
that these narratives invoke are perhaps similar to those employed in war-like situations 
that the segmentary lineage theory refers to (e.g. the Nuer) .145 However, this does not mean 
that ‘clans’ are the main organizing principle on the constituency level in Kyrgyzstan. The 
selected election district can be considered a critical case for the ‘clan politics’ hypothesis 
(Collins, 2006; Khamidov, 2002; Temirkulov, 2004).146 In this chapter I will show that
144 The bargain basically granted regional elites institutional benefits, in terms of how the seats were 
determined and the structure of the parliament. ‘Thus, in its final form the electoral law primarily reflected the 
regional leaders’ preferences...’ (Jones Luong, 2002, p. 185).
145 For more on segmentary lineage theory see (Kuper, 1982).
146 The most elaborate ‘clan politics’ statement about electoral politics can be found on p.238 in Collins book 
‘Where several names appeared on one ballot in a rural district, competition among several notables, usually
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‘clans’ do not determine the outcome of parliamentary elections in Kyrgyzstan. Yes, 
elections are conflict generating and without any programmatic or ideological content the 
contest becomes one of personalities, mythologies, and financial resources. This is the 
context where kinship became politicized in Kyrgyzstan in the immediate post-Soviet 
period. More important, however, is the political liberalization that allowed for alternative 
political and economic elites to take advantage of the situation. A situation that opened up 
space for protest voting and perhaps even the first signs of democratic accountability.
The chapter is structured as follows. I begin with an introduction to the district {rayon) of 
Kara-Kulja (Kapa-Kyjraca) in southern Kyrgyzstan. Each of the parliamentary elections in 
this district is shortly examined with a focus on an alleged ‘clan dynamic’. I wrap up by 
addressing four key questions in explaining electoral competitiveness.
Case Study: Kara-Kulja Rayon, Osh Oblast
Through my research, I have selected Kara-Kulja district to illustrate local electoral 
dynamics in rural Kyrgyzstan. In the literature on Kyrgyz politics it is often said that ‘clans’ 
are influential in rural areas and especially in the southern parts of the country. Kara-Kulja 
is a peripheral mountainous district in the southern province {oblast *) of Osh. The district 
can be considered a critical case for the ‘clan politics’ thesis, which states that politics in 
Central Asia is heavily influenced by ‘informal social networks rooted in kin and fictive kin 
ties [clan networks]4 (Collins, 2006, p. 19). Based on discussions with both locals and 
international experts I short-listed a dozen Kyrgyz-only rural districts that had exhibited 
both competitiveness and non-competitiveness in the last four electoral cycles.147 Also, 
during my fieldwork, by-elections were organized in Kara-Kulja, which provided me with a 
good opportunity to study an election campaign in the making.
from different clans living within that district, took place. Ballots were typically cast along clan lines...’ 
(Collins, 2006, p. 238).
147 By competitiveness we here refer to a modified version of Taagepera and Shugart’s classic Effective 
Number o f Parties, as introduced by (Dunleavy & Boucek, 2003). This is basically a fractionalization score, 
weighted with the winner’s share of the vote. The higher the number the more competitive 
(dispersed/fractional) the election results.
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I looked for a mono-ethnic district in order to avoid having to consider possible inter-ethnic 
dynamics, as is the case in so many parts of Kyrgyzstan. I also wanted to select a district 
where there is a history of incumbents losing elections, indicating a certain level of 
‘meaningful competition’.148 Finally, Kara-Kulja is fascinating in that local elites from this 
arguably peripheral district have played such an influential role in the Kyrgyz society since 
the days of Kurmanjan-Ja^. As an indication of this, the mobilization that started in the 
south prior to the overthrow of President Akaev (the so called ‘Tulip Revolution’) was 
fuelled by electoral grievances from Kara-Kulja candidates and their supporters (Radnitz, 
2006a). In the following introductory sections I present a short note of the history, 
geography, and local elites of Kara-Kulja.
N o te  o n  H is to ry
Prior to the Russian conquest of the areas around Ferghana valley the Kokand Khanate 
controlled the area with its base in the city of Kokand, located in modem day Uzbekistan. 
The mountainous areas that today belong to Kyrgyzstan were distant comers of this state 
formation. There are stories about local biis (chieftains) rebelling against the appointment 
of bureaucratic personnel from Kokand during the khanate era (19th century). This pattern 
of local resistance prevailed well into the Soviet era. For instance the Basmachi revolt in 
the early 20th century was especially strong in the mountain areas surrounding the Ferghana 
valley. There are several occasions during the most repressive years of Soviet rule when 
this region resisted the new practices (collectivization etc.). And then of course we have the 
only female Central Asian ruler, Kurmanjan-datka, who managed to rally mountain ‘tribes’ 
behind her in late 19th century. This district was politically active even during the Soviet 
times, as indicated by letters that were sent to Moscow to complain about local 
conditions.149
148 ‘Meaningful competition’ taken from Levitsky&Way 2009 (unpublished book manuscript) ‘Put another 
way, whereas officials in closed regimes can rest easy on the eve of elections, as neither they nor opposition 
leaders expect anything but an incumbent victory, incumbents in competitive authoritarian regimes can not. 
Government officials fear a possible opposition victory (and must work hard to thwart it), and opposition 
leaders believe they have at least some chance of victory. In competitive authoritarian regimes, incumbents 
are often forced to sweat.’
149 Interview, Bekbolotov, Kumar, Bishkek, 1-Apr-08. Note that this was not necessarily an uncommon 
practise in other parts of the USSR also.
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Geography
Today’s Kara-Kulja rayon stretches from the borders of Uzgen rayon, close to the Uzbek 
border, all the way up to the Chinese border in the south. It is a mountainous region with a 
river flowing right through it. The population of 87 000 is concentrated in and around the 
rayon center, but there are settlements at several points along the river all the way to the 
Chinese border. In the oblast ’ there are 12 ‘clusters of villages’, or aiyl okmotu (a/o), which 
is the smallest administrative unit. These are spread out with three of them close to the 
Chinese border. These three are often referred to as Alaiku. There were no proper roads up 
to Alaiku until 1982, and even in the spring of 2008 the road required a four-wheel drive 
vehicle. The rest o f the villages are concentrated in and around the rayon center further 
down the river.
Map III: Kara-Kulja district (rayon) including aiyl okmotus
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* This map is from the 1999 Census publication from the National Statistical Committee o f Kyrgyzstan.
District (rayon) Elites
What strikes an outside observer is that this arguably peripheral district has produced so 
many influential political profiles. Part o f the answer lies in history and contemporary 
policies o f preferential treatment of ethnic Kyrgyz (Korenizatsiya during the Soviet era). 
The southern capital of Kyrgyzstan, Osh, was historically an Uzbek city because the
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Kyrgyz being nomadic herders did not settle down until late 19th century (Geiss, 2003; 
Khazanov, 1984).150 Other hypotheses are that children from this sparsely populated area 
were sent to boarding schools in the southern capital of Osh, and therefore received a better 
education than even some urban children. Many Kyrgyz also simply believe that people 
that grow up in though circumstances become stronger. Two influential families in the 
center of the rayon are worth mentioning: the Jeenbekov’s and the Osmonov’s. Both of the 
family heads were very influential during Soviet times, in the district itself and beyond. In 
contemporary Kyrgyzstan their off springs have held posts such as chairman of Supreme 
Court, Minister of Agriculture, Member of Parliament, oblast ’ Governor, Speaker of the 
Parliament, Ambassador etc.
The Jeenbekovs are said to be one of the most influential families in the whole of Kara- 
Kulja rayon.151 The grandfather, Jeenbek, the one who’s name they carry, is said to have 
been a simple man.152 The family home was in Bimyrza close to what is today the rayon 
center. Jeenbek had three sons. Sharip Jeenbekov, the youngest of them, was the chairman 
of RaiPo (a state owned wholesaler) during the Soviet time in Uzgen, Jalalabad, and Kara- 
Kulja. Sharip studied in Tashkent, in the neighboring Soviet republic of Uzbekistan, which 
back then was considered the capital of Central Asia. At one point he was the chairman of 
the enlarged Uzgen Ray ' Soviet}55 Everyone you talk to in Kara-Kulja recognizes that he 
was a strong local authority figure. When the RaiPo was dismantled in 1990s he retired and 
when he died in 1998 there was a big funeral. An interesting connection between Sharip 
Jeenbekov and the former Soviet time MP and Kara-Kulja Sovkhoz director, Saip Kokoev, 
is that their wife’s were sisters. The national importance of Sharip is illustrated by the fact 
that President Akaev is said to have sought his support in the presidential elections of 1995 
when Akaev was re-elected.154 All of his sons went on to have successful careers, more 
often than not in politics. One brother is currently the ambassador to Iran. Another is a MP 
from the Social Democratic Party (SDPK), and the third, Sooronbai, has been a MP for 
three times and also a minister, but is currently keeping a low profile.
150 Still in the 1989 census the Osh city population was 41 percent Uzbek.
151 Several sources, both in Kara-Kulja, Osh, and Bishkek.
152 Interview, Murat’s ‘sister’, Bishkek, 29-Mar-08.
153 Like a municipal representative body.
154 Interview, Baisalov, Edil, Stockholm, Sweden, 6-Mar-08.
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The other really influential family in Kara-Kulja is the Osmonov’s from a village on the 
east side of the rayon center, ‘The First of May’ (Birinchi Mai). Nothing is known (to me) 
of the grandfather to the contemporary generation of influential Osmonov’s, but their 
father, Ergesh Osmonov was at his time a local strongman. Ergesh was educated in 
Moscow, which at the time was very impressive for a village boy from rural Kyrgyzstan. It 
should be noted that this kind of rapid upward social mobility was not unusual for the 
Stalin through to Brezhnev generations in the 1930s-1960s. He later became the director of 
the Sovkhoz in the rayon center. He also served in the Second World War, and later served 
as the Nookat 2nd Secretary of the Communist Party.155 He died the year after Sharip 
Jeebekov, in 1989. After his death, the local school, the former Lenin School, in the rayon 
center was renamed after him. His sons both actively participated in politics, one of them 
served as deputy Prime Minister, and later the chairman of the Supreme Court.
As a point of summary, I conclude by outlining an elite typology. We basically have three 
archetypes here: pre-Soviet ‘traditional’ elites, Soviet era elites, and post-Soviet elites. The 
interesting part is both continuity and change in the elite formation patterns. Elections seem 
to have triggered an unprecedented positioning of locals or quasi-locals.
Table 76: Candidate typology at the time of the election (winners only)
Elite segm ents Candidate Names
Experienced politicians (pro- 
Government)
Jeenbekov Sooronbai (95, 00, 05)
Experienced politicians (Oppositional) Chotonov Duishonkul (00), Sydykov Usen 
(02)
Bureaucrats (State administrators) Osmonov Kurmanbek (00), Abdiev Kurmantai 
(07)
Businessmen Parmankulov Zamirbek (02)
Cultural (intelligentsia) Ibraimov Abyt (90, 95)
* For detailed election results see Appendix: Election Results.
This table shows that the range of people that have done well in Kara-Kulja is broad. We 
have older experienced politicians winning, as well as younger businessmen, younger 
oppositional politicians securing a seat as well as old Soviet era nomenklatura.
155 Interview, Murat’s ‘sister’, Bishkek, 29-Mar-08. Nookat is another rayon in Osh oblast’.
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‘Clan’ mapping
The dominant ‘meta-clan’, or ‘tribe’ if you will, in Kara-Kulja is the Adigine. If  we 
examine the now famous ‘Pre-Revolutionary ‘clan’ m ap’ by the Soviet anthropologistswe 
can see that in Kara-Kulja there is only one group and that is Adigine (Abramzon, 1963, p. 
175).
Map IV: Abamzon Pre-Revolutionary tribal division (zoomed in on Kara-Kulja)
mi Ad,9ine
* I got a electronic version o f the ‘Abramzon’ map from David Gullette.
However, when the villagers in Kara-Kulja talk about ‘clan’, using the Kyrgyz uruu, they 
are referring to the next level, i.e. the lineages stemming from Adigine. In the current 
research project I have not done a thorough ethnographic study, but I was nevertheless able 
to identify villages in the district that are dominated by one ‘clan’ or the other. These are 
rough estimates of the proportion o f ‘clans’ in Kara-Kulja. These kinship-based identities 
are very strong in Kara-Kulja. In this rural and mountainous district everyone seem to know 
their ‘clan’. During my fieldwork in Kara-Kulja, I never encountered anyone that did not 
know or anyone that hesitated to tell their ‘clan’ belonging, nor have I encountered any 
hostility towards me for asking the question.156
&.<ljalal-Abad
156 In posing the question, we always used the Kyrgyz uruu, even if  the question was posed in Russian.
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Table 77: ‘Clan’ map of Kara-Kulja
Uruu % (expert 
estim ate)
Location (dominating in a /o )
Bargy 30-50% Chalma, Kapchygai, Oi-Tal, Kyzyl-Jar, Ylai-Talaa, 
Alaiku
Boru 15-20% 1-mai v. in K-K a/o , Oi-Tal, Alaiku
Tengizbai 15-25% Bimyrza in K-K a/o
Joru 5-10% Alaiku
Mongoldor 5% Mirzake
Kytai
Sarybulak Karakochkor
Tasma 5% Jany-Talaa
The most populous local ‘clan’ in Kara-Kulja is the Bargy branch, with the Sarybargy (sub­
branch) being the biggest. In terms of political influence though they do not seem to be 
very influential. The most powerful people from Kara-Kulja come from either the 
Tengizbai or the Born ‘clan’. The villages in South-Eastern Uzgen rayon, that at times have 
been included in the Kara-Kulja electoral district, are mostly populated by Bora. Tengizbai 
is said to have dominated the district in the whole post-Soviet period.157 According to some 
they used ‘Mafia methods’, winning elections with the help of financial resources.158 There 
has been a Tengizbai MP from the district since at least 1985. Alaiku (and their Bargy) are 
said to always lose in rayon level elections.159 ‘Clans’ are said to play a big role in elections 
in the sense that one always votes for a fellow ‘clan’ member, at least according to some 
local aksakals'60 The importance of ‘clans’ is said to be diminishing in the district capital, 
while up in the mountains of Alaiku it is still strong.161 An outside observer and agitator for 
one of the candidates from Mirzake (village in neighboring Uzgen rayon) told me in an 
interview that campaigning is unnecessary in Kara-Kulja since the people are divided into
1 fOroda (‘clans’). Later in this chapter I will show that the role of ‘clans’ in terms of 
electoral behavior is overstated.
157 Interview, Nurlan, Osh, 4-Oct-07.
158 Interview, Aksakals, Kara-Kulja rayon, 21-Apr-08.
159 Interview, Anonymous, 1-Apr-07.
160 Interview, Aksakals, Kara-Kulja rayon, 21-Apr-08.
161 Interview, Bekbolotov, Kumar, Bishkek, l-Apr-08.
162 This was a completely unprovoked answer, since in my questions I had not even hinted at my interest in 
‘clan’ related issues. This just goes to show how prevalent the ‘clan discourse’ is in describing politics in 
Kyrgyzstan.
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Candidate Survey
So what do the candidates themselves say about identity issues and their campaign 
experience? Two-thirds of the interviewed candidates say it is important (or very important) 
to know your forefathers (in the jeti ata sense).163 An impressive 76% claim that they know 
all seven of their forefathers (jeti ata). Also, each of them gave a straight and immediate 
answer to the question about their uruu identity.164 But not only do they know their own 
uruu, a staggering 82% also claim to know the uruu of all the other candidates as well. 
Furthermore, three-quarters think that the voters also know this and less than 20% say that 
voters only ‘sometimes’ know this. All this confirms that candidates are quite comfortable 
in die ‘clan discourse’ and that they also think that voters are. These numbers are within a 
10-15 percent margin of the national averages for the same questions.
If we now move to voting behavior and ask candidates in Kara-Kulja if uruu plays any role 
in determining the vote, we get the following results: around 40% say that voters always 
vote for someone from their own uruu; another 40% claim that they do it only sometimes, 
and only 6% say that uruu identity does not play any role when people vote.165 If we 
contrast the candidates from Kara-Kulja with the national average we note that it largely 
corresponds, apart from the number of candidates that think uruu does not play any role 
whatsoever. While this number was 8% in the Kara-Kulja sample, the national average is 
almost 20%. This confirms that Kara-Kulja is indeed a very good case for testing the ‘clan 
politics’ hypothesis.
What more can we say about the candidates and the campaign itself? Quite predictably, the 
role of political parties was marginal since the demise of the Communist Party following 
the collapse of the Soviet Union. Two-thirds of the candidates were not a member of any 
political party at the time of the elections. Another peculiar Kyrgyz phenomenon is that of 
local elders, or aksakals. The exact translation in English is ‘white beard’ and this word is 
reserved for respected local elders. It is often alleged by local observers that elders do play
163 Jeti ata is a Kyrgyz term that means ones seven forefathers. It is culturally considered to be important to 
the Kyrgyz to know their jeti ata (ref?).
164 In Russian ‘Nazovite imya vashego uruu’.
165 The rest of the respondents did not provide any answer to this question.
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a particular role in elections, and especially so in terms of candidate selection, coordinating 
gift distribution (vote buying) etc. When asked about the influence of aksakals, 30% of the 
interviewed candidates say that they do not take part in the elections. The rest gave 
examples of them being involved as organizers and in some cases actively involved in 
candidate selection and distribution of gifts. We also specifically asked about the kind of 
persons that were more useful in the campaigning and got the following results:
Table 78: ‘Useful campaigners’ -  Candidate Survey, Kara-Kulja only
What kind of persons in your single-m em ber district (SMD) 
were m ost useful for you in your campaign?
Relatives 78.4%
Colleagues 50.3%
School Friends 36.6%
Local Authority representatives 11.1%
Political Party members 9.2%
Business friends 7.2%
* Allowing for two choices. The results are here presented in the order of importance, not in the order of the 
alternatives given (Q25).
Perhaps not surprisingly, an overwhelming majority relied on relatives in their 
campaigning. Again, this largely corresponds to the national averages. Finally, concerning 
the actual election results, a majority say that they were to a large extent falsified, but only 
6% claimed that they were completely falsified. Only one of the candidates made a formal 
complaint about falsification, demonstrating an almost complete lack of trust in the legal 
system. In terms of ideology, not a single one of the candidates identify themselves as left, 
given the left-center-right choices.
Voter Survey166
Here I examine what voters themselves say about some of the same identity issues and the 
campaigns. When asked about the importance of jeti ata an overwhelming majority of the 
respondents say that knowing your seven forefathers is either really important (35%) or
166 This is not a proper survey of voters in Kara-Kulja. The focus in the research was on political elites and I 
therefore choose to focus on candidates, not voters as such. But just to get a sense of how voters would 
answer similar questions we conducted mini-surveys in three villages in Kara-Kulja, with a questionnaire of 
15 questions. In Kara-Kulja we conducted over 50 face-to-face interviews, responses to these questionnaires. 
In terms of sampling, we chose every fourth or fifth household on the right-hand side when we entered the 
village. I had a local assistant with me who translated for me.
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only ‘important’ (57%). Interestingly, however, 40% say they do not know their jeti ata. In 
other words, it is considered by the interviewed residents to be something culturally 
important, but on an individual level not everyone is ‘up to the standards’. On the ‘clan’ 
question each of the respondents gave a name of their uruu and uruk without hesitating. 
When asked whether all voters know the uruu of all the candidates two-thirds said that, yes, 
that is always the case. But in terms of voting for someone from one’s own uruu only 48% 
say that people always vote for someone from their own uruu. One-third claim that uruu 
identity does not play any role in terms of voting behavior. This last figure is significantly 
higher than what the candidates thought would be the case. This indicates that there is an 
elite bias in the ‘clan discourse’, in the sense of candidates emphasizing these genealogical 
categories, while the voters themselves might be more interested in other issues. Or then 
voters are simply ashamed of admitting that they would always vote for someone from their 
own uruu.
When asked about the December 2007 party list elections, 40% say that there was no vote 
buying this time around, but the number of respondents that ‘do not know’ is a very high 
40%. This indicates that vote buying is a sensitive subject to discuss, especially with 
outsiders. Only two percent say that there was a lot of vote buying in December 2007, 
while four percent say that there was ‘a bit o f  vote buying. However, when asked about the 
February 2005 elections that triggered the ‘Tulip Revolution’ only 30% ‘do not know’ and 
one-third clams that there was a lot of vote buying. Either these people have been 
indoctrinated with the President Bakiev’s line about the benefits of a party list system, or 
then the 2005 elections were really dirtier in the sense of vote buying. It also seems as if 
all of the candidates in 2005 were using vote buying as a technique, at least according to 
83% of the respondents. But there does not seem to be any sanction mechanism punishing 
voters that do not vote for their patrons (the candidates giving them money), since 90% say 
that one does not need to vote for the person that one receives the money from (c.f. the 
Akaev campaign about vote buying). Finally, two-thirds think that a party list proportional 
system is better than the previously exercised SMD system.
167 A PR party-list system, was by President Bakiev said to heal the Kyrgyz politics from localism and 
tribalism. This was a position long held by the political opposition as well.
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To conclude, from both the candidate and the voter survey it is apparent that there is a 
significant fluency in terms of genealogical categories, be it aksakals, jeti ata, or uruu/uruk. 
This much is clear, but it still does not reveal much of the consequences for local politics. 
Kinship categories are thought to be one out of many considerations in determining the 
vote, but in the campaign itself the candidates often rely on relatives. Let us now turn to 
each of the legislative elections and go through them one by one, starting with the last 
Soviet era elections in the spring of 1990.168
1990 Elections
These were the first ever multi-candidate elections in Kyrgyzstan. At the time the only 
opposition came from the intelligentsia, i.e. educated professionals not working directly in 
the state bureaucracy (doctors, teachers, lawyers etc.). For the first time the people were 
free to choose among many candidates and in a few districts the ruling Communist party 
nominated candidates were defeated. However, the winning combination seems to have 
been a nomenklatura profile, with the entailing understanding of how the work the system, 
but also male gender, and local knowledge.169 The national level election outcome can be 
summarized as follows:
The election results gave the party apparatus a large and obedient majority in the 
new republic supreme soviet. Party officials, 81 in all, formed the largest single 
occupational group. All 40 raikom [district committee] first secretaries, both 
obkom [regional committee] first secretaries, and the four leading republican 
secretaries secured seats in the parliament. Ordinary workers and peasants again 
faired poorly in the more competitive elections, returning only 17% of the 
deputies. Leading personnel from government, industry and agriculture occupied 
virtually all of the remaining seats. The chairmen of collective farms and the 
directors of state farms alone accounted for 39 seats. Thus, the familiar pattern of 
parliamentary representation based on posts, and not people, was continued. The 
predominance of nomenklatura workers among republic supreme soviet deputies 
ensured that communists would assume a commanding share of the seats.
Communist party members comprised 90% of the republic deputies (Huskey 
1995: 825).
As for Kara-Kulja, four representatives were to be elected in single-member districts in this 
rayon. One of only a few competitive districts in these elections was also one of the most
168 Detailed election results are presented in the Appendix: Election Results 1995-2007.
169 C.f the electoral success of Omurbek Tekebaev, in Jalalabad in the same election. Tekebaev, the current 
chairman of Ata Meken, was back then a local school teacher that successfully challenged a nomenklatura 
candidate.
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peripheral districts up on the Chinese border in Kara-Kulja. One candidate described this as 
a revanchist moment for the local elites whose forefathers had fought against the Soviets in 
the early 20th century (c.f. the Basmachis). This district, no. 311, in Kara-Kulja proved to be 
one of the most interesting in this whole election. Abyt Ibraimov, an academic from the 
remote Alaiku areas bordering China, won the election against a high-level KGB official 
from the oblast ’ capital of Osh. Ibraimov was, in his own words, demanding democratic 
rights, including, freedom of movement (repealing the propiska system). The repressive 
nature of the Soviet state was also a target in the case of Ibraimov’s campaigning, perhaps 
not surprising since the authorities sent a KGB official from Osh to campaign against 
Ibraimov in this strategically located border area. Ibraimov won with 70 % of the votes in 
the second round with strong support from local aksakals according both to the candidate 
himself and the local elders in Alaiku.
1995 Elections
In 1995 the rayon of Kara-Kulja was covered by two single-member districts, one for each 
of the chambers in the new 105 seat parliament.
Table 79: 1995 Parliamentary Election Results in Kara-Kulja
Legislative Assembly SMD no. 25 Gulcha
Ibraimov Abyt 14,099 26.89% 29,173 56.61%
Amatov Begish 15,095 28.79% 22,363 43.39%
Abdykaparov Asanbek 6,352 12.11%
Bazarkulov Askarbek 498 0.95%
Bekeshov Tynybek 3,134 5.98%
Kalybekov Bekbolot 825 1.57%
Kasymbekov Toktosun 1,370 2.61%
Keneshbaev Abdipatan 404 0.77%
Omurzakov Mamatemin 5,632 10.74%
Osmonov Kurmanbek Ergeshovich 1,764 3.36%
Taychabarov Marip 1,288 2.46%
Cholponbaev Tokush 652 1.24%
Emilbaeva Meylikan 1,324 2.52%
Total 52,437 100.00% 51,536 100.00%
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P eo p le 's  A ssem bly  SMD no . 4 0  K ara-K ulja
Jeenbekov Sooronbai Sharipovich 5,551 21.53% 13,415 51.83%
Zhamshitov Zhanybay 6,338 24.58% 12,466 48.17%
Abduraimov Zharasul 5 ,162 20.02%
Abdykadyrov Turgunbay 163 0.63%
Aytbaev Taalaybek 209 0.81%
Aytkulov Abdykadyr 24 0.09%
Ashimbaeva Salamat 136 0.53%
Israilov Abdilashim 2,218 8.60%
Maylubashov Kochkonbay 1,872 7.26%
Toktobaev Erkindik 95 0.37%
Toktosatarov Akun 2,943 11.41%
Turdubaev Osmon 1,076 4.17%
Total 25 ,787 100.00% 25,881 100.00%
* Two-chambered parliament, one professional full-time body (Legislative Assembly) and one that only met 
occassionally (People’s Assembly).
The first round of elections in Kara-Kulja (and Alai rayon) show that the process was quite 
open and that no clear alliances and affiliations had been established.170 As so much else in 
Kyrgyzstan at this point in history everything seems to have been in a flux. The 
institutional arrangement for the elections made this instability (and the resulting volatility) 
apparent to all observers. A new bi-cameral assembly was to be elected, with a professional 
full-time upper chamber. It really seems to have been an open race where positioning, 
negotiation and coordination were tried out, but in the end the local elites decided to play it 
out among themselves at the booth.
Both the voters and the candidates already had some experience with elections and voters’ 
expectations on both the campaign and the capacities of the future MPs were highly 
inflated. This district shows that the new emerging economic elites were not yet in a 
position to challenge the established local elites, like Sooronbai Jeenbekov in Kara-Kulja in 
the lower chamber or the incumbent Abyt Ibraimov in the upper chamber. This is how the 
OSCE mission summarizes the composition of the new parliament:
170 In the 1995 legislative assembly district both Kara-Kulja rayon and Alai rayon were part of SMD no. 25.
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...the new parliament includes only six of the former deputies; the rest are a mix 
of government officials (central, regional, local), businessmen, representatives of 
the intelligentsia, and clan leaders. The single largest group (25) is engineers, 
followed by seven economists, five surgeons and five lawyers (OSCE, 1995, p.
10).
Note the use of the ‘clan’ concept, a perfect illustration of the orientalistic discourse, 
implying that ‘clans’ exist as organizations and that they have leaders that get elected to 
parliament.
2000 Elections
For the 2000 elections there were some slight changes with the introduction of a small 
proportional component of 15 seats. The SMD seats between the two chambers were 
divided up equally, largely corresponding to the rayon delineation.
Table 80: 2000 Parliamentary Election Results in Kara-Kulja
Legislative Assembly SMD no. 33 Kara-Kulja
Osmonov Kurmanbek Ergeshev 10,776 23.63% 24,462 53.35%
Turganbaev Nadyrbek 14,412 31.61% 21,313 46.48%
Parmankulov Zamirbek 8,496 18.63%
Israilov Abdilashim 7,620 16.71% -......-........
Boronbaeva Toktokan 2,918 6.40%
Ibraimov Abyt 1,330 2.92%
'against all1 47 0.10% 78 0.17%
Total 45 ,599 100.00% 45,853 100.00%
People's Assembly SMD no. 33 Kara-Kulja
Jeenbekov Sooronbai Sharipovich 30,468 65.90%
Osmonov Jolbors 15,703 33.96%
'against all' 66 0.14%
Total 46 ,237 100.00%
* The parliament was still structured as two-chambered, but this this with new district delineation.
These elections illustrate the emergence of a new younger generation of business elites that 
vie for support and influence. There were incumbents and young businessmen in both 
SMDs. In the People’s Assembly election, the lower chamber, where the incumbent 
Jeenbekov ran, the incumbency effect was clearly discemable, reducing the 
competitiveness to a meager 1.67 Effective Number o f Candidates. However, we can 
clearly see that the second candidate, Jolbors Osmonov, managed to attract a considerable 
number of votes. Actually according to Jolbors, Jeenbekov had promised him in 1995 that
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he could have the seat in 2000; a strong indication that informal deals do not necessarily 
hold.
In the Legislative Assembly race the competition was fierce and partly (perhaps) organized 
along ‘clan’ lines. In the end Kurmanbek Osmonov, who came in second in the first round, 
managed to win the seat. The most interesting thing is that an incumbent MP, Ibraimov, 
lost his seat after getting less than three percent of the vote. This is a remarkable result for 
an influential person from the biggest uruu in the district. This is here also taken as an 
indication of the oppositional mentality in theses peripheral mountainous regions of 
Kyrgyzstan. These elections also set the stage for future mobilizations, especially relevant 
considering the tragic Aksy events that were to follow in 2002. In these elections there was 
also a national party-list component (15 seats only). One of these seats went to the young 
oppositional politician from Kara-Kulja, Duyshonkul Chotonov.
2002 By-elections, October
Table 81: 2002 Parliamentary by-election Results in Kara-Kulja
People's Assembly SMD no. 33 Kara-Kulja
Sydykov Usen 18,421 48.80%
Parmankulov Zamirbek 7,450 19.74%
Osmonov Jolbors 5,383 14.26%
Dyikanbaev 3,808 10.09%
Satybaldiev 1,390 3.68%
Amanbaev 1,298 3.44%
'against all1
Total 37 ,750
* Note only the People’s Assembly seat was up for by-election.
This is one of the most interesting by-elections ever in Kyrgyzstan. By-elections were 
called for because the incumbent MP, Kurmanbek Osmonov was appointed deputy Prime 
Minister, in a reshuffle after Bakiev left his position as the Prime Minister in the aftermath 
of the Aksy tragedy.171 This can be considered a turning point in the Akaev presidency. The 
elections came six months after the Aksy events and together these two events constituted 
rallying causes for southern oppositional forces. Clearly the authority of president Akaev 
had been circumscribed and especially so in the south. The favorite in this election was a
171 See footnote 69.
former communist party official and MP, Usen Sydykov, one of the most influential 
southerners in the country. The crowds actually seized the district {rayon) state 
administration building at one point and took the rayon akim (head) hostage protesting 
falsified elections and the loss of Mr. Sydykov. In an unprecedented development they 
actually made the akim walk with tied hands all the way from Kara-Kulja to the 
neighboring rayon capital of Uzgen in front of the protest march.172 This pattern of 
demonstration was later to be repeated across the country during the ‘Tulip Revolution’ in 
the spring of 2005. However, there was no clear coordination between anti-Akaev fractions. 
This provided an opening for a young Bishkek-based businessman who was bom in Kara- 
Kulja, Mr. Parmankulov to emerge as the winner, but only after a protracted legal process 
and a second round that was postponed by more than half a year. This election illustrates 
the emergence of a new class of younger generation businessmen, a category that would go 
on to play a key role in the 2005 elections.
2005 Elections
Table 82: 2005 Parliamentary Election Results in Kara-Kulja
SMD no. 36 Kara-Kulja
Jeenbekov Sooronbai 11,962 52.61%  1
Chotonov Duyshonkul 5,942 26.13%
Parmankulov Zamirbek 4,239 18.64%
Bozhonov Zamirbek 531 2.34%
'against all' 62 0.27%
Total 22 ,736 i
* A unicameral parliament with 75 SMD seats.
A very interesting election that also played into the larger post-electoral ‘revolutionary’ 
dynamic that eventually led to the overthrow of president Akaev. The incumbent MP, 
Jeenbekov secured re-election already in the first round. However, due to discontent and 
allegations of fraud the other candidates mobilized their (horizontal) networks to 
demonstrations in the Oblast capital of Osh. Two of the losing candidates were incumbents, 
Chotonov and Parmankulov. The discontent they felt after losing is understandable, as is 
their interest in challenging the results.
172 Interview, Baisalov, Lysekil, Oct-08.
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The organization of protesters in Kara-Kulja is a case study in community 
networks that become politicized by external events. After Chotonov lost in the 
first round with 20% of the vote to pro-govemment candidate Sooronbai 
Jeenbekov (no relation to Jalalabad’s Jeenbekov), Chotonov and two of his 
campaign organizers, who later became members of the coordinating 
committee—and then deputy governors of Osh—began plotting in Kara-Kulja.
They utilized Chotonov’s mobile group (mobil’naya gruppa) of 20-30 campaign 
activists, which had done most of the legwork during the campaign. Chotonov 
and his aides coordinated from the center of the district while the mobile group 
worked in villages, some separated by up to 100 kilometers. On February 28, the 
mobile group went door-to-door and made phone calls to mobilize people for a 
protest at Kara-kulja’s courthouse on March 2. In all, 217 were recruited to 
protest on behalf of Chotonov, more than half of them from the district’s center 
Alaiku, and most of those from Koch-ati village, where Chotonov was bom and
his family lives—a small but committed portion of the total population. After 
protesters had gathered, the remainder of the election committee returned and 
reconstituted as the leadership of the movement. After losing their case, they 
decided to appeal to higher authorities—and began marching toward Osh 
(Radnitz, 2006a, p. 168).
The February 2005 elections clearly prove a lack of ‘clan’ coordination in Kara-Kulja. 
There were two candidates from the Bora ‘clan’ and two from Tengizbai. The majority
Bargy ‘clan’ did not even field any candidates in this race. If Bora had been able to
coordinate their behavior they might have stood a chance, but now since there were two 
candidates they conveniently split the votes between each other. Also, the Tengizbai 
challenger, the young journalist, did not seem to be intimidated by the presence of a MP 
from his own ‘clan’. This goes to show that ‘clan dynamic’ cannot explain politics on a 
district level. There simply are not any effective sanction mechanisms for ‘clans’ to use.
2 0 0 7  B y -e le c tio n s ,  S e p te m b e r
Table 83: 2007 Parliamentary by-election Results in Kara-Kulja
Abdiev Kurmantay 9,024 44.10%
Aydarov Kerim 1,375 6.72%
Osmonov Kamchybek 4 ,442 21.71%
Chotonov Duyshonkul 5,623 27.48%
'against all1
Total 20 ,464
When the incumbent, Jeenbekov, became minister in the Atambaev cabinet in April 2007, 
following the large-scale demonstrations in the winter of 2006/07, the seat freed up and 
new elections were scheduled for September 2007. It was clear that these elections would 
be a preparatory stage for the upcoming parliamentary elections (that had not yet been 
scheduled). The vote shares for each candidate pretty much correspond to the ‘clan’
180
proportions in the district. The turnout figures are believed to be heavily inflated, but the 
proportion of votes were kept the same!173
These were very competitive elections, like most of the post-independence elections in this 
district. The race was open for alternative elites to participate and the intensity of the 
campaigning was not even diminished by the knowledge that there might not be a second 
round if the president decides to call early general elections.174 It does not make sense to 
put so much effort into a campaign without a clear agenda or idea about the purpose. The 
winner of the first round, Kurmantai Abdiev, perhaps thought that by getting elected in the 
first round he would be in a good position to secure a nomination on a party ticket later in 
the fall, if early party-list elections were to be called. In this he did not succeed, but his son- 
in-law later managed to get nominated as number 15 on Bakiev’s Ak Zhol party list in the 
December 2007 PR elections. Chotonov’s ambition on the other hand was clear in that he, 
as the vice-chair of Ata-Meken, was preparing for the upcoming electoral cycle, just like 
they did in another by-elections in Balykchy, the same fall. The same might be said about 
Kamchibek Osmonov who was supposed to run on the Asaba party in these by-elections, 
but later got cold feet, most likely due to government pressure. And finally we got, 
Kerimbek Aidarov, the young journalist that managed to get almost seven percent of the 
votes in his first ever attempt in his home region. In sum, it seems as if the SMD by- 
election in September 2007 was both a platform for future electoral struggles, but also a 
final last glimpse of the workings of a majoritarian system in Kyrgyzstan.
173 Interview, Azamat and Bekbolotov, Bishkek, 10-Dec-07.
174 At the time however most people were convinced that the sitting parliament would serve its full term (until 
2010).
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2007 Party-list Elections, December
Table 84: 2007 Parliamentary Election (PR system) Results in Kara-Kulja rayon
Kara-Kulja rayon__________________________________________
Ak Zhol 34 ,024 87.06%
Ata Meken 1,873 4.79%
Communist Party 1,309 3.35%
Others 1,873 4.79%
Total 39 ,079
* Note: Only the rayon level results for Ak Zhol and CP have been obtained. We have estimated the results 
for Ata Meken and all other parties, by dividing up the rest of the votes equally between these two categories.
The consolidation of president Bakiev’s power over the regions, and especially in the south 
is well illustrated by the case of Kara-Kulja in December 2007. These elections were the 
first ones to be organized using a party-list proportional system, a major institutional 
change from the previous single-member district majoritarian system. At the end of the day, 
the pro-presidential party, Ak Zhol, did not have any problems delivering Kara-Kulja, even 
though there were no high profile candidates from this particular region on their party list. 
There were only a few pockets of resistance left in this district, mainly in the home region 
of the vice-chair of the main oppositional party Ata Meken.
Another interesting development was the election of Asylbek Jeenbekov, from the quasi- 
oppositional Social Democratic Party (SDPK). He chose SDPK out of loyalty to his brother 
and the then sitting PM Atambaev (also a fellow businessman). The Jeenbekov family has 
treaded a fine line throughout the history of independent Kyrgyzstan. As a matter of fact, an 
immediate family member has been a MP since 1985 (if we include Saip Kokoev).175 Their 
power seems to have been cemented in the district, in that no matter what regime there is in 
Bishkek they always get elected. Is it because Bishkek does not control the district or is it 
because the Jeenbekov’s are appeasing the center? There was also another candidate from 
Kara-Kulja worth mentioning, Kerim Aidarov, who also ran in the September 2007 by- 
elections. He tried to register his candidacy for the Taza-Koom party, but the CEC denied 
the party their registration.
175 Saip Kokoev first marriage was to Sharip Jeenbekov’s wife’s sister.
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Discussion o f Competitiveness
From the short overview of each parliamentary election it seems obvious that there are 
much more at play than simply politically mobilized kinship groups. Here I outline the 
implications of my study by addressing four pertinent questions about local level electoral 
dynamics in Kyrgyzstan.
1. Why were so many rural districts competitive?
Constituencies were competitive, first of all, because the central authorities did not exercise
1 nf%complete control over all districts in Kyrgyzstan in the first place. This was partly the 
outcome of a conscious decision to decentralize a lot of authority in the 1990s. Secondly, 
because any possible coordination and control mechanisms that could have hampered 
competition had broken down, if there ever were any such mechanisms. It seems as if 
neither the President nor the ‘clan elders’ were in complete control over the processes in 
this transitional period when democratic institutions were first introduced.177 Since none of 
the local elites could consolidate power and secure representation by informal pre-electoral 
coordination mechanisms they allowed for elections to play that role. Elections were not 
competitive in order to please the international community, but rather to please different 
segments of the local elites. Elections provided an opportunity for the elites (both local and 
national) to advance their interests in an otherwise economically and socially deteriorating 
environment. There were a lot of procedural problems with the electoral process, but in 
SMDs where there were candidates strong enough to defend their votes, in the sense of 
forcing polling station officials to count their votes, it contributed to the competitiveness.178
City districts were less competitive because administrative resources were more readily 
available there, in the form of large public sector and state affiliated institutions, like
176 This largely corresponds to the argument put forward in a forthcoming book by Levitsky and Way 
‘Competitive Authoritarianism’ (forthcoming), chapter two: ‘...regime outcomes also hinge on incumbents’ 
capacity to resist opposition challenges. Autocratic governments vary considerably in their ability to control 
civil society, co-opt or divide oppositions, repress protest, and steal elections’.
177 Here I am not suggesting that there is such a thing as elders representing a particular ‘clan’, I am only 
addressing the assumptions in the ‘clan politics’ literature (see section on ‘Clans’ in Kyrgyzstan).
178 More on the procedural problems with elections in Kyrgyzstan see OSCE/Odihr, National Democratic 
Institute (NDI), International Republican Institute (IRI), International Federation for Electoral Systemt 
(EFES), and Koalitsia (local NGO) election observation reports.
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schools and universities. There were also a few urban cases of very rich businessmen that 
just by their sheer popularity, wealth, and active discouragement deterred people from 
challenging them. In competitive rural districts, there is furthermore an element of 
impatience on the behalf of the voters, in the sense that disappointment in the 
socioeconomic development was directed towards the incumbent MPs. Both voters and 
candidates express a frustration with the performance of parliamentarians and this can be 
considered an emerging pattern of democratic accountability. People simply have too high 
expectations on the capacity of the government, and its institutions, to deliver benefits. This 
dynamic might be more prevalent in rural areas since the withdrawal of the all- 
encompassing Soviet state apparatus was more directly felt here than in urban areas. This 
constant resentment translates into a demand for alternative candidates.
2. Why do not ‘clans’ coordinate among themselves in order to secure representation?
This is one of the most challenging puzzles when it comes to local level electoral dynamics 
in Kyrgyzstan. In the literature ‘clans’ are considered to be the most salient cleavage and 
the organizing principle of political battles (Collins, 2006). However, examined on a local 
level another picture emerges. ‘Clans’, in the sense of Kyrgyz uruu do not exist as 
corporate groups anymore, if they ever did. An uruu identity with its ensuing genealogical 
narrative does not mean that it exists as an organization with a hierarchical structure and 
enforceable capacities. The fact that the biggest ‘clan’ in Kara-Kulja, the Bargy, was not 
able to get anyone elected in the 2000, 2002, 2005 or 2007 elections show that other forces 
than ‘clans’ are at play. A group with around 30-50 % of the rayon population can be 
assumed to leverage a certain influence, but somehow the smaller Tengizbai ‘clan’ came to 
dominate politics in the rayon.
Yet, there might have been attempts to ‘coordinate’ between different ‘clan elders’, but 
since their influence was mostly of ceremonial nature they were unable to monopolize the 
candidate selection procedure. This is clearly shown by the fact that in 2005 there were two 
candidates from each of the strong ‘clans’ in the district. If these kinship groups had been 
able to enforce a decision of uniting behind a fellow ‘clan’ member, or forcing the lesser of 
the two to step down, it might have altered the election outcome. So it seems clear that 
‘clans’, even in times of heightened political battles, are anything but united actors with a 
clearly defined agenda. Talk about ‘clans’ and forefathers is a crucial part of the self­
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perception of most Kyrgyz and this narrative is especially strong in some of the rural 
districts, but ‘clan’ affiliation is only one of many factors that influence electoral outcomes 
and in most electoral districts, except for a few mono-ethnic rural districts, it probably does 
not have any effect at all.
3. Why do incumbent MPs lose in an otherwise semi-authoritarian setting?
One hypothesis is that incumbents lost due to falling out of favor with the central 
authorities, a replacement sanctioned from the top in other words. This might be the case in 
many other semi-authoritarian settings, but this argument implies that the state is capable of 
delivering a certain election result. The most likely scenario in the case of Kyrgyzstan 
seems to be weak performance of incumbents and consecutive punishment by the voters 
and local elites. Both voters and fellow candidates confirm this in the case of Kara-Kulja. 
The relative open political climate allowed for local elites to exploit the weakness of the 
incumbents. The empowered citizenry was ‘shopping around’ in times of elections, 
receiving gifts and financial support, from several different candidates. The economic 
reforms (privatization etc.) in 1990’s created a new class of entrepreneurs that vied for the 
support of the voters. If the incumbent was seen as aloof and too closely associated with an 
unpopular president they were up for a tough fight at the polls.179
4. Why did so many candidates run even though they knew they would lose?
This is an interesting phenomenon contributing to the competitiveness of elections in 
Kyrgyzstan. The reason is probably a combination of conscious strategy on the part of 
different groupings to divert attention from other candidates and hubris on the part of 
candidates themselves. Either these candidates were fa$ade candidates or then they simply 
imagined that they could make it to a second round and that the stacks would be re­
organized in the second round allowing for them to win. The fa?ade candidates can either 
be someone running in order to secure benefits from other more prominent candidates. For 
instance a local school might want to nominate their head teacher in order to secure benefits 
from a winning candidate.180 Or, a leading candidate could put them on the ballot in order
179 Here we are referring to Abyt Ibraimov, the incumbent in the 2000 elections that got only 2.3 percent of 
the votes in the first round and who’s brother was President Akaev’s state secretary.
180180 Note untii the December 2007 elections worker’s collectives had a right to nominate candidates.
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to take votes of opponents. There are also those who ran out of a sense of loyalty to their 
most immediate constituencies, in several cases being asked by aksakals from their own 
village to run.181
Chapter 6 Conclusions
This chapter shows that there is no such informal institution as ‘clan politics’ in 
Kyrgyzstan. ‘Clans’ in the sense of uruu and uruk do exist as categories, but their function, 
if any, is more related to life-cycle celebrations and rituals, like weddings and funerals. 
There is no ‘regularized pattern of interaction’ that restrains candidates or voters, as a rigid 
definition of an informal institution would require (O'Donnell, 1996, p. 35). The district 
covered in this chapter, Kara-Kulja, is not representative of a typical district in Kyrgyzstan, 
on the contrary it is an atypical district that was selected as a critical case for falsifying the 
‘clan politics’ hypothesis. If politics is not dominated by ‘clans’ in Kara-Kulja it probably 
is not dominated by ‘clans’ anywhere else in Kyrgyzstan either. That is, if I narrowly define 
a ‘clan’ as a kinship-based social unit that possesses agency characteristics. I therefore 
suggest that we stop using the concept of ‘clan’ when describing politics in Kyrgyzstan and 
the rest of Central Asia. Since the corresponding Kyrgyz concepts uruu/uruk do indeed 
have a very unique emic meaning it seems somewhat misleading to stretch the concept to 
cover all sorts of informal and often
181 Interview. Date?
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this dissertation I have illustrated how electoral campaigns are fought in a country where 
allegedly ‘clans’ are playing a central role. The research questions, as outlined in chapter 
two concerned explanations of electoral competition and more specifically the explanatory 
power of the ‘clan hypothesis’ for district level patterns of competition. Through an 
analysis of local (district) level dynamics and with a special focus on local level ‘kinship’ 
identities I have attempted to shed some light on the dynamics of formal and informal 
institutions in an impoverished former Soviet Republic. I have no illusions about the limits 
of my understanding of this very complex phenomenon. As a matter of fact many locals 
also admit to being confused about the nature of ‘clan’. In this concluding section I will 
summarize my findings and speculate about possible future avenues for research.
Elections and Identity politics in Kyrgyzstan
As was shown in the two preceding chapters several of the conditions for ‘clan politics’ to 
be present were indeed present in the time period covered.182 The first conditions were all 
about the ‘existence’ of ‘clans’ in reality, i.e. whether both candidates and voters were 
fluent in the genealogical discourse about ‘clans’. The tougher conditions included vote 
shares of a candidate from a particular ‘clan’ having to be on par with the proportion of 
voting age fellow ‘clan’ members. Again, the conditions that I outlined prior to conducting 
fieldwork were not intended to imply that there actually was such a candidate in the last 
few elections in Kyrgyzstan. This was only used as a benchmark for identifying critical 
cases to test the ‘clan politics’ hypothesis.
The un-weighted results of the candidate survey illustrate several key things about politics 
and identity in post-independence Kyrgyzstan.183 For one, ‘clan’ identities are strong and 
this is by some candidates believed to have straightforward implications for voting 
behavior. However, a majority of the respondents say that ‘clans’ should not play any role
182 Conditions outlined in chapter two, section ‘Studying ‘clans’ and clientelism’.
183 Remember the rural bias in the candidate survey. For more information see table Table 87 in the 
Methodology appendix.
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in politics, that it is a purely historical identity phenomena with no place in a modem 
democratic Kyrgyzstan. Furthermore, candidates in rural districts are acutely aware of the 
number of fellow uruu members, the size of the ‘clan’ so to speak, with more than 85% 
responding to the question about the uruu proportions in their district. But the implications 
of strong ‘clan’ identification for voting behavior remain a puzzle. Voting for someone 
from one’s own village or town is hardly a unique Kyrgyz phenomenon. This kind of 
electoral localism is seen all over the world. So the question really becomes: what exactly 
does the ‘clan’ component determine in an election and what is the role of locality? In the 
case of Kyrgyzstan it is clear that there is no such thing as a ‘clan’ that actually does things, 
i.e. coordinated action among ‘clan’ members. At most, it is a symbolic reality, an 
imagined community if you will. Political entrepreneurs gladly utilize the ‘clan’ language 
in describing their candidacy, but this does not mean that there actually are sanction 
mechanisms at hand for ‘clan elders’ to enforce decisions on candidate selection or voting. 
This is not to say that ‘clans’ do not exist as culturally important categories and that life­
cycle rituals are at times organized around these kinship units.
I here cast in doubt whether ‘clans’ even are informal institutions. Based on my findings it 
seems as if there is no ‘regularized pattern of interaction’ that restrains candidates or voters, 
as a rigid definition of an informal institution would require (O'Donnell, 1996, p. 35). Note 
that if politics is not dominated by ’clans’ in Kara-Kulja, my selected critical case, it 
probably is not dominated by ‘clans’ anywhere else in Kyrgyzstan either, or Central Asia 
for that matter. That is, if I narrowly define a ‘clan’ as a kinship-based social unit that 
possesses agency characteristics. I therefore suggest that we stop using the concept of ‘clan’ 
when describing politics in Kyrgyzstan and the rest of Central Asia. Since the 
corresponding Kyrgyz concepts uruu/uruk do indeed have a very unique emic meaning it 
seems somewhat misleading to stretch the concept to cover all sorts of informal and often 
criminal behavior, like corruption.
It has here been illustrated that ‘clans’ are indeed discursively present in times of 
heightened political battles (elections). The question in the Kyrgyz case is: under what 
condition does an emic category like uruu become a ‘klan’, as in a politicized kinship
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group?184 Relying on ‘clans’ as a key component in the new identity project in post-Soviet 
Kyrgyzstan was an intentional strategy deployed by the Akaev administration (Gullette, 
2006a). In an ironic twist, ‘clans’ replaced the communist party, as something that you had 
to pay lip service to. A ‘new conformism’ developed, partly as a result of the ideological 
confusion in this transitional period.185 This new conformist narrative was especially strong 
in rural areas. But the fractionalizing nature of the single-member district (SMD) system 
also contributed to the persistent focus on ‘clans’. There were no incentives for political 
entrepreneurs to reach beyond their district in their campaigning. The majoritarian SMD 
system in Kyrgyzstan allowed for localized identity formations to be exploited in election 
campaigns. The switch to a nation-wide party list system in late 2007 ended all of this, 
turning the contest more into a question about trust in authorities and oppositional 
mentalities, not kinship categories.
Competitiveness in Kyrgyzstan
Since the first multi-candidate elections introduced during Soviet era, in 1990, there has 
been, on average, a fairly high number of candidates challenging each available seat in 
Kyrgyzstan. Exceptionally high as a matter of fact, considering that I am talking about a 
regime that can at best be classified as Partly Free. The perception of competitiveness on a 
district level has been persistently high with on average 83% rating the election as either 
‘very’ or ‘somewhat’ competitive. It is interesting to note that perceptions of 
competitiveness do not correlate with international ratings of the electoral process. Freedom 
House lowered the Electoral Process score for Kyrgyzstan in the wake of the 2000 election, 
but the perceived level of high competition was 93% for that year. This just goes to show 
that the international community is obsessed with high-profile national level politicians, 
like Felix Kulov or Danyar Usenov in the 2000 elections, and failed to recognize local level 
dynamics outside of these heavily exposed SMDs. Furthermore, when asked to compare 
levels of competition with the previous election in the same district there is also a fairly 
stable majority that rates the elections as becoming more and more competitive for each 
time. When asked to explain high levels of competition candidates simply say that there are 
many strong candidates with the campaign experience, networks, and the resources needed
184 Note the Russian spelling of ‘clan’ with the letter k.
185 The concept of ‘New Conformism’ was suggested by my supervisor, Prof. James Hughes at LSE.
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to put up a fight. However, as already noted high levels of competition does not mean that 
it was a fair battle. As a matter of fact the level of falsification on Election Day has been 
persistently high. In terms of trends over time there are nevertheless some interesting 
patterns. The perception of falsification is going down over time, with the 2005 elections 
being the first time ever a majority does not rate the elections as having been ‘completely’ 
or ‘somewhat’ falsified. This all probably has changed since then, due to the parliamentary 
elections in December 2007 that were considered as sub-standard (OSCE, 2008).
Parliamentary elections in Kyrgyzstan were competitive because central authorities were 
not capable of fully controlling all electoral districts. Part of the story is that central 
authorities simply neglected some rural districts, i.e. they decided not to control these 
districts. However, the ‘Tulip Revolution’ in 2005 clearly illustrated the danger with this 
strategy, since a lot of the revolutionary mobilization started in these peripheral districts. 
This tells us something about the evolving state-society relationship in this newly 
independent country. The state’s capacity was limited and different social actors were 
empowered through both economic (privatization) and political (democratization) reforms 
introduced in the 1990s. The state was weak and societal actors grew stronger, at least in 
the sense of increasing the room for maneuver outside the realm of the state. This was 
quickly picked up by political entrepreneurs. Politics in Kyrgyzstan since independence in 
1991 has been characterized by negotiations about institutions, shifting loyalties and 
balances of power, and a general sense of loss of direction. New actors entered the scene 
and old ones were marginalized, or found new roles. This is the context where elections in 
Kyrgyzstan became surprisingly competitive, a trend that was reversed in the December 
2007 elections. Only time will tell if the era of competitive elections is over in what was 
formerly known as the ‘Island of Democracy’.
Political elites in Kyrgyzstan
Some elements of the old communist nomenklatura were able to transfer their pre­
independence influence into post-independence power, but there was an abundance of 
challengers. For local elites, running for a seat in the parliament became something of an 
obligatory ‘game’ where a plethora of players bet a lot of resources on the prospects of 
winning a seat. I can only speculate about the motivational factors of these political 
entrepreneurs, but it is well known that the rewards, if a seat was secured, were good in
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terms of both protecting existing resources, by gaining immunity, but also by opening up 
new avenues for amassing more wealth and influence. Much of the competition was 
organized, in terms of positioning, around views of the incumbent President and his 
administration. The weak capacity of the central authorities, both in terms of coercive 
capacity (stick), but also financial incentives (carrot), seems to be a condition for this 
dynamic to work. Also, the question about the role of new economic elites seems to be of 
central importance. The transition process in Kyrgyzstan produced an open elite structure. I 
tested the hypothesis that the role of business elites over time has increased and found that 
some rich businessmen are indeed outperforming other candidate categories. But there were 
also many petty businessmen that participated in the elections and more often than not with 
meager results.
Election campaigns since the last Soviet era elections contained a lot of dirty tricks 
including vote buying and the use of administrative resources. However, since almost 
everyone was using these techniques the field strangely leveled. Furthermore there seems to 
be a resigned acceptance among candidates of the fact that elections in Kyrgyzstan contain 
irregularities. Also, the party system was extremely weak and the explanation is partly 
found in the institutional incentives with tough requirements on party nominations, while 
almost none on self-nominated candidates. Even though this might seem like a un-intended 
systematic glitch there is evidence that the authorities tried to undermine the creation of a 
new strong party system (Jones Luong, 2002).
Implications for further study
If the ‘clan politics’ hypothesis is insufficient, and perhaps even misleading, in describing 
electoral politics in Kyrgyzstan, then what explains extreme levels of vote dispersion (high 
competition)? Competition is clearly not explained by any of the standard explanations 
found in the democratization literature. As I have already noted we need to take both social 
forces and cleavages, but also the nature of the State into consideration. The Kyrgyz State 
in the transition period was challenged from many directions, both from neighboring states, 
but also, perhaps more importantly from sub-national forces. State institutions were 
disorganized and incapable of forcing its will on the territory of this newly independent 
state. Explaining the emergence of ‘pockets of electoral competition’ might be as simple as 
central authorities simply not being capable of fully controlling local level forces. Part of
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the story is that central authorities simply neglected some rural districts, i.e. they decided 
not to assert their control of these districts. However, the ‘Tulip Revolution’ in 2005 clearly 
illustrated the danger with this strategy, since a lot of the revolutionary mobilization started 
in these peripheral districts.
Persistently high levels of competition in Kyrgyzstan in the period covered, 1995-2005, 
could also be due to a path dependency logic. The first elections in 1995, the ones that were 
arguably very competitive and provided many local elites with opportunities to test their 
strengths, can be considered as establishing a path that Kyrgyzstan has thereafter been 
following. This largely follows the work on the effects of elections on the ensuing regime 
type in other parts of the world (Lindberg, 2006). It might be as simple as elections, once 
held, do indeed lead to more competitive regimes. However, the case of Kyrgyzstan and the 
authoritarian consolidation under the current leadership challenges this theory. On the other 
hand one could argue that the increasing authoritarianism that we are now observing is only 
a temporary one and that soon enough elections in Kyrgyzstan will be competitive again.
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Appendix I -  Methodology: Candidate Survey Kyrgyzstan
The baseline unit of analysis in this research project is individual candidates. The selection 
of our sample of candidates was done through a selection of Single-Member Districts 
(SMD) in the February 2005 Parliamentary Elections in Kyrgyzstan. The selection was 
done in two phases: 1) random selection and 2) purposeful addition of SMDs of particular 
interest. The population is all candidates that officially registered to run in parliamentary 
elections in Kyrgyzstan. In addition we decided to back-track and interview candidates in 
the same region for earlier elections as well, in 2000 and 1995.
A total of 160 candidate interviews were conducted, a third by the PhD candidate himself 
and the rest by local assistants. All the interviews were conducted in the spring/summer of 
2008. Roughly half of the conducted interviews focused on the 2005 elections and the other 
half focused on the two previous electoral cycles (1995 and 2000)
Questionnaire
A structured questionnaire was constructed partly based on previous experience of similar 
surveys conducted by Professor James Hughes (J. Hughes, 1997). The questionnaire 
contained 41 questions of which 15 were open-ended and 26 were multiple choice type 
questions. There were also two additional ‘commentary’ type questions where the 
interviewer noted the respondent’s attitude to the ‘clan’ identity questions and other 
comments. The questionnaire was prepared together with a local polling agency, Siar- 
Bishkek, a leading agency that has worked with the World Bank, UNDP, and NDI. The 
interview was conducted in Russian or Kyrgyz. The PhD candidate coordinated all the 
interviews. All the interviews were conducted face-to-face and the duration of the 
interviews was 50-70 minutes on average.
Table 85: Collectors (Interviewers)
Collector Name
Number of 
Responses Oblast' Affiliation
Iliyas 21 Talas 8t Bishkek Research Assistant
Jenishbek 9 Issyk-Kul (Balykchy) Siar-Bishkek
Turat 8 Naryn Siar-Bishkek
Azat 4 Issyk-Kul Siar-Bishkek
Munojat186 62 Osh 8i Batken Siar-Bishkek
Fredrik Sjoberg 56 Whole country
Total 160
Getting the candidates to agree to an interview was not always easy. This is partly due to 
the intensifying political intimidation in 2007/08. Furthermore some of the questions asked
186 Several collectors, but coordinated by Munozhat.
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were of a sensitive nature, e.g. questions about ‘clan politics’, that fore some people have 
connotations of political corruption and the like.
Sample
In order to get a regionally representative sample of SMDs we, as a first step, generated a 
region stratified random sample. There are nine administrative regions (<oblast *) or cities 
with ‘region’ status in Kyrgyzstan. The sample was structured in the following way: 1) 
First we randomly selected SMDs one at a time separately in all nine oblast' (regions) of 
Kyrgyzstan. This was done until we had reached 50 percent of all the Single-Member 
District (SMD) in a particular oblast \  The total number of SMDs in the 2005 elections was 
75. In this first phase we selected 40 SMDs.187 2) Secondly, we also added four of the most 
competitive, four of the least competitive, and one ‘clan prone’ SMD (in line with the 
hypothesis testing outlined in the research design).
A total number of 49 SMDs were thus selected. In consultation with local stakeholders, 
some of these SMDs were deemed to be very difficult to conduct interviews in.188 In the 
selected SMDs there were a total of 389 candidates if we count the final number of 
candidates as reported in the CEC results publication (Tsentralnaya Komissia, 2006). 
However, in two of the SMDs with only one candidate we decided to include one of the 
withdrawn candidates as well in order to get a better picture of the district. Furthermore, in 
the selected SMDs we decided to include all the by-elections that had been organized in the 
period 1995-2007.
Table 86: Total Number of conducted interviews per Election Year
E-Year Frequency
Percent
(%)
1990 1 0 .6
1995 36 22 .5
2000 33 2 0 .6
2002 1 0.6
2005 73 4 5 .6
2006 7 4 .4
2007 9 5.6
Total 160 100.0
All in all we conducted 73 interviews with candidates from the February 2005 elections, 
which constitutes 20% of the total number of candidates running that year. In the next table 
(following page) we can see that relatively few interviews were conducted in Bishkek and 
the region surrounding the capital, Chui oblast ’. The reason for this is simply the urban and
187 In cases where the number of SMDs per oblast’ was uneven we selected at least 50%, i.e. in Talas there 
were three SMDs and we selected two of them.
188 For instance the SMD of the former President’s son, Aidar Akaev, or the current President’s, Bakiev’s, 
district (SMD).
194
multiethnic nature of these regions, and especially the Slavic (Russian) influence in these 
parts of the country. In this research project the focus is on rural and non-Slavic dynamics 
and we therefore did not fully pursue the interviews in Bishkek and Chui. There is therefore
1 O Q
a rural bias in the sample, with almost 90% of the interviews were from rural areas.
Since the ambition in this research project is to say something about the development over 
time we decided to conduct interviews in a purposefully selected set of SMDs for the 
previous elections as well (1995 and 2000). As already noted we also added interviews for 
by-elections in the selected sample of SMDs. Furthermore, some of these candidates had 
been running in previous elections as well, but each interview nevertheless focused 
exclusively on only one election.190 In total we conducted 83 back-track interviews (36 
focusing on 1995, 33 on 2000, and 17 by-election), i.e. interviews with candidates in SMDs 
that had already been included in the 2005 sample. Here the rural bias is even more 
prevalent (see next table). If we examine the final column of the table we see the proportion 
of the total number of conducted interviews related to the size of the oblast'. Here we see 
that in six out of nine oblast’ we conducted interviews with around 0.01% of the total 
number of voters in the region. In only two of the oblast ’ do we have significantly lower 
numbers, Bishkek and Chui, where that number is 0.001%.
Table 87: Sample characteristics
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Bishkek 355,412 11 8 73% 54 47 87% 5 11% 9% 0 1.4%
Batken 214,132 6 5 83% 34 28 82% 10 36% 29% 11 9.8%
Jalalabad 494,427 14 8 57% 76 41 54% 10 24% 13% 6 3.2%
Naryn 147,549 4 3 75% 22 15 68% 5 33% 23% 9 9.5%
Osh City 133,689 4 3 75% 13 10 77% 5 50% 38% 4 6.7%
Osh 536,832 14 8 57% 74 46 62% 24 52% 32% 33 10.6%
Talas 113,712 3 2 67% 18 12 67% 6 50% 33% 5 9.7%
Chui 429,759 12 6 50% 59 28 47% 5 18% 8% 0 1.2%
Issyk- 231,741 7 6 86% 41 36 88% 7 19% 17% 15 9.5%
Kul
Total 2,657,253 75 49 391 263 77 83
Avg 69% 70% 33% 23% 7%
189 This in a country where 60% are rural (World Development Indicators, World Bank).
190 In some of the interviews conducted by the PhD Candidate we also generated responses on several 
elections but the number of interviews conducted remained the same (even if the number of interviews in 
terms of data surged).
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* Including withdrawn candidates from SMD no. 16 and 45 ** 1995, 2000, and all the by-election candidates 
*** As a proportion of voters in 1000s.
In addition we also conducted a couple of interviews with candidates from the 1990 
elections for a case study on a rural district (Kara-Kulja). Note that if we were to consider 
each time the respondent’s took part in an election as the as a case in itself, we would have 
a 75% higher sample, a total of 282. As already noted, in some cases the interviewer was 
able to focus on several years in one and the same interview.
Table 88: Number of elections participated in (Candidate survey Sample)
Here we focus on the X elections, but have 
in another parliamentary election? If so, w
you ever ran 
hat years?
Answer Options
Response
Percent
Response
Count
1990 8.80% 14
1995 41.90% 67
2000 40.60% 65
2005 55.00% 88
2007 (PR) 15.60% 25
Other (by-elections) 14.40% 23
answered 160
Total 282
Avg 1.76
* (Q2).
Again, as a rule each interview focused exclusively on only one election. But from the table 
above we can see that each of the sampled candidates took part in 1.8 elections on average, 
either before or after the election that we are here focusing on (year X). The conducted 
interviews are not only skewed in the sense of over-representing rural districts, but there is 
also an ethnic bias in the sample. In reality the population of Kyrgyzstan consists of Kyrgyz 
64.9%, Uzbek 13.8%, Russian 12.5%, Dungan 1.1%, Ukrainian 1%, Uygur 1%, other 5.7% 
(1999 census). In the table below we see the nationality of the sample as reported by the 
candidates themselves:
Table 89: Nationality of the Candidate sample
Total
2005 2000 1995
Answer Options
Response
Percent
Response
Count
Kyrgyz 91% 146 87% 68 94% 31 94% 33
Uzbek 7% 11 10% 8 6% 2 3% 1
Russian 1% 1 0% 0 0% 0 3% 1
Other192 2% 2 1% 1 0% 0 0% 0
answered 160 78 33 35
* (Q7: What is your nationality?).
191 One Tajik and one Korean.
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Here we can see that the sample used in this survey clearly over-represents the Kyrgyz. So 
how representative is the sample in terms of gender?
Table 90: Gender sample distribution
Total
2 0 0 5 2 0 0 0 1 9 9 5Answer
Options
Response
Percent
Response
Count
Female 87% 139 15% 11 6% 2 8% 3
Male 13% 21 85% 62 94% 32 92% 33
Total 160 73 34 36
For the 2005 elections the population distribution on in terms of gender was 90% male and 
10% female. From the table we can see that our sample slightly over-represents female 
candidates in 2005. On the other hand in the 2000 and 1995 sample the number of 
interviewed females is substantially lower which means that the total sample (1995-2005) 
roughly reflects the population distribution (i.e. the total number of candidates).
Coding/Editing/Analyzing
Local assistants entered the data from the interviews directly into an Internet based 
database allowing for continuous (real time) checks by the PhD candidate. A first analysis 
of the data was printed out from the database. The complete data was later transferred into a 
SPSS file.
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